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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
University of Central Oklahoma 
Edmond, Oklahoma 
NAME: Jason T. Harris 
TITLE OF THESIS: Combat, Supply, and the Influence of Logistics During the 
Civil War in Indian Territory 
DIRECTOR OF THESIS: Dr. Stanley Adamiak 
PAGES: 169 
ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship of combat, 
supply, and the influence of logistics during the war in Indian Territory.  This thesis 
examines the war in detail, particularly the role and importance of supplies.  In almost 
every instance, provisions were a driving force for engagements within the territory.  
This study draws upon vast collections of primary sources, including letters, diaries, 
and official reports.  This work also employs secondary sources to add to the 
interpretation and develop the historiography and necessary background.  Each 
chapter explores a significant period in the conflict.  It chronicles the events, from the 
withdrawal of federal troops in 1861 through the end of hostilities in 1865.  The 
federal command learned valuable lessons during the first two years of the war.  
Besides ineffective leadership, the inability of the army to supply Union troops led to 
an eventual mutiny even after successfully defeating enemy forces in the field.  By 
late summer 1863, federal commanders reentered Indian Territory and occupied Fort 
Gibson and Fort Smith, dividing the Indian Territory and forcing Confederate forces 
south of the Arkansas River.  During 1864 the war remained stagnant.  Union troops 
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crossed the Arkansas River and drove south into the Choctaw Nation but failed to 
decisively defeat the enemy.  Confederate troops attacked Fort Smith, driving in the 
federal pickets but could not force the garrison from the post.  Throughout the 
remained of the year raids became the prominent form of warfare with both 
commands unable to muster the strength or supplies to drive the other from the 
territory.  In early 1865, federal and Confederate troops prepared for renewed 
offensives; however, the war ended before soldiers began active campaigning.  The 
end came quietly as officers waited their turn to surrender and moved to nearby 
federal garrisons to be paroled.  From there, the troops returned home to begin their 
life after four years of war 
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Chapter 1: Review of Literature 
 
 The American Civil War is one of the most studied periods of history.  
Authors have written and argued about a wide variety of topics.  However, the bulk of 
available texts deal with the Civil War in the east while the war in the Trans-
Mississippi West receives little attention.  While grand armies marched across 
Virginia with over 100,000 soldiers, colonels moved with regiments across the Indian 
nations.  That is not to say that Indian Territory was not an important theater.  Indian 
Territory lay at the western flanks of both armies and served as a buffer for 
Confederate Texas and Arkansas from Kansas.  In summer 1863, General James G. 
Blunt amassed the largest federal force in the territory during the entire war and 
moved south from Fort Gibson to engage the enemy.  With Blunt was a mere 4,500 
men.  Federal troops struggled to maintain their supply lines which stretched over 160 
miles from Fort Scott, Kansas, to Fort Gibson, Cherokee Nation.  As war stripped the 
territory of livestock and farms went untended, Union troops grew dependent on 
wagons filled with war provisions for their very existence. 
 The Confederate troops suffered as well.  At times, their force numbered 
between 9,000 and 12,000 men.  However they suffered from a lack of arms, 
ammunition, and equipment.  With the fall of Fort Gibson in 1863, Confederate 
dominance of Indian Territory fell below the Arkansas River.  For the duration of the 
war, Confederate troops fought to deny the enemy of supplies and force their 
withdrawal from the territory.  Even though Confederate troops rode circles around 
the Union garrison, they could not drive the federals from the field. 
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 Within the borders of Indian Territory, soldiers fought not for territorial gain, 
but for supplies.  As the war progressed, both sides grew desperate for materials as 
they divided the territory at the Arkansas River.  Mules and horses became so scarce 
that federal commanders were willing to pay $175 for each animal.1  This study 
examines the role and importance of supplies and the engagements surrounding them.  
In almost every instance, supplies were the driving force of the engagements within 
the territory.  In addition, this thesis includes a number of new primary sources and 
brings the significant secondary works together in one study to reexamine the 
conflict. 
A number of works exist on the Civil War in the Indian Territory.  The vast 
majority of written works fall into five categories.  The first set of works were all 
written before 1925 by two authors.  Annie Heloise Abel’s trilogy examines the role 
of Native Americans in the Civil War, particularly diplomatic relations to the 
Confederate States of America and the postwar impact of defeat on the tribes. 2  
However, additional “sources might also have served to temper Abel’s ethnocentric 
perspective and racist language.”3  In their introduction to the reprinted edition, Theda 
                                                 
 1 William A. Phillips to Samuel R. Curtis, Letter, 7 March 1864, United States War 
Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies Series 1, Volume 34, Part 2, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 70 
volumes in 128 books, 1880-1901), 524-527. and James G. Blunt to Samuel R. Curtis, Letter, 30 
March 1864, OR, Series 1, Volume 34, Part 2, 791-792. 
 2 Annie Heloise Abel, The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist,  Cleveland: 
Arthur C. Clark Co., 1915. and Annie Heloise Abel, The American Indian as Participant in the Civil 
War. and  Annie Heloise Abel.  The American Indian Under Reconstruction, Cleveland: Arthur C. 
Clark Co. 1925.   This work is available as The American Indian and the End of the Confederacy, 
1863-1866, Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska, 1993. and Wiley Britton, The Union Indian 
Brigade in the Civil War,  Kansas City, Missouri: F. Hudson, 1922.  An excellent reprint is available in 
the Kansas Heritage Press 1994 reprint. and  Wiley Britton,  The Civil War on the Border, 2 volumes, 
New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1899.  The Kansas Heritage Press offers this publication in reprinted 
paperback form (1994). 
 3  Annie Heloise Abel, The American Indian and the Civil War, 1862-1865, (Lincoln, 
Nebraska: University of Nebraska, 1992), 5. Introduction by Theda Purdue and Michael D. Green.  
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Purdue, noted Cherokee historian, and Michael D. Green, Creek historian, go on to 
say, “access to Native sources would have produced a different book, one that still 
needs to be written.”4  The second author who falls into this category is Wiley 
Britton.  Britton served as a member of the Kansas cavalry in the Indian Territory and 
wrote several books and articles on the Civil War in the West.  The Civil War on the 
Border, Britton’s first work, is a two volume narrative of operations in Missouri, 
Kansas, Arkansas, and the Indian Territory, based on his personal experiences and the 
official reports of Union and Confederate commanders.5  As he notes in his 
introduction, “the official reports are very meager, except as to larger operations, and 
give a very incomplete account of the war…”6  This piece places the Indian Territory 
in the greater context of the border region during the war and focuses by focusing on 
troop movements and military defeats.  It must be noted that both of Britton’s works 
heavily favor Union accounts of the war and lack any references.  He stated that he 
compared his own personal observations with official records when possible.  His 
second work, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, is a brigade history of 
Union troops and chronicles their participation in the Civil War.7  This work is 
especially helpful considering Britton spent much of his Civil War service in Indian 
Territory.  In this volume, Britton draws upon his personal observations of Indian 
troops during the conflict and the official reports of commanders.   
                                                                                                                                           
Reprint from the original edition entitled The American Indian as Participant in the Civil War, 
Cleveland: Arthur C. Clark Co., 1919. 
 4 Abel, The American Indian and the Civil War, 1862-1865, 5.  
 5 Wiley Britton,  The Civil War on the Border, 2 volumes, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1899.  The Kansas Heritage Press offers this publication in reprinted paperback form (1994).  
 6 Britton, The Civil War in the Border, Volume 1, 1861-1862, iv.  
 7 Wiley Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War,  Kansas City, Missouri: F. 
Hudson, 1922.  An excellent reprint is available in the Kansas Heritage Press (1994.)   
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The second set of works is the official records.  Several groups of official 
records exist.  Any historiographical review of materials pertaining to the Civil War 
in the Indian Territory should begin with War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.8  This official series, 
published over a twenty-one year period, contains the official correspondence of the 
Union and Confederate Armies with a general index.9  The material relating to Indian 
Territory is spread throughout the Official Records and many pages and can be 
searched with the general index or by volume for individual commander, place name, 
fort name, battle names, or unit names.10  The Official Records helps the reader to 
                                                 
 8 United States War Department, War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Armies.  70 Volumes, 128 Books. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1880-1901.   
 9 The collection is broken into four series.  Series I is the formal reports, both Union and 
Confederate, of the first seizures of United States property in the South, and of all military operations 
in the field, with the correspondence, orders, and returns relating specifically thereto.  Series II 
contains the orders, reports, and returns, Union and Confederate, relating to Prisoners of War and (so 
far as the military authorities were concerned) to state and political prisoners.  Series III contains 
correspondence, orders, reports, and returns of the Union authorities (embracing their correspondence 
with the Confederate officials) not relating specifically to the subjects of the first and second series.  It 
embraces the annual and special reports of the Secretary of War, of the General-in-Chief, and the 
chiefs of the several staff corps and departments; the calls for troops and the correspondence between 
the National and the several state authorities.  Series IV contains correspondence, orders, reports, and 
returns of the Confederate authorities, similar to that indicated for the Union officials, as of the third 
series, but excluding the correspondence between the Union and Confederate authorities given in that 
series.   
 10 For a broad view of action within the Indian Territory it is easy to locate operations by 
individual year.  Indian Territory operations for 1861 can be found in Series I, volumes 1, 3, 8, and 53.  
Operations for 1862 can be found in Series I, volumes 8, 13, 22, and 53.  Operations for 1863 can be 
found in Series I, volumes 22, 26, and 53.  Operations for 1864 can be found in Series I, volume 22, 
34, and 41.  Operations for 1865 can be found in Series I, 46, 47, 48, and 49.   
 Records for the organization and equipment within Indian Territory can be found in Series I, 
volumes 41 and 53; Series III, volumes 2 and 4; and Series IV, volume 1.  Information pertaining to the 
restoration of civilian authorities within the territory can be found in Series I, volume 48 and Series II, 
volume 4.  Information on departments of the Indian Territory can be found in Series I, volumes 1, 8, 
13, and 22.  Information on the Confederate District of the Indian Territory can be found in Series I, 
volumes 22, 23, 26, 34, 35, and 41.  Information on Union District of the Indian Territory can be found 
in Series I, volume 1, 13, 22, 23, 26, 34, 35, and 41. 
 Information regarding both the Union and Confederate Indian units is extensive.  The 
following Confederate forces are addressed within the Official Records.  The 1st Cherokee Cavalry 
Battalion can be found in Series I, volumes 13, 22, and 48.  Information on the 1st Cherokee Regiment, 
Series I, volumes 3, 8, 13, 22, 34, 41; Series II, volume 3; and Series IV, volume 1.  Information on the 
2nd Cherokee Mounted Rifles can be found in Series I, volumes 22, 34, 35, and 41.  Information on 
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gain firsthand knowledge of the war, however, many officers attempted to highlight 
their achievements while minimizing negative actions.  Careful examination reveals 
discrepancies among the reports by commanders within a department as well as very 
different Union and Confederate descriptions of events.   
Kansas regiments were instrumental to the federal war in Indian Territory.  
The official military history of all Kansas regiments during the Civil War, composed 
from records of the adjutant general’s office, is available in Official Military History 
of Kansas Regiments during the War for the Suppression of the Great Rebellion.11  
Each regiment has an individual section, in chronological order.  The records of the 
adjutant’s general of Kansas are available in Report of the Adjutant General for the 
                                                                                                                                           
Drew’s Cherokee Mounted Rifles can be found in Series I, volumes 3, 8, 13, 22, 34, and 41.  
Information on Holt’s Cherokee Battalion can be found in Series I, volume 22.  Information on Scales’ 
Cherokee Battalion can be found in Series I, volume 41.  
 Information on the 1st Chickasaw Cavalry Battalion can be found in Series I, volume 13, 22, 
34, and 41.  Information on the 1st Chickasaw Regiment can be found in Series I, volumes 41, 48, and 
53.  Information on Pickens’ Chickasaw Battalion can be found in Series I, volumes 22 and 34.  
Information on the 1st Choctaw Battalion can be found in Series I, volume 41.  Information on the 1st 
Choctaw Cavalry Regiment can be found in Series I, volume 13, 14, 22, 34, 41, and 48.  Information 
on the 1st Choctaw Cavalry War Regiment can be found in Series I, volumes 13, 14, 22, 34, 41, and 48.  
Information on the 3rd Choctaw Regiment can be found in Series I, volumes 34 and 48.  Information on 
the 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles can be found in Series I, volumes 3, 8, 13, 22, 34, 41, 
48, and Series IV, volume 1.  
Information on the 1st Creek Cavalry Battalion can be found in Series I, volumes 8, 9, and 13.  
Information on the 1st Creek Regiment can be found in Series I, volumes 3, 8, 13, 22, 34, 35, 41, 53, 
and Series II, volume 1.  Information on the 2nd Creek Regiment can be found in Series I, volumes 22, 
34, 41, and 53.  Information on Kenard’s Creek Squadron can be found in Series I, volume 41.  
Information on McSmith’s Creek Company can be found in Series I, volume 13.  Information on the 
Osage Battalion (Broke Arm) can be found in Series I, volumes 22 and 41.  Information on the 1st 
Seminole Cavalry Battalion can be found in Series I, volumes 8, 9, 13, 22, 26, 34, 41, 53, and Series 
IV, volume 2.  Material is available for Union Indian Troops as well.  Information on the 1st, 2nd, and 
3rd, Home Guards can be found in Series I, volumes 13, 22, 34, 35, 41, and 48.  Information on the 4th 
and 5th Home Guards can be found in Series I, volume 22.  For units operating within the Indian 
Territory originating outside of the Indian Nations consult the General Index with specific troops 
identification for the various volumes needed.   
11 W.S. Burke, Official Military History of Kansas Regiments During the War for the 
Suppression of the Great Rebellion, Leavenworth, Kansas: Kansas Printing Office, 1870.   A reprint is 
available, Ottawa, Kansas: Kansas Heritage Press, no date. 
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State of Kansas.12  Another set of state records worth researching is Annual Report of 
the Adjutant General and Acting Quartermaster General of the State of Wisconsin.13   
Several Wisconsin regiments served in the territory during the conflict. 
The third set of historical works relating to the Civil War in the Indian 
Territory includes published, secondary works.  Many of these suffer in a variety of 
ways.  Some of the earlier pieces are heavily biased towards the Confederacy.  In 
addition, a large number fail to cite their sources or are meant to be brief narratives of 
the events without interpretation. 
Opothleyaholo and the Loyal Muskogee: Their Flight to Kansas in the Civil 
War by Lela J. McBride addresses the Creek Nation before the war erupts and then 
follows the pro-Union Indians flight to Kansas.14  Now the Wolf has Come: the Creek 
Nation in the Civil War continues the examination of the effects of the Civil War on 
the Creek Nation as well as their participation during the conflict.15  The Cherokee 
Nation in the Civil War, by Clarissa W. Confer, addresses the Cherokee Nation 
specifically in its pre-war years and the tribal government’s decision to go to war.  
Confer also looks at Cherokee tribal members as refugees during the war years.16  A 
short work by LeRoy H. Fischer and Jerry Gill, Confederate Indian Forces Outside of 
                                                 
12 Kansas, Adjutant General’s Office. Report of the Adjutant General for the State of Kansas, 
Topeka: Kansas State Printing Office, 1896.  
13  Wisconsin, Adjutant General’s Office. Annual Report of the Adjutant General and Acting 
Quartermaster General of the State of Wisconsin, Madison: Adjutant General’s Office, 1866. 
 14 Lela J. McBride, Opotheleyaholo and the Loyal Muskogee: Their Flight to Kansas in the 
Civil War, Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, 2000. 
 15 Christine S. White and Benton R. White, Now the Wolf has Come: the Creek Nation in the 
Civil War, College Station, Texas: Texas AandM University Press, 1996.    
 16 Clarissa W. Confer, The Cherokee Nation in the Civil War, Norman, Oklahoma: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 2007.    
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Indian Territory, provides a history of the limited role of Native American 
participation outside of the territory, including the Battle of Prairie Grove.17   
For a more concise work on the Civil War in the area, consult Civil War in the 
Ozarks by Phillip W. Steele and Steve Cottrell.18  This work provides a short 
summary of the region during the war years allowing for a broad view of hostilities, 
but lacks citations.  For  a description of the early war years, William M. O’Brien’s A 
Time of Decision: the Indian Territory in the first years of the Civil War, August 1861 
through Early 1862,  provides a look at early decisions and diplomacy among Native 
Americans with the Confederacy and the decision to leave the protection of the 
United States.19  Jay Monaghan’s Civil War on the Western Border, 1854-1865 places 
Indian Territory in the broad context of the West.  However, Monagahan provides 
limited space for discussion of Indian Territory.20   
 Of the many single volume works on the Civil War in the Indian Territory, 
one of the earliest works is Civil War in Indian Territory by George H. Shirk.21  
LeRoy H. Fischer presents a compilation of articles entitled The Civil War Era in 
Indian Territory.22  This arrangement covers the pre-war years through 
reconstruction.  Another work by Fischer, The Western Territories in the Civil War, 
                                                 
 17 LeRoy H. Fischer and Jerry Gill, Confederate Indian Forces Outside of Indian Territory, 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: Oklahoma Historical Society, 1969.   
 18 Phillip W. Steele and Steve Cottrell, Civil War in the Ozarks, Gretna, Louisiana: Pelican 
Publishing Co., 1993.   
 19 William M. O’Brien, A Time of Decision: the Indian Territory in the first years of the Civil 
War, August, 1861 through Early 1862, Jenks, Oklahoma: Published by author, 1997.  
 20 Jay Monaghan, Civil War on the Western Border, 1854-1865, Boston: Little, Brown and  
Co, 1955.  
 21 George H. Shirk, Civil War in Indian Territory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: Oklahoma 
Historical Society, 1900.  
 22 LeRoy H. Fischer, The Civil War Era in Indian Territory, Los Angeles: L.L. Morrison, 
1973.  The papers in this book were originally published in the Journal of the West and include 
bibliographical references and index.   
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places Indian Territory within the context of the broad expanse of territorial states.23   
A more recent history of the war in the Indian Territory is Larry C. Rampp and 
Donald L. Rampp’s The Civil War in Indian Territory.  This book chronicles the large 
scale movement of troops; however, a number of the cited sources are used 
incorrectly or do not correlate with the material referenced.  Some sections of text 
vary significantly from primary source descriptions of events.  Despite these 
shortcomings, this is the first modern history of the conflict within the territory from 
the opening shots of the war through the end of hostilities.24  For a collection of 
various works in one volume, Kepis and Turkey Calls: an Anthology of the War 
Between the States in Indian Territory, edited by Mark L. Cantrell and Mac R. Harris, 
provides a brief history of the hostilities within the territory by arranging Chronicles 
of Oklahoma articles into the general framework of the war.25  For a short summary 
of the war years in the territory look at Steve Cottrell’s Civil War in the Indian 
Territory.26  This book is concise; however it lacks an index or references and has an 
extremely limited bibliography.  
 There are a small number of works on individual battles, engagements, units, 
and places within the region.  For the most part, they tend to be large pamphlets rather 
than monographs.  Because of the scarcity of materials available for individual 
actions and the relatively low number of participants in each engagement, most 
skirmishes and battles are incorporated into larger works.  In State of Thieves: 
                                                 
 23 LeRoy H. Fischer, The Western Territories in the Civil War, Manhattan, Kansas: Journal of 
the West, 1977.   
 24 Larry C. and Donald L. Rampp, The Civil War in Indian Territory, Austin, Texas: Presidial 
Press, 1975.  
 25 Mark L. Cantrell and Mac R. Harris, ed., Kepis and Turkey Calls: An Anthology of the War 
Between the States in Indian Territory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: Western Heritage Books, 1982.    
 26 Steve Cottrell, Civil War in the Indian Territory, Gretna, Louisiana: Pelican Publishing  
Co, 1995.  
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Detailing the truth of the first Battles of the Civil War in Indian Territory, Robert W. 
DeMoss examines the earliest battles in Indian Territory.27  Another short work by 
DeMoss is The Battle of Caving Banks or Chusto Talasah.28  Jess C. Epple’s Battle of 
Cabin Creek, September 18, 19, 1864, called 2nd Battle of Cabin Creek, Cherokee 
Nation, Indian Territory, looks specifically at the Confederate victory and the capture 
of the large Union supply train.29   For another perspective on the second Battle of 
Cabin Creek, Steven L. Warren’s Brilliant Victory: the Second Civil War Battle of 
Cabin Creek, Indian Territory, September 19, 1864, recounts the engagement.30   
Honey Springs, Perryville, Skullyville, and Boggy Depot were key supply basis for 
Confederate troops during the war.  Federal commanders struck each throughout the 
conflict, robbing the enemy of military goods.  Another work by Epple, Honey 
Springs Depot, Elk Creek, Creek Nation, Indian Territory, provides a description of 
the Confederate depot located at Honey Springs as well as operations in the vicinity.31   
 Of all the individuals involved in the Civil War in Indian Territory, Stand 
Watie and his military career receives the most attention.  Most authors, however, 
inflate Watie’s success as a military leader and his troop’s ability to fight on the 
battlefield.  One best known work’s is Frank Cunningham’s General Stand Watie’s 
                                                 
 27 Robert W. DeMoss, State of Thieves: Detailing the Truth of the First Battles of the Civil 
War in Indian Territory, Cleveland, Oklahoma: R.W. DeMoss, 2004.   
 28 Robert W. DeMoss, The Battle of Caving Banks or Chusto Talasah, Cleveland, Oklahoma: 
R.W. DeMoss, 1993.   
 29 Jess C. Epple, Battle of Cabin Creek, September 18, 19, 1864, called 2nd Battle of Cabin 
Creek, Cherokee Nation, Indian Territory. Muskogee, Oklahoma: Hoffman Print Co., 1964.  
 30 Steven L. Warren, Brilliant Victory: the Second Civil War Battle of Cabin Creek, Indian 
Territory, September 19, 1864, Spokane, Washington: S.W. Warren, 2002.    
 31 Jess C. Epple, Honey Springs Depot, Elk Creek, Creek Nation, Indian Territory,  
Muskogee, Oklahoma: Hoffman Print Co., 1964.  This work was reprinted in 2002 by Thomason Print 
Co., Muskogee, Oklahoma. 
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Confederate Indians.32  Cunningham looks at Watie and his troop’s role in the region, 
including the Battle of Prairie Grove and his book serves as a good general guide into 
the movement of Watie and his men; however, the general’s role in combat is 
exaggerated.  Wilfred Knight offers a different perspective with Red Fox: Stand 
Watie and the Confederate Indian Nations during the Civil War Years in Indian 
Territory.33  This piece serves as a biography of Stand Watie and his military career 
within the greater context of Native American involvement.  Another work on Watie 
is Stand Watie and the First Cherokee Regiment, 1861-1865, by Carolyn M. Bartels.34  
A short work on Stand Watie can be found in Mabel W. Anderson’s Life of General 
Stand Watie: the only Indian Brigadier General of the Confederate Army and the Last 
General to Surrender.35  This work stands out by providing significant information on 
the officers and soldiers of Watie’s Brigade; however, the short booklet comes close 
to “hero worship.”  To examine Stand Watie in the context of the Cherokee Nation, 
Stand Watie and the Agony of the Cherokee Nation by Kenny A. Frank’s provides a 
look at the political situation within the tribe and Watie’s reaction to developing 
events.36   For a different perspective on Watie, B. Narasingarajan provides a foreign 
scholar’s interpretation in Stand Watie: an Analytical Study. 37   
                                                 
 32  Frank Cunningham, General Stand Watie’s Confederate Indians. San Antonio, Texas: 
Naylor Co., 1959, This book was reprinted by the University of Oklahoma Press in 1998.  
 33 Wilfred Knight, Red Fox: Stand Watie and the Confederate Indian Nations During the Civil 
War Years in Indian Territory, Glendale, California: A.H. Clark Co, 1988.  
 34 Carolyn M. Bartels, Stand Watie and the First Cherokee Regiment, 1861-1865, 
Independence, Missouri: Two Trails Publishing, 1990s.  
 35 Mabel W. Anderson, Life of General Stand Watie: the only Indian Brigadier General of the 
Confederate Army and the Last General to Surrender, Pryor, Oklahoma: M.W. Anderson, 1915.  
Brandy Station Bookshelf reproduced the work in 1995.   
 36 Kenny A. Franks, Stand Watie and the Agony of the Cherokee Nation, Memphis, 
Tennessee: Memphis State University press, 1979. This work is based on the author’s thesis at 
Oklahoma State University, 1973.    
 37 B. Narasingarajan, Stand Watie: an Analytical Study, Bangalore, India: Mayflower 
Publications International, 1984.    
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 Works on other individual participants who fought within the Indian Territory 
are available as well.  LeRoy H. Fischer and Larry C. Rampp have written a short 
piece entitled Quantrill’s Civil War Operations in Indian Territory, chronicling 
Quantrill’s operations within the area.38  A firsthand account of the war years is 
presented in A Creek Warrior for the Confederacy: the Autobiography of Chief G.W. 
Grayson, edited by W. David Baird.39     For a perspective on a Union officer General 
James G. Blunt, Tarnished Glory, by Robert Collins, examines General Blunt and his 
activities in the West as well as the problems surrounding his command.40   Another 
Confederate Cherokee is examined in The Confederate Cherokee: John Drew’s 
Regiment of Mounted Rifles by Craig W. Gaines.  Throughout the war, Drew dealt 
with desertions and constant problems motivating his full blood troops to fight against 
their own tribal brethren.41  
 Because of the large number of Texas troops operating in Indian Territory, 
researchers should look carefully at several books on commanders and units from 
Texas.  A Texas Cavalry Officer’s Civil War, the Diary and Letters of James C. 
Bates, edited by Richard Lowe, provides a white Confederate officer’s perspective.  
Bates served extensively in the Indian Territory and offers commentary on a variety 
of issues.42  One Texas regimental history of value is Suffering to Silence: Twenty-
Ninth Texas Cavalry, CSA, Regimental History.  The 29th Texas Cavalry actively 
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served in Indian Territory and met disaster at the Battle of Honey Springs.43  The role 
of the 9th Texas Cavalry can be found in Fighting With Ross’ Texas Cavalry Brigade, 
CSA: The Diary of George L. Griscom, Adjutant, Ninth Texas Cavalry Regiment, 
edited by Homer L. Kerr.44   
 The use of guerilla warfare in West was extensive.  Union operations required 
a steady flow of supplies down the Texas Road from Fort Scott, Kansas, through 
Baxter Springs and Cabin Creek, to Fort Gibson.  Confederate harassment of the 
supply line was continuous throughout the war.  Several books deal with guerilla 
warfare in the area.  Thomas Goodrich’s piece Black Flag: Guerrilla Warfare on the 
Western Border, 1861-1865 reviews racial violence in the west, especially in Kansas 
and Missouri.45  Firsthand accounts of guerilla warfare can be found in John C. 
Livingston Jr.’s work, Such a Foe as Livingston: The Campaign of Confederate 
Major Thomas R. Livingston’s First Missouri Cavalry Battalion of Southwest 
Missouri.46   The war saw troops of all ethnicities used in combat.  To fill the void in 
numbers, Black and Native American troops fought alongside white troops early in 
the war in the Trans-Mississippi west.  In combat, colored regiments faced harsh 
atrocities in guerilla warfare.   
 The fourth set of works are compilations of published, personal accounts of 
the war.  These draw directly from firsthand accounts and other primary sources and 
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are a great aid to researchers.  The Prairie was on Fire: Eyewitness Accounts of the 
Civil War in the Indian Territory by Whit Edwards is a collection of personal 
accounts of the Civil War in Indian Territory from the opening of the war through the 
end of hostilities.47  This piece provides accounts from military personnel, civilians, 
slaves, and Native Americans and is probably the most useful collection of its type.  
Frank Moore’s eleven volume The Rebellion Record; a Diary of American Events is a 
compilation of various works including documents, narratives, illustrations, poetry, 
etc, published in 1864.48  Information on Indian Territory is scattered throughout the 
collection.  Another early collection of personal perspectives is Reminiscence of the 
Boys in Gray, 1861-1865 by Mamie Yeary. Yeary compiled a narrative from several 
hundred Confederate veterans who lived in Texas at the time of her research.49  A 
recent, condensed version can be found in Texas Boys in Gray edited by Evault 
Boswell.50   
 Often overlooked and forgotten sources for manuscripts on the Civil War in 
Indian Territory are thesis and dissertations.  This group of student works makes up 
the fifth, and last, assemblage of pieces on the war in Indian Territory.  Leslie B. 
Scoopmire’s The Descent of Indian Territory into the Civil War is a narrative of the 
pre-war years, as well as Union and Confederate government relations with the 
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Native Americans.51  To examine the relationship of the Confederate government 
with the Native Americans, Edward E. Prag’s thesis The Confederate Diplomacy with 
the Five Civilized Tribes Albert Pike and the Texas Commissioners work in 
negotiating treaties of alliance.52  This work focuses specifically on the Confederacy’s 
connection and interaction with Indian Territory.  The History of the Indian Territory 
during the Civil War by Marian S. Brooks offers a broad overview of the Civil War in 
Indian Territory in early literature.53  Even though dated, this thesis serves as a 
general view of early attempts at writing on the subject.  Clinton S. Crowe’s A Civil 
War within the Civil War: the Division in the Indian Nations, looks at the internal 
schisms within the tribes themselves.  Crowe examines the resurrection of removal 
factions within the tribes and the divisions within tribal leadership.54  Stand Watie and 
his military career are addressed in Stand Watie, Cherokee Warrior, by Kenny A. 
Franks.55  Several works have been produced on Colonel William A. Phillips, an 
active Union commander in Indian Territory.  Murray P. Tripp’s The Early Career of 
William A. Phillips offers a background history of Phillips through the beginning of 
the Civil War.56  Sharon D. Wyant covers Phillips before and during the war years in 
Colonel William A. Phillips and the Civil War in Indian Territory.57  Several students 
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have written on General James G. Blunt.  Robert S. Jones looks at Blunt in the greater 
context of the border region in General James G. Blunt and the Civil War in the 
Trans-Mississippi West.58  The Military Career of James G. Blunt: an Appraisal, by 
William R. Marsh, offers a critique of his questionable career as a military officer.59  
A third perspective on this character and his war years can be found in James G. 
Blunt and the Civil War by J.C. Hopkins.60   
 The purpose of this study is to broaden the historical knowledge of the war in 
Indian Territory by looking at the relationship between combat, supply, and logistics 
and the progression of warfare in the territory as a result.  This thesis brings together 
unused primary source materials including letter and diaries and interprets significant 
secondary works to reexamine the conflict in detail, particularly the overlooked role 
and importance of provisions.  In almost every instance, supplies were the driving 
force leading to engagements within the territory and rarely receive mention in most 
studies.  This work also utilizes secondary sources to add to the interpretation and 
develop the historiography and necessary background to shape the thesis.  Each 
chapter explores a significant period in the conflict.  It chronicles the events in the 
Civil War in Indian Territory from the withdrawal of federal troops in 1861 through 
the end of hostilities in 1865. 
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Map 1: The Geography of Indian Territory 
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Chapter 2: Hostilities Erupt: Federal Abandonment and the  
Flight of the Unionists 
 
 As tempers flared across the nation in early 1861, citizens chose sides under 
the imminent threat of civil war.  In the west, delegates tried to induce the Five 
Civilized Tribes to form alliances with the new government in Richmond while 
federal forces abandoned the territory and halted annuity payments.  The southern 
emissaries cited the various tribes’ cultural and economic ties to the south, including 
slavery.  Drainage of local river systems flowed towards the southeast, tying the 
Indian Territory to the southern states.  In addition, most tribal funds were invested in 
southern state bonds.61  The Choctaw Nation led the way in early February 1861.  
Geography would transform the prairies and hills of Indian Territory into the 
battlefields of the far west as opposing forces fought the war on tribal lands, rather 
than in their own states.  To the north of the Indian nations lay pro-Union Kansas, to 
the south and its flanks lay pro-Confederate Texas, Arkansas, and Missouri.  As 
armies moved to meet each other in battle, Indian Territory would suffer the 
devastation of war.    
 At the outbreak of hostilities in April 1861, federal soldiers occupied several 
military posts within the territory.  The United States stationed troops at Fort Washita, 
Fort Arbuckle, and Fort Cobb to protect the Five Civilized Tribes from plains Indians.  
Situated along the Arkansas River on the border of Arkansas, Fort Smith served as a 
supply depot for the garrisons to the west. (See Map 1.)  With the secession of 
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Arkansas, resupplying the garrisons up the Arkansas River would halt, forcing 
material to travel down the Texas Road from Fort Scott, Kansas, leaving the federal 
troops isolated and the posts untenable.  In addition, provisions transported from the 
depot at St. Louis that made their way by rail to Rolla, Missouri, and then on to Fort 
Scott and Fort Gibson by wagon would have to be rerouted.  The Texas Road, formed 
by two separate branches, served as the major thoroughfare running north-south 
through Indian Territory.  One branch ran south from Baxter Springs, Kansas, and 
followed the divide between the Verdigris and Grand Rivers to Fort Gibson with the 
other beginning in Saint Louis and running southwest to Springfield, Missouri, and 
past Fort Wayne on upper Spavinaw Creek to Salina, and joined the other. From Fort 
Gibson the route proceeded southwest past Honey Springs and crossed Canadian 
River just below Fishertown, North Fork Town, Perryville, and Boggy Depot. At the 
latter place the road forked and one branch went directly south to Warren’s on Red 
River and the other reached the river at Preston by way of Fort Washita.62   
 Just days after Confederate troops fired on Fort Sumter, South Carolina on 12 
April, Second Lieutenant William A. Averell left Washington, D.C., for Indian 
Territory with special orders from the War Department.63 Lieutenant Colonel William 
H. Emory, commander of the garrisons in Indian Territory, returned to Fort Smith in 
late March with orders to mass his troops at Fort Washita.  His entire force was 750 
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men in eleven companies, spread amongst the four forts.  Upon his arrival, Emory 
found locals around Fort Smith clamoring for secession.  His infantry had moved to 
Fort Washita and the cavalry from Fort Arbuckle was en route.  On 13 April Emory 
rode west with all but two companies of cavalry.  He left orders with Captain Samuel 
D. Sturgis to abandon Fort Smith the moment Arkansas seceded.64 
 En route to Fort Washita, Emory learned a large force of Texans was moving 
toward the post.  After arriving on 16 April, he hurriedly loaded the garrison’s 
supplies and equipment and moved the command toward Fort Arbuckle.  The 
following day, Texas troops occupied Fort Washita.  After Emory’s departure, 
Captain Sturgis found his position at Fort Smith precarious as pro-southern sentiment 
exploded through the region. On 23 April he ordered the place abandoned and moved 
west with two companies of cavalry to make contact with Emory at Fort Washita.  
Just one hour after the federal troops departed, some 300 Confederate militia and ten 
pieces of artillery arrived by steamboat to occupy the fort and take possession of the 
town.  Sturgis hurried to catch up to Emory’s column.65 
 On 2 May, Averell finally caught up with Emory and delivered his special 
orders.  The War Department advised the commander, “by order of the General-In-
Chief, with all troops in the Indian country west of Arkansas, march to Fort 
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Leavenworth, Kans.”66  On 3 May the garrison of Fort Arbuckle met Emory’s men on 
the east bank of the Washita River, five miles from the post.  The next morning, the 
entire column headed towards Fort Cobb, the last federal post remaining in the 
territory.67  Texans pursued the federal force on their move north.  When Emory 
learned of the chase, he ordered Sturgis and Avery along with a company to bring in 
the Texans advance guard.  The federal troops moved to intercept the Texans and 
brought in a group, “composed of gentlemen acting under erroneous impressions.”68   
The following morning, Emory released the prisoners and moved towards Fort Cobb.  
On 9 May, Emory’s column ran into the fort’s garrison.  An overwhelming force of 
Texans had occupied Fort Cobb on 5 May.  Unable to offer resistance, First Sergeant 
Charles E. Campbell surrendered the post.  The Texans promised Campbell safe 
passage for the Union soldiers and their families to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.69  On 
9 May Emory prepared to move north to Kansas.  The whole command, 750 soldiers, 
150 women, children, teamsters, and other non-combatants from the four abandoned 
forts, headed towards Fort Leavenworth.70 
 Emory’s withdrawal from Indian Territory ended federal occupation of the 
territory.  As his men moved north, Texans and pro-Confederate Indians occupied the 
abandoned posts.  Emory’s departure was more than just the abandonment of four 
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military posts.  The removal of federal soldiers violated many of the treaties held with 
the Five Civilized Tribes further alienating them with the government in Washington.  
Tribal leaders trying to remain neutral soon fell to pressure from their citizens and 
delegates from the new Confederate government to sign treaties aligning the Native 
Americans with Richmond. 
 On 13 May, Benjamin McCulloch, of Texas, received a commission from 
Richmond appointing him a brigadier general and commander of Texas, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, and Indian Territory.  In order to secure cooperation of the Indian nations, 
the Confederate government appointed Albert Pike special commissioner to the 
tribes.  Pike worked quickly and secured agreements with the various tribes.  In 
December 1861, the Confederate Congress ratified the treaties and designated the 
Indian Territory a military district in the Trans-Mississippi Department.71  
Commissioned a brigadier general, Pike was placed in command and charged with 
raising and equipping troops in Indian Territory.  Supply problems began almost 
immediately.  Despite these official treaties aligning the tribes with Richmond, many 
Native Americans chose to remain loyal to the federal government.  Isolated, they 
sought leadership to guide them.72    
  In early September 1861 E. H. Carruth, Indian Commissioner for the United 
States, contacted Opothleyaholo, leader of the pro-Union Creeks, and other loyalists 
requesting that tribal representatives travel from Indian Territory to Kansas in order to 
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maintain the alliance between the tribes and the federal government.73  Opothleyaholo 
gained fame in the Creek War against Andrew Jackson, becoming the recognized 
leader of the Upper Creeks.  Opothleyaholo’s influence helped maintain the loyalty of 
many Creeks to the United States.  As pressure from Confederates sympathizers in 
Indian Territory mounted, the Unionists decided to seek refuge in Kansas.   
 In late fall, groups of pro-Union Indians, mainly Creek and Seminole, joined 
with Opothleyaholo near North Fork Town on the Canadian River. (See Map 2.) 
Confederate Colonel Douglas H. Cooper, former United States Indian agent to the 
Choctaws, learned that as many as 6,000 loyalists had joined Opothleyaholo’s camp.   
Many were women and children along with escaped slaves.  In an effort to prevent 
open hostilities, Cooper sent messengers to arrange a meeting between the two forces; 
however, the attempts failed.  Fearing that Opothleyaholo would align himself with 
Unionists in Kansas Cooper took action.74   
 By mid November, Cooper amassed a force of 1,400 men, including both 
Native American and white troops.  They left Fort Gibson on 15 November 1861 and 
moved toward Opothleyaholo’s camp.75  By the end of the first day, Cooper’s men 
located the fleeing Indian’s trail.  In an attempt to elude the pursuers, 
Opothleyaholo’s followers set fire to the prairies behind them, masking their route 
and destroying vital forage for anyone who followed.  On 19 November Cooper’s  
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Map 2: Opothleyaholo and the Loyal Indians 
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men spotted smoke near the Red Fork of the Arkansas River and ordered Lieutenant 
Colonel William Quayle, commander of the Ninth Texas Cavalry, to attack.  Hoping 
to destroy the enemy’s means of subsistence nearly 500 Texans charged the site only 
to find it abandoned, but the Confederates soon discovered scouts from 
Opothleyaholo’s camp.76   
 Quayle’s men pursued the retreating party toward Round Mountain, hoping to 
locate the main camp. (See Map 2.)  Near dusk the Texans discovered 
Opothleyaholo’s main camp spread along a timber-lined stream.  As the Confederates 
approached, a devastating volley erupted from the cover of the trees.  The sudden 
barrage from the concealed warriors halted the cavalry’s advance. Unable to regroup 
in the darkness, the Texans retreated.  As the Confederates fell back Opothleyaholo’s 
men gave chase, protecting the numerous civilians in the camp.77 
 At the first signs of battle, Colonel Cooper dispatched additional mounted 
troops to support the Texans but as darkness engulfed the battlefield the Union 
Creeks disappeared into the night.  To cover their withdrawal, the prairie was again 
set on fire threatening both Cooper’s supply train and the forage necessary to sustain 
                                                 
 76 M. J. Brinson, Report, 25 November 1861, OR, Series 1, Volume 8, 14. and William A. 
Quayle, Report, January 1862, Special Microfilm Collection, Roll IAD-5, Oklahoma Historical 
Society, Archives Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. and Robert A. Young, Report, 30 November 
1861, OR, Series 1, Volume 8, 15. and James C. Bates, A Texas Cavalry Officer’s Civil War: The 
Diary and Letters of James C. Bates, edited by Richard Lowe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1999), 27-33. and George L. Griscom, Fighting With Ross’ Texas Cavalry Brigade: 
The Diary of George L. Griscom, Adjutant, Ninth Texas Cavalry Regiment, edited by Homer L. Kerr 
(Hillsboro, Texas: Hill Junior College Press, 1976), 5-6. and William Coffman, Letter, 25 November 
1861, 9th Texas Collection, Harold B. Simpson Research Center, Hillsboro, Texas. and Cottrell, The 
Civil War in the Indian Territory, 24. and Edwards, The Prairie was on Fire, 4.   
 77 M. J. Brinson, Report, 25 November 1861, OR, Series 1, Volume 8, 14. and William A. 
Quayle, Report, January 1862. and Robert A. Young, Report, 30 November 1861. and Bates, A Texas 
Cavalry Officer’s Civil War: The Diary and Letters of James C. Bates, edited by Richard Lowe, 27-33. 
and Griscom, Fighting With Ross’ Texas Cavalry Brigade: The Diary of George L. Griscom, Adjutant, 
Ninth Texas Cavalry Regiment, 5-6. and William Coffman, Letter, 25 November 1861. and Cottrell, 
The Civil War in the Indian Territory, 24. and Edwards, The Prairie was on Fire, 4.  
31 
 
his cavalry mounts.  As dawn broke, Confederate soldiers entered the abandoned 
camp.  Cooper reported his losses during the engagement at Round Mountain as six 
killed, four wounded, and one missing.  Opothleyaholo left no records. Thus ended 
the first serious engagement within Indian Territory.78 
 As the Union column continued north, General McCulloch ordered Cooper to 
move his army toward Colonel Stand Watie’s Camp at Fort Wayne along the 
Arkansas River.  As they pressed forward, Opothleyaholo’s followers took advantage 
of the reprieve and prepared for continued assault by the enemy force.  While en route 
to meet Watie, Cooper marched to Concharta to obtain supplies. (See Map 2.) While 
there, Cooper received a dispatch freeing him to engage Opothleyaholo.79  On 29 
November, Cooper’s men, now re-supplied and rested, moved toward Opothleyaholo 
in two groups.  Cooper led one column, composed of six companies of the First 
Regiment of Chickasaw and Choctaw Mounted Rifles and the Creek and Seminole 
battalion, toward Tulsey Town while Colonel William B. Sims moved a second 
column, composed of Ninth Texas Cavalry, toward Coody’s Settlement to join the 
First Cherokee Mounted Rifles under Colonel John Drew.80   
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 One of Cooper’s soldiers escaped from Opothleyaholo’s camp and located his 
commander camped at Tulsey Town. (See Map 2.)  He informed Cooper that 
Opothleyaholo planned to attack him with about 2,000 warriors.  With just 780 men, 
Cooper ordered Sims and Drew to quickly march to his aid.  The Texans located 
Cooper’s column; however, Drew and his men misinterpreted the command and 
marched toward Bird Creek. (See Map 2.)  Once encamped Drew discovered his 480 
men were within miles of Opothleyaholo’s supporters.81  Within Drew’s regiment, 
many of the Cherokee soldiers still remained opposed to engaging the pro-Union 
faction.  Soon Cooper and Sims arrived and took up positions near the Cherokee 
troops.82   
 On the night of 8 December, nearly all of the full-blood members of the First 
Cherokee Mounted Rifles deserted, unable to bear arms against a foe they viewed as 
brethren.  Together, with his roughly sixty remaining men, Drew abandoned his camp 
and moved toward Cooper’s position.  In the chaos, Drew realized that his men had 
abandoned their ammunition.  Wanting to keep the supplies out of enemy hands, he 
dispatched several riders to inform Cooper of the situation and returned with a small 
force to recover the cartridges. Cooper reacted quickly to the mass Cherokee 
desertion and ordered Colonel Quayle to take a company of his cavalry to Drew’s 
camp while he moved his force toward Opothleyaholo along Bird Creek.83 
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 As Cooper’s skirmishers approached, the Union Indians opened fire.  
Opothleyaholo’s troops feigned an attack and then fell back.  Assuming the enemy 
line was breaking, Cooper’s troops followed as the small retreating force led them 
toward an ambush.  Leaving his supply train on the prairie with a small guard, Cooper 
ordered all of his forces into the fight.  The approaching Confederates ran straight the 
waiting warriors.  For over five hours both sides fired relentlessly at each other along 
a bend of Bird Creek called Chusto-Talasah.84 (See Map 2.)  As evening approached, 
a number of Opothleyaholo’s Creeks charged toward the Choctaw and Chickasaw 
soldier’s horses, gathered to allow the soldiers to fight dismounted.  The Confederates 
repulsed the attack, but soon abandoned their line and fled toward their mounts.  As 
night fell, Colonel Cooper retired from the field and encamped some five miles from 
the battle field.85   
 During the night Opothleyaholo’s force abandoned their camp at Chusto-
Talasah and continued north.  As dawn broke, Cooper discovered their retreat.  He 
reported losses as fifteen killed and thirty-seven wounded.  Union losses were not 
recorded; however, Cooper reported “their loss, admitted by prisoners taken on our 
last scout, was 412.  It probably was 500 killed and wounded.”86  No other reports 
exist to substantiate Cooper’s report.  The intense fighting at the Battle of Chusto-
Talasah depleted Cooper’s supplies, forcing the Confederates to retire to Fort Gibson 
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for provisions.  In just two weeks, Cooper’s men exhausted their ammunition and 
food stuffs.87   
 The desertion of over 400 of Colonel Drew’s men forced Cooper to request 
reinforcements.  Colonel James McIntosh, commander of Confederate troops at Van 
Buren, took to the field with 1,600 Confederate cavalry to assist Cooper.  Unlike 
many of the troops currently in the field, McIntosh brought battle hardened, veteran 
troopers to the campaign.  His column consisted of five companies of Colonel Walter 
P. Lane’s South Kansas-Texas Regiment, seven companies of the Third Texas 
Cavalry, Captain H.S. Bennett’s company of Texas Cavalry attached to division 
headquarters, four companies of the Second Arkansas Mounted Riflemen, and all of 
the available troops from the Sixth Texas Cavalry.88   
 Arriving at Fort Gibson on 20 December, McIntosh planned a campaign to 
finally destroy Opothleyaholo’s band.  With over 2,000 men, Cooper and McIntosh 
decided to move in two separate columns.  On 22 December, Cooper and his Indian 
troops, assisted by Major John Whitfield’s Texas Cavalry, moved up the north side of 
the Arkansas River.  McIntosh proceeded up the Verdigris River with seven 
companies of the 11th Texas, Captain H.S. Bennett’s Independent Cavalry, a battalion 
of the Third Texas Cavalry, and a battalion of the Second Arkansas Mounted Rifles.89   
 Colonel McIntosh’s column left Fort Gibson and by Christmas crossed the 
Verdigris River as planned.  As his men set up camp, some 200 mounted troops 
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appeared about a half mile away.  McIntosh himself led a battalion in pursuit, but he 
did not repeat Cooper’s mistake and quickly ordered his men back to camp.  During 
the night, a dispatch arrived from Cooper reporting his column would be delayed two 
to three days because of a large desertion of teamsters.  Choosing to move without 
Cooper, McIntosh proceeded west toward Shoal Creek and Chustenahlah on 26 
December. (See Map 2.)  Opothleyaholo’s scouts sighted the approaching enemy and 
alerted the camp, allowing the warriors to move into a defensive position along a 
rocky, tree-covered hill overlooking the creek. 90   
 As the enemy advance forded the stream, Opothleyaholo’s men opened fire.  
McIntosh’s Texans immediately moved toward cover and returned fire.  As his main 
force arrived, he prepared for an attack on the ridge.  The Texans charged the slopes, 
forcing Opothleyaholo’s line to break.  The Unionists attempted to rally three times as 
the Confederate cavalry advanced, each without success.  They formed one final line 
three miles from the initial contact, but the Texans again overran their position and 
Opothleyaholo’s men scattered across the prairie.  Many of retreating Union Indians 
were hunted down in the ensuing hours.  In their haste, the refugees abandoned their 
camp, leaving precious stores behind.  Colonel McIntosh reported his casualties for 
the Battle of Chustenahlah as three dead and thirty-two wounded.  He estimated 
Opothleyaholo’s losses at 250.91   
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 The additional Texas veterans were too much for Opothleyaholo’s men to 
fend off.  The engagement devastated the Union camp.  The Confederates captured 
160 women and children, 20 blacks, 30 wagons, 70 yoke of oxen, 500 horses, 100 
sheep, and a small number of cattle.  In addition, the Unionists lost hundreds of 
buffalo robes and large quantities of food needed to sustain Opothleyaholo’s camp 
through the winter.  Late that evening, Colonel Stand Watie and 300 men from the 
Second Cherokee Mounted Rifles reached the battlefield while Opothleyaholo’s 
defeated force fled north.92   
 The Confederate column moved north early on 27 December, with Watie in 
the lead until lead scouts found the enemy’s trail.  After traveling about twenty-five 
miles Watie’s troopers sighted two wagons; however, they were set afire before the 
cavalry could approach.  As the Texans arrived, they heard gunfire in the distance as 
Watie’s soldiers engaged Opothleyaholo’s men.  The Cherokee Mounted Rifles 
moved in two groups to attack.  Half of the regiment, under Major Elias Boudinot, 
moved forward on the left flank while Watie engaged Opothleyaholo on the right.  
For more than an hour, Watie’s men fought through ravines and rough terrain forcing 
the enemy back.93   
 Watie reported no losses and claimed ten enemy killed.  In addition, his men 
captured another seventy-five women and children, and thirty pack horses.  That 
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evening Colonel McIntosh decided Opothleyaholo and his fleeing column no longer 
presented a threat to Confederate operations.  They were destitute, fleeing across the 
frozen prairie starved and nearly naked.  The following morning McIntosh returned to 
Fort Gibson with his troops.  Cooper continued north, pursuing the retreating refugees 
until lack of supplies and inclement weather forced him to retire.  Following the 
battle, the pro-Union force continued up the Verdigris River Valley towards Kansas.94 
 The abandonment of Indian Territory by federal forces at the outbreak of 
hostilities left many loyal Indians refugees in their own nations.  Fearing they would 
be unable to supply the posts, the War Department believed its only course of action 
was to remove the troops to the north.  Confederate negotiations with the tribes 
proceeded unopposed from the beginning.  Pike managed to secure treaties with each 
of the Five Civilized Tribes, providing a buffer to the newly formed Confederacy in 
the west.  The Trans-Mississippi was expected to supply large quantities of salt, 
sugar, bacon, beef, wheat, wool, and cotton to the war effort.  In addition, vital 
supplies imported from Europe could enter the Confederacy through Mexico.95 When 
the Unionist finally gathered, Confederate officers moved to attack before the group 
could become a significant threat.  Forced to flee to Kansas, Opothleyaholo’s 
followers fended off several enemy attacks before overwhelming numbers routed 
their camp.  In quick haste, the vital provisions needed to maintain the group were 
abandoned.  The Unionists crossed into Kansas destitute, starving, and nearly naked.  
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Once in Kansas, the southern superintendent of Indian affairs was forced to act, 
placing a tremendous burden on the quartermaster stores at Fort Scott. 
 Despite battlefield success during the first year of the war the Trans-
Mississippi region suffered several drawbacks.  The region was almost entirely 
agrarian with limited industrial infrastructure.  Compared to the rest of the south, the 
trans-Mississippi lacked any substantial railroad network.  Louisiana contained just 
328 miles of track, and Texas slightly more, compared to 1400 miles in Georgia and 
1800 in Virginia.  With a limited rail network, the Trans-Mississippi Department 
depended on river systems and wagons to move the bulk of its goods.96  When trans-
Mississippi states occupied federal arsenals at the outbreak of the war they 
confiscated all equipment and weapons; however, a majority of these firearms proved 
obsolete and the state governments located few serviceable cannon.  Many of the field 
pieces acquired were smoothbores from the 1850s.  By the end of the year the 
Ordnance Bureau began shipping field pieces west and in February several guns 
arrived in Indian Territory.97  
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Chapter 3: A Failed Return: The Indian Expedition of 1862 
 
By the end of 1861 thousands of refugee Indians had arrived in Kansas.  
Failure of the United States government to fulfill treaty obligations and the 
abandonment of the military posts in the region left loyal Indians at the mercy of 
Confederate forces.  Once in Kansas, the destitute natives overwhelmed the Southern 
Superintendency and military quartermasters at Fort Scott with demands for 
provisions prompting a military expedition to return the refugees.  The plan called for 
a military invasion and occupation of Fort Gibson, but this force would have to 
receive supplies from the quartermaster department at Fort Scott, nearly 160 miles 
away.  Once in Indian Territory, federal troops would receive supplies from Fort 
Scott by wagon train via the Texas Road and gather provisions from the recently 
returned civilians as they put in crops.  Before the federal plan could succeed, Union 
soldiers had to drive the enemy from the area.   
News of the Indians plight and the atrocious condition they were in reached 
General James W. Denver, military commander of the District of Kansas, and 
William G. Coffin, Southern Superintendent of Indian Affairs.  George W. 
Collamore, Mayor of Lawrence, wrote to William P. Dole, Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, “they were reduced to such extremity as to be obliged to feed upon their 
ponies and their dogs…and in some cases absolute nakedness was their condition” 
and “the women and children suffered severely from frozen limbs, as did the men.”98 
Coffin ordered all of the agents under his supervision to Fort Row, Kansas, to take 
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charge of the various groups of natives.  For weeks, destitute groups of loyal Indians 
poured into southern Kansas.  Slowly, government officials relocated the refugees 
toward Leroy, Kansas, in an effort to better care for them and ease logistical problems 
for distributing agents by moving them closer to Fort Scott and governmental 
supplies. (See Map 4.) The arrival of large numbers of refugees quickly depleted the 
available resources.  Coffin turned to the army for help, but by mid February the 
quartermaster ran out of provisions.99  The Commissary Department, responsible for 
providing the army with subsistence, or food, purchased all provisions by contract.  
Once materials are obtained, the quartermaster provides transportation for all goods 
and stores it for distribution.  Fort Scott received its supplies from the St. Louis depot.  
First the goods traveled west to Fort Leavenworth by boat along the Missouri River 
and then south by wagon.  Dole arrived at Leavenworth in January to take charge and 
provide assurances of an early return to their homes in Indian Territory.100 
Wanting to return the Indians to their homes where they could sustain 
themselves, Commissioner Dole concluded that an invasion of Indian Territory could 
be made with the available federal troops stationed in Kansas.  On 13 March, he 
recommended to Secretary of the Interior Caleb B. Smith that he “procure an order 
from the War Department detailing two Regiments of Volunteers from Kansas to go 
with the Indians to their homes and … to furnish two thousand stand of arms and 
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ammunition to be placed in the hands of the Loyal Indians.”101  This recommendation 
achieved immediate results.  In less than a week Dole received the promise of two 
white regiments and permission to enlist five thousand Indian troops.102    
On 19 March, Adjutant General Lee L. Thomas dispatched a letter to Major 
General Henry W. Halleck, Commander of the Department of Missouri, stating “It is 
the desire of the President, on the application of the Secretary of the Interior and 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that you should detail two regiments to act in the 
Indian country, with a view to open the way for the friendly Indians who are now 
refugees in southern Kansas to return to their homes and to protect them there.”103  
Despite the army’s decision to abandon the territory the previous year, arming and 
returning loyal Indians back to their homes became a priority.   
 General Halleck disapproved of the order and opposed arming the Indians.  
Federal troops had withdrawn just a year before because of the fear of supplying 
troops at such distances.  At the time, he remained occupied with suppressing raiders 
along the border with Missouri and sought Dole’s nominee for the commander of the 
Indian Expedition for his own operations.  Finally in April, Halleck relented and 
ordered General James W. Denver to designate the 1st Kansas Infantry, the 12th and 
13th Wisconsin Infantry, the 2nd and 7th Kansas Cavalry, and two batteries of artillery 
for an Indian Expedition.  The procurement of firearms for the Indian troops began 
slowly, but by 8 April the weapons shipped to Superintendent Coffin in Kansas.104    
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Map 3: Area of Operations, 1862 
 
From Rampp and Rampp, The Civil War in the Indian Territory 
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 Federal forces patrolling the northern borders of the Cherokee Nation had not 
sighted Confederate troops in some time, finding only small bands of raiders.  
General Denver decided that the proposed Indian Expedition should begin its 
invasion as soon as possible.   However, on 10 April, in a last order before the 
operation commenced, Halleck replaced Denver with General Samuel D. Sturgis.105  
The reasons for Halleck’s decision soon became apparent when Sturgis brought the 
expedition to a standstill by halting the enlistment of Indians without further 
instructions and directed the arrest of any person found in violation on 25 April.106  
Superintendent Coffin and Colonel John Ritchie, commander of the incomplete 2nd 
Indian Regiment, immediately protested the order and notified Commissioner 
Dole.107 
 In the midst of the conflict over the use of Indian troops and the forthcoming 
invasion of Indian Territory, the departments of the west were reorganized.  The 
former Department of Kansas, including Indian Territory west of Arkansas, was 
reinstated on 2 May, with General James G. Blunt, an adamant abolitionist from 
Kansas, placed in command.108  Without delay Blunt directed, “…the two Indian 
regiments ordered to be raised will be fully carried out, and the regiments will be 
raised with all possible speed.”  Once again, it appeared arming and returning the 
Indians to their homes was a priority.  Blunt saw beyond the refugee problem.  He 
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intended to occupy Indian Territory and use Fort Gibson as a supply depot for federal 
incursions into western Arkansas.109    
 With increased Confederate activity in Missouri, Indian Territory appeared to 
be lightly defended.  The Union command determined to move quickly with plans for 
invasion and the relocation of the refugee Indians.110  Recruiting officers soon 
completed enlistment in the 1st Indian Regiment, with eight companies of Creeks and 
two companies of Seminoles.  The 2nd Indian Regiment, composed of soldiers from 
various tribes, still lacked the men needed to fill the ranks.  Colonel John Ritchie, 
commander of the unit, ventured into the Osage Nation looking for recruits.111  
However, disagreement and lack of cooperation between Superintendent Coffin and 
Agent Peter Elder delayed Ritchie’s return and enrollment into the regiment.112 
 Placed under the command of Colonel William Weer from the 10th Kansas 
Infantry, the Indian Expedition received equipment for their move south at Humboldt, 
Kansas, from the quartermaster department.  The quartermaster department at Fort 
Scott was responsible for providing clothing, camp equipage, garrison equipage, and 
transportation for its supplies.  Regulations allowed each staff officer one tent and 
every fifteen infantry soldiers or thirteen mounted soldiers one tent.  In addition, each 
infantry and cavalry group were entitled two camp kettles, five mess pans, two 
hatchets, two axes, two pickaxes, and two spades.  Each soldier received his uniform 
including shirt and socks, and one knapsack, haversack, cartridge box, cap pouch, 
bayonet and scabbard, and canteen.  Weer noted the inferior quality of the supplies 
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and weapons issued to the Indians and attempted to locate replacements at Fort Scott.  
In some cases, the weapons would not fire and proved completely worthless.  Finally, 
Weer discovered additional weapons at Fort Leavenworth and issued different 
muskets to portions of the regiment.113   
 The amount of provisions needed by an actively campaigning army is 
staggering.  All of the cavalry horses and wagon teams required twelve pounds of hay 
and ten pounds of grain daily.  Regulations provide each man with daily rations 
consisting of “beef, salt and fresh, pork, bacon, flour, pilot or hard bread, cornmeal, 
coffee, sugar, beans, peas, rice, hominy, molasses, vinegar, soap, candles, and 
desiccated vegetables.”  Each day’s rations for one man average three pounds in 
weight.  All of the beef is provided by local contractors or brought in from the north.  
Pilot bread is made in Cincinnati and St. Lois and shipped west.  While in camp, the 
soldiers usually receive fresh bread, reserving the hard bread for active campaigning.  
To properly supply 100 men required 300 pounds of rations per day, or 9,000 pounds 
per month.  To transport the provisions the army required one wagon for every two 
tons, or 2,000 pounds of goods. Each wagon required a team of mules or oxen, 
ranging from two to eight head, and an additional forty to one hundred sixty pounds 
of forage each day.114   
 While the Indians were readied for the move south, the white troops kept busy 
chasing small bands of bushwhackers in Missouri and the Cherokee Neutral Lands.  
When General Blunt took charge of the Department of Kansas, Colonel Frederick  
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Map 4: Area of Operations, Weer Expedition 
 
Adapted from Rampp and Rampp, The Civil War in the Indian Territory 
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Solomon of the 9th Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry was commander of Fort Scott.  At 
the post were eight companies of the 9th Wisconsin, part of the 2nd Ohio Cavalry 
under Colonel Charles Doubleday, the 10th Kansas Infantry under Colonel William F. 
Cloud, and the 2nd Indiana Battery. These troops could be mustered into service if 
needed for the push south.  In another change of command to the expedition, Blunt 
reassigned the Indian Expedition to Colonel Doubleday.115   
 As Doubleday assembled his force at the border of Indian Territory, Blunt 
once again decided to replace the leader of the Indian Expedition.  Blunt designated 
Colonel Weer as overall commander and reassigned Doubleday to the second brigade.  
Ignoring Blunt’s orders, Doubleday moved ahead with plans for the expedition.  He 
entered Indian Territory on 1 June with troops from the 2nd Ohio Cavalry, 6th Kansas 
Cavalry, 9th Wisconsin Infantry, 10th Kansas Infantry, and the 2nd Indiana Mounted 
Light Artillery.  Colonel Weer and the Indian troops remained behind.116  Acting on 
his own, Doubleday decided it was possible to march to Fort Gibson before 
Confederate forces in the area could unite and stop the federal invasion so he 
immediately moved towards Cowskin Prairie to attack the Confederates under 
Colonels Watie and J.T. Coffee. (See Map 4.)  Even if the federal troops proved 
successful in their campaign, the various delays moved the invasions departure into 
early summer and would prevent any of the returning Unionists Indians from planting 
crops.  Without the opportunity to begin farming, the natives would once again be 
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forced to turn to the army for subsistence.  This time, 160 miles separated the Indians 
from Fort Scott. 
 On 6 June, Doubleday moved south toward the Grand River and Cowskin 
Prairie with 1,000 men and a battery of artillery.  The expedition reached the area 
near dusk, locating the enemy camp just three miles away.  Doubleday ordered the 2nd 
Ohio across the river to take up a position south of the enemy, followed by the 
artillery and infantry as support.  The troops closed in on Watie’s men, not knowing 
their exact numbers.  In a bold move, Doubleday planned to surprise the Confederate 
force before they could mount an effective defense and drive them from the field.117   
 As dawn approached, the artillery opened fire at a distance of 500 yards, 
sending six rounds into the camp.  “The shelling was splendid.  The shells would 
bound from tree to tree and burst with a thundering noise.”118  As the federal rounds 
exploded amongst their tents, Confederate soldiers scrambled putting up only 
minimal resistance.  Watie and the majority of his men escaped; however, the Union 
troops captured 500 to 600 horses along with a number of cattle.119  Watie wrote of 
the engagement briefly, “Federal forces supposed to be 600 strong dashed into 
Cowskin Prairie yesterday and drove in our pickets.  I have moved my train onto 
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Spavinaw Creek.”120  Regardless of the outcome, the engagement served as a warning 
for the Confederates; Union troops had entered Indian Territory.   
 Watie immediately requested reinforcements, knowing that he and Colonel 
Coffee did not have the numbers needed to engage the federals in open combat.  
General Pike, commander of Indian Territory, refused to move his troops from the 
Red River while Cooper slowly pushed his men toward the Cherokee Nation.  
Reacting to Pike’s various delays, General Thomas C. Hindman, commander of the 
Trans-Mississippi Department, sent Colonel James J. Clarkson and a portion of the 
Missouri State Guard to Watie’s assistance.121    
As Doubleday made his way through the Indian nations, Colonel Weer arrived 
at Fort Scott to take command of the Indian Expedition.  Finding Doubleday absent, 
he immediately ordered him to return to Baxter Springs, Kansas rather than take to 
the field. (See Map 4.)  The decision to withdraw the troops from Indian Territory, 
and Weer’s replacement of Doubleday as commander of the expedition, caused some 
controversy in the local press.122  With enemy forces aware of his expedition’s 
intentions, Weer determined to move the command before Watie could unite with 
Brigadier General James S. Rains.  Colonel Weer never indicated why he decided to 
recall the troops from the field.  The decision to wait for their return delayed the 
move south nearly a month. 
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Weer continued to train his new Indian regiments, placing troops from the 
Tenth Kansas in command positions with Colonel Robert W. Furnas in command of 
the Indian Brigade.   Even with the new attention, the Indian regiments lacked the 
necessary transportation to begin the move south.  By mid June Weer returned to 
Leroy, Kansas leaving Solomon and Doubleday at Baxter Springs.  Constant delays 
frustrated Weer and required re-supplying the troops from Fort Scott, eighty miles 
north, before any move south could commence.  If the expedition was to be 
successful, he knew that he had to get his troops moving.  Finally, the Indian 
regiments were readied for action and supplies gathered for the expedition.  In an 
attempt to gain experience, Weer dispatched patrols from the Indian Regiment to 
maintain contact with the enemy and determine their exact locations and strength 
across the border.123   
As dawn broke on 28 June, the Indian Expedition finally began its official 
move south and the first federal invasion of Indian Territory commenced.  Thousands 
of refugees longing to return home accompanied the expedition and the newly 
uniformed Indian soldiers.  Union detachments located Confederate troops under 
Watie at Spavinaw Creek and Colonel Clarkson and his Missourians at Locust Grove. 
(See Map 4.)  Wanting to strike before the enemy forces could unite, the expedition 
moved south in two columns along the Texas Road, and went into camp at Hudson’s 
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Crossing on the Neosho River.  Here the soldiers waited for the supply trains from 
Fort Scott to catch up with the column.124 
After a two day delay, the main Union force under Colonel Lewis R. Jewell 
crossed the Neosho River and moved down the east side of the Grand River.  From 
Carey’s Ford the soldiers continued southeast to Round Grove on Cowskin Prairie, 
where they went into camp.125  Weer learned from the locals that the Confederates 
had moved south.  They also reported that Colonel John Drew and the Cherokee 
Mounted Rifles were at Park Hill and Tahlequah, wavering in allegiance to the 
Confederacy.126  (See Map 4.)  Colonel Weer’s troops moved down the Verdigris 
River toward Grand Saline to confront Clarkson at Locust Grove.  However, the 
federal troops were not alone.  Watie and his men remained in the vicinity of 
Cowskin Prairie, determined to halt the Union advance into Indian Territory.    
On 23 June, General Pike ordered Colonel Cooper north of the Canadian 
River to assume command of all troops in the region.  On 26 June, General Hindman 
issued contrary orders for Colonel Clarkson to assume command of all forces within 
the Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole nations.  Clarkson’s men would be the first 
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Confederate force to meet the approaching Union advance.127  Frustrated with the 
developing situation, Pike turned to Richmond for help.  He reported to Secretary of 
War George W. Randolph that General Earl Van Dorn had transferred twelve Parrot 
guns and 3,000 pounds of artillery powder as well as nearly all tents, clothing, and 
shoes for his Indian forces from Fort Smith to Little Rock, depriving his men of 
valuable supplies.128   In an attempt to solve his supply problem, Pike sent agents to 
San Antonio and Mexico to locate provision.  Despite his efforts, by the end of the 
year he reported he had “no ammunition, no provisions, no transportation, no money, 
and little credit.”129      
 In order to strike at Clarkson, Colonel Weer sent his supply trains, a portion of 
his artillery, the 2nd Ohio Cavalry, and the 9th and 12th  Wisconsin Infantry to the 
west bank of the Grand River and ordered them to Cabin Creek.  In the early evening 
of 2 July, Weer moved with 300 men from the 10th Kansas Infantry and 9th Kansas 
Cavalry, along with a section of Rabb’s 2nd Indiana Battery, to engage Colonel 
Clarkson at Locust Grove.  Moving across the open prairie, the column passed a 
number of Indian cabins en route.  The Union soldiers immediately arrested the local 
men to prevent the enemy from learning of their advance.130 At daylight on 3 July, the 
federal troops attacked.  Awakened by the gunfire, Clarkson and his men only 
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mounted minimal resistance.  The engagement was brief as a sudden barrage of 
gunfire routed the Confederate forces.  According to Union accounts, Clarkson was 
completely defeated, losing 30 men killed and over 100 captured.131 
 Colonel Clarkson painted a different picture.  Sick at the time, he reported 
detaching a portion of his regiment to Watie leaving about seventy-five men in charge 
of the baggage train.  Clarkson also stated he sent Watie across the Grand River to 
watch the federals; however, Watie had disregarded the request and “the consequence 
was the enemy came down the west side of the river, crossed about one mile above 
me, and captured myself and forty-eight men together with all the baggage and 
trains.”132  Members of Clarkson’s own regiment seem to support the Union accounts 
of the engagement, reporting that there were roughly 250 men with the supplies.  
They suggested that Watie contacted Clarkson and advised him to move in the 
direction of Fort Gibson.133    
 Along with the over 100 taken prisoner, the Confederates lost large quantities 
of supplies, including their entire wagon train.134  This small skirmish had 
significance outside of the prisoners and the provisions captured; more importantly 
the Confederate force had been defeated.  Clarkson’s routed men fled to Tahlequah, 
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spreading fear along the way.  The panic that ensued opened schisms between the 
Indians and their governmental leaders, raising questions about the ability 
Confederate government to protect them.  Many of the Unionists fled toward the 
federal lines, increasing the numbers in the invading force.135   
 The Indian Expedition expected opposition from Confederate forces in the 
area.  Colonel Phillips and his scouts kept Weer’s rear free from enemy troops; 
however, the road ahead was unknown.  Watie learned the location of the Union 
forces and planned to halt the advance guard of the federal expedition.  Encamped at 
his mill near Spavinaw, Watie lay in wait for the approaching Union force. (See Map 
3.)  Two companies of 6th Kansas Cavalry, under the command of Captain Harris S. 
Greeno, attacked his position.  A small force, under Major Elias C. Boudinot, slowed 
the Union crossing at Salina Creek.  However, the engagement at the mill resulted in 
a defeat for Watie and his soldiers. The federals captured a large quantity of sugar and 
other supplies, which were destroyed for lack of transportation. Following their 
victory, the Union troops retired to Cabin Creek and celebrated the Fourth of July. 
(See Map 4.)  Colonel Watie rallied his men and moved toward Colonel Cooper near 
Fort Gibson.136  
The Union expedition entered Indian Territory with a predefined policy on 
Indian affairs.  Before their departure, Commissioner Dole suggested to 
Superintendent Coffin that Commissioner Carruth and H.W. Martin accompany the 
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command as special Indian agents to assure the loyal Indians that the government 
would protect them and honor treaty arrangements.137  The United States government 
planned to offer Chief John Ross and the Cherokee the chance to repudiate their 
treaty with the Confederacy and open the area to reoccupation by federal troops.138  
The skirmish at Locust Grove offered Colonel Weer the opportunity to reach out to 
the tribal government with victory on his side.  Weer wrote to Ross, advocating his 
desire to meet and bring the loyal Cherokee under his protection.139  
Despite Ross’s initial attempts to remain neutral at the outbreak of hostilities 
his response proved unacceptable.  He referred to the Cherokee treaty of alliance with 
the Confederacy dated 7 October 1861 and stated that “…the destiny of this people 
became identical with that of the Southern Cherokee…I cannot, under existing 
circumstances, entertain the proposition for an official interview between us.”140  
Much to Weer’s relief, verbal reports reached him that Ross was acting 
diplomatically and waited for the right opportunity to change his allegiance openly.  
Weer forwarded the matter to General Blunt, who ordered him into the area 
immediately to take advantage of the situation.141 
 Colonel Weer moved the federal troops to Flat Rock on 10 July, with a plan 
for the complete takeover of Indian Territory.  Again, he divided his command.  On 
14 July, two detachments moved out under Major William T. Campbell and Captain 
Greeno.  Campbell moved south and ran into a superior force of Confederates at Fort 
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Davis.  After a brief skirmish, he moved toward Fort Gibson in order to rejoin Weer’s 
column.  Captain Greeno took the Sixth Kansas Cavalry and two companies from the 
Indian Regiment and moved toward Tahlequah to secure the Cherokee capital.142    
 Greeno and his troops arrived in the area on 15 July, finding some 200 
Cherokee waiting to join with the Union force.  Greeno quickly summoned the 
various leaders of the tribe.  When his troops found orders from General Cooper 
instructing the men to report to Fort Davis, Greeno arrested the Cherokee leaders and 
made them prisoners of war.  Released on parole, Ross and others accompanied 
Greeno’s men back to Flat Rock.   From there, the Cherokee leader took the Cherokee 
treasury and large portions of their archives, moved on to Fort Scott.143   
 Hoping to press the Confederates, Colonel Weer took 600 troops and moved 
south.  He met some resistance as he combed the country around Fort Gibson for the 
enemy.  About 2:00 a.m. he met Major Campbell, who had driven the Confederate 
pickets from the area and occupied the post.  On 15 July Weer moved toward the 
banks of the Arkansas River and discovered a considerable force on the opposing 
shore.  The federals fired a few shots and fell back to Flat Rock. The federals troop’s 
success throughout the campaign thus far was tremendous; however, the tide was 
about to turn as weaknesses within the expedition began to mount.144 
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When Colonel Weer retired to Flat Rock, he fell into a drunken stupor for 
several days.145  While some of the troops were volunteers from Kansas, a majority of 
the white enlisted men were from Ohio, Colorado, and Wisconsin.  They were poorly 
prepared for a campaign through Indian Territory during the hottest summer months.  
With supplies diminishing and troops exhausted from constant movement in the July 
heat, the expedition ground to a halt.  Forage for the livestock disappeared quickly 
due to the large number of animals needed by the army.  Each day the animals 
required twelve pounds of hay and ten pounds of grain.  Without the necessary hay 
and grain, the animals turned to the prairie.146  In addition, supply trains from Fort 
Scott failed to arrive with the desperately needed provisions to maintain the army.  
Knowing the expedition represented a majority of the forces at his disposal, General 
Blunt warned Weer not to overstretch his supply lines from Fort Scott.  Operating 
over 160 miles from Fort Scott required constant communication and shipments of 
goods down the Texas Road, both easily disrupted by Confederate troops.  As food 
and ammunition dwindled, Weer ordered a Union expedition to the Grand Saline 
River in an attempt to replenish his salt supply.  Receiving ordnance was a second 
major problem.  Munitions had to be brought south from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
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along the Texas Road.  Transporting these materials through enemy lines over such 
distances left them open to attack as they crossed the open prairie.147     
 As conditions worsened in the camp, the Indian Expedition slowly 
disintegrated.  On 18 July, Colonel Solomon acted.  In a clear case of mutiny, he 
arrested Weer and assumed command.  Solomon reported, “The time had arrived, in 
my judgment, in the history of this expedition when the greatest wrong ever 
perpetrated upon any troops was about to fall with crushing weight upon the noble 
men composing the command.  Someone must act, and that at once, or starvation and 
capture were the imminent hazards that looked us in the face.”  In explaining the 
details to his fellow officers, Solomon went on to say, “By Colonel Weer’s orders we 
were forced to encamp where our famishing men were unable to obtain but putrid 
water…Our reports for disability and unfitness for duty were disregarded; our cries 
for help and complaints of unnecessary hardships and suffering were received with 
closed ears.”148   
 A council of war decided the expedition should fall back so regular 
communication could be reestablished and supplies received from Fort Scott; 
however Colonel Weer refused to move.  With nearly two weeks passing since the 
last communication with Fort Scott, the men of the expedition were forced on half 
rations while the horses devoured the scant prairie grass around the camp.  Solomon’s 
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arrest of Weer brought the expedition to a complete halt.149   Ironically, on 19 July, 
the day after Weer’s arrest, General Blunt sent a dispatch from Fort Leavenworth to 
Weer ordering him to hold his ground and “accept the services of all persons, without 
reference to color, who are willing to fight for the American flag and the maintenance 
of the Federal Government.”150   
It was too late to preserve the expedition.  On 19 July, the white troops began 
moving toward Hudson’s Crossing, where couriers reported a supply train waited.  
The morale boost caused by early success disappeared as troops faced starvation.  
Solomon chose Hudson’s Crossing as the site of the base camp because “the 
vicinity…appears as the most commanding point in this country not only from a 
military view as a key to the valleys of Spring River, Shoal Creek, Neosho and Grand 
River, but also as the only point in this country now where an army could be 
sustained with limited supply of forage and subsistence, offering ample grazing and 
good water.”151  By the time the expedition made it to Hudson’s Crossing, nearly half 
of the cavalry were dismounted, their horses giving out under the harsh conditions.  
Becoming desperate for forage, many of the ponies began eating each other’s manes 
and tales while picketed on the prairie.152 
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To guard the retreat of the white soldiers, Solomon left the Indian regiments 
along the Grand and Verdigris Rivers to block any advance by enemy forces in the 
area.   He knew that Colonel Watie and some 1,200 Confederates were moving up the 
east side of the Grand River in an effort to destroy his command and capture what 
little supplies remained.153  When General Blunt received news of Weer’s arrest and 
the retreat of the white troops, he immediately sent orders to Solomon to halt the 
retreat and provide reinforcements for the Indian troops.  Blunt left Fort Leavenworth 
to personally take command of the expedition.  The general rushed to Fort Scott, and 
to his surprise found Solomon and the entire command had beaten him to the post.  
Blunt later learned that Solomon had received his orders while at Baxter Springs on 
his march north.154       
Colonel R.W. Furnas, commander of the isolated Union Indian troops, 
combined the three Indian Regiments into a single brigade.  The new 1st Indian 
Brigade moved into a new position along the Verdigris River; however, numerous 
desertions quickly diminished his ranks, forcing him to move north.  Upon reaching 
Baxter Springs the Indian Brigade caught up with Colonel Solomon.  Before Solomon 
continued his retreat, the Indian Brigade received a small detachment of infantry and 
a section of artillery, but more importantly, they obtained supplies.  With a renewed 
vigor, the Indian Brigade moved into a new position along Horse Creek and 
established Camp Wattles and began dispatching regular patrols.155  
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With Solomon at Fort Scott, the newly formed 3rd Indian Home Guard and a 
battery of Kansas artillery, under Major William A. Phillips’ command, marched to 
the Tahlequah and Park Hill vicinity in late July.  From there, Phillips ordered his 
men down the three roads that converged upon Bayou Menard, seven miles from Fort 
Gibson.  Phillips’ men marched south on 27 July. (See Map 4.)  The center column 
ran head long into the 1st Cherokee Regiment under Colonel Thomas F. Taylor.  As 
fighting erupted between Phillips’ soldiers and Taylor, the two federal flank columns 
arrived.  Quickly overwhelmed, the routed Confederates fled toward Fort Gibson, 
leaving thirty-two bodies on the field.  Colonel Phillips reported the capture of 
twenty-five prisoners.156   The engagement at Bayou Menard helped to keep the 
Confederate forces in the area in check following Colonel Solomon’s retreat.   
While the military forces tried to regroup and avoided contact with one 
another, civilians began waging war upon each other.  The influx of Unionists back 
into the territory, and the presence of the Indian regiments, allowed some families to 
settle old scores.  Murders, house burnings, and robbery became prevalent following 
the withdrawal of federal forces in early 1861.  Unionists took revenge on 
Confederate sympathizers for their actions over the past year and sought to persuade 
neutral families to their cause.  Pro-southern partisans, in turn, victimized the newly 
returned Indians.  Neither side could muster enough strength to push the other from 
the area.  “A federal Indian agent noted it created a “spirit of license.”  He feared that 
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it if “our citizens are in the habit of taking vengeance into their own hands, the 
Indians may follow the example.”157  Union forces implemented a policy of 
dispatching patrols to protect loyal Indians while at the same time extracting a heavy 
toll on those still in support of the enemy.  Civilians in the Cherokee Nation faced 
physical dangers as well as the constant psychological terror because raids were so 
frequent.158    
As raids throughout the territory continued, General Hindman persisted in his 
fight with General Pike.  He wanted Pike to move into Arkansas, but Pike refused, 
citing Confederate agreements with the tribes.  Finally Pike resigned his commission 
and Colonel Cooper assumed his position.  After Pike’s arrest on 14 November, 
Confederate troops transferred him to Little Rock to stand trial for treason; however, 
he was never prosecuted.  The Confederate government in Richmond accepted his 
resignation.  Colonel Cooper ordered his new command north from Pike’s camp at 
Fort McCulloch toward the Cherokee Nation.   
The buildup of Confederate troops at Fort Davis, the reorganization of Watie’s 
men, and reduced supply caused alarm among the Union Indian regiments.  As a 
result, Colonel Furnas ordered the Indian brigades to return northward.  The 1st Indian 
Brigade retired to Baxter Springs, Kansas, the 2nd Indian Brigade moved to Shirley’s 
Ford on the Spring River near Carthage, Missouri, while the 3rd Indian Brigade 
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moved to Neosho, Missouri, leaving Indian Territory open to reoccupation by 
Confederate forces.159   
With this final withdrawal the first federal invasion of Indian Territory ended.  
The Indian Expedition had moved rapidly, almost unopposed from the beginning.  
Union victories on the battlefield helped to destabilize Confederate alliances with the 
tribes in Indian Territory, particularly the Cherokee.  However, weaknesses in the 
army’s ability to maintain a steady flow of supplies compounded over time and the 
failure of Weer to react to the situation culminated in his arrest.  Solomon and the 
majority of the command fled north, against General Blunt’s orders, abandoning the 
Indian regiments and leading to the complete failure of the Indian Expedition.  As a 
result of the withdrawal to the north, Confederate troops again pushed into the area 
causing large numbers of Unionist Indians to again flee into Kansas.   
The federal command learned a valuable lesson during the campaign.  The 
Indian Expedition moved south with the intention of occupying the area.  Besides the 
ineffective leadership of the expedition, the inability of the army to supply these 
troops led to an eventual mutiny even after successfully defeating the enemy forces in 
the field.  At the end of federal campaign, Cooper remained south of the Arkansas 
River and Watie retired across the border into Arkansas.  Had the army prepared for 
the expedition and provided the necessary provisions, the Indian Expedition could 
have maintained their occupation.  The next time federal troops entered Indian 
Territory, they would understand the complications of forward operations. 
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Chapter 4: Into the Heart of the Rebellion: The Union Invasion of 1863 
 
 For the first two years of the war, Confederate dominance over Indian 
Territory reigned supreme.  Union operations in the territory had been disastrous.  
The year 1863 proved to be a turning point for the Civil War in Indian Territory.   
Union success depended on maintaining a force at Fort Gibson and securing the 
Texas Road as a supply route from Fort Scott, Kansas.  Colonel William Weer’s 
attempt to occupy and return refugees resulted in mutiny just a year before, causing 
thousands of Unionists to again seek protection in Kansas.  In order to maintain a 
garrison at Fort Gibson, federal supply lines had to remain open.  Failure to stabilize 
the area surrounding the post would force refugees to seek the safety of the Union 
fortification, adding to the burden of supplying the post.  In addition, an effective 
occupation of the Cherokee Nation would open the door for expanding operations to 
Fort Smith and western Arkansas.  Establishing a garrison 160 miles from their 
supply base posed additional problems.  Overwhelming enemy troops and small 
raiding parties could constantly harass the federal army, threatening to end the 
occupation with the capture of each approaching wagon train.   Increasing pressure to 
remove pro-Union Indian refugees back to Indian Territory would finally lead to 
another military expedition into the Cherokee Nation in April.    
The situation in Indian Territory changed rapidly in early 1863.  On 8 January 
Confederate Brigadier General William Steele, of Texas, took overall command of 
Indian Territory and assumed his position at Fort Smith, Arkansas.  Colonel Douglas 
H. Cooper retained control of all troops in the field and worked on reorganizing the 
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scattered units of Indians and Texans in the southern sections of Indian Territory.160  
In early 1863, the Trans-Mississippi Department was unified under General E. Kirby 
Smith, with his headquarters at Shreveport, Louisiana.  The department suffered from 
a lack of funds and the poor transportation system forced transportation by wagon 
train.  During spring 1863 Union General James K. Blunt ordered Colonel William A. 
Phillips to start relocating Indian refugees from Neosho, Missouri, back into Indian 
Territory.  Roughly 1,000 Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole families began the ninety-
mile trip back, escorted by Phillips and 3,000 Union Troops.  Upon reaching Park 
Hill, just south of Tahlequah in the Cherokee Nation, Phillips encamped.  The second 
invasion of Indian Territory had commenced.161 (See Map 5.) 
On 3 April 1863, one federal battalion from the 2nd Indian Regiment and one 
company from the 6th Kansas Cavalry under Captain N.B. Lucas moved from Park 
Hill southeast towards Fort Smith to search the area for any signs of enemy 
movement.  En route, Captain Lucas ventured to Fort Gibson, and easily drove the 
small garrison from the post. Upon his return, Lucas informed Phillips that no 
significant enemy units were north of a line running from the Arkansas River to Van 
Buren, Arkansas.  Federal occupation of the post could offer Phillips’ command 
additional protection and help create the permanent presence along the Arkansas 
River that General Blunt wanted to establish in the territory.162   
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Map 5: Area of Operations, 1863 
 
Adapted from Rampp and Rampp, The Civil War in the Indian Territory 
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On the morning of 9 April, a refugee train, over a mile long and under the 
protection of Captain A.C. Smith, arrived from Neosho motivating Phillips to 
continue south.  A guard of 300 Indian soldiers arrived with many women and 
children, reuniting many of the pro-Union families for the first time in over a year.  
Phillips marched on to Fort Gibson, reaching it on 13 April and immediately began 
improving the fortifications.   However, there was a major disadvantage to this new 
location.  Fort Gibson was 160 miles from the supply base at Fort Scott, Kansas.  In 
order to maintain a permanent presence, Phillips would be responsible for the 
protection of the supply line south from Baxter Springs, some eighty miles.163 
Rather than wait for the enemy to attack his vulnerable supply lines Phillips 
went on the offensive, hoping to take the war to the enemy and allow provisions to 
reach Fort Gibson.  On 24 April, Colonel Phillips took roughly 600 mounted men 
from the three Indian regiments and the 6th Kansas Cavalry, crossed the Arkansas 
River and started south to find the enemy.  At daylight he found them at Webber’s 
Falls, some twenty miles south of Fort Gibson, under Colonel Stand Watie. (See Map 
5.)  With total surprise, the Union troops opened fire on the enemy soldiers.   A short 
and vigorous fight ensued killing fifteen and wounding about the same number of 
Confederates. The Union losses in the skirmish were reported as two killed.  Caught 
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off guard, Watie made little effort to rally his men and the federals completely routed 
his troops. 164   
On his return from Webber’s Falls, scouts informed Phillips that General 
William L. Cabell had advanced north from Fort Smith to the vicinity of Cane Hill, 
Missouri, placing 1,000 cavalry on his flank, endangering the vulnerable supply line 
from Fort Scott. (See Map 5.)  To remove the threat Phillips dispatched 800 men and 
a section of Hopkins’ Battery, under Lieutenant Colonel Fredrick W. Schuarte, to 
locate and attack the enemy.  Schuarte spent the next week of marching through the 
mountainous area along the border of Indian Territory and Arkansas but never came 
within ten miles of the Cabell.  Despite failing to find the enemy, the expedition did 
stop the Confederate threat towards Fort Gibson and its supply line.  As the Union 
force returned to their post, Cabell moved east to occupy Fayetteville, Arkansas.  
General Cooper moved north from the Choctaw Nation towards Webber Falls to help 
expel the Union troops from Fort Gibson.165  
To drive the federals from the Cherokee Nation, General Steele ordered 
Cooper, now promoted to Brigadier General, with his 5,000 men and three mountain 
howitzers, towards the general vicinity of Fort Gibson. With little delay Cooper took 
up a position five miles south of the fort.  From this new location Cooper watched the 
movements of the Union troops in and around the post and forded the Arkansas and 
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Verdigris Rivers above his camp to harass approaching Union supply trains from Fort 
Scott.166  With the increased pressure from Cooper, Phillips’ position at Fort Gibson 
became precarious.  Phillips sent urgent requests to General Blunt for reinforcements.  
He was aware that if Cooper and Cabell joined forces, he would be unable to hold his 
position at Fort Gibson.   
 On 19 May, General Cooper sent Watie across the Arkansas River during the 
night with parts of five regiments to engage the federals and capture as much Union 
livestock as possible.167  Moving into position under the cover of darkness, Watie’s 
men waited anxiously to begin their assault.  Federal troops discovered the 
Confederates around 9:00 a.m., throwing the garrison into panic. As the alarm 
sounded, Union troops within the fort took arms and moved at the double quick into 
position.  Many rushed to their mounts and raced forward to stop the enemy advance.  
They soon came within sight of the Confederates, mostly Choctaw and Chickasaw, 
formed for battle in the timber.168  A sharp skirmish took place, forcing the federal 
soldiers to retreat.  Phillips set out to the east with two battalions of Indian infantry 
and a section of Hopkins’ battery.  Locating the enemy position, the federal artillery 
opened fire while the cavalry advanced on the left breaking the Confederate line.  The 
Union horsemen pursued them some fifteen miles down the Arkansas River towards 
Webber’s Falls.169   
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 Cooper responded to the retreat and ordered three artillery pieces, supported 
by infantry, to a position three miles south of Fort Gibson.  Within minutes 
Confederate shells began to fall upon a Union picket station on the Arkansas River.  
Cooper intended to attract Phillips’ attention and force him to recall the troops 
chasing Choctaws and Chickasaws.   Rather than recall the cavalry, Phillips took his 
infantry and a section of Hopkins’ Battery to the river bank opposite the Confederates 
and made contact, allowing the riders to continue the pursuit south.  The Union guns 
opened fire upon the Cooper’s men with shot and shell, compelling them to retire.  
Following the assault, the garrison returned to its daily operations. 170  
 With a supply train approaching, Phillips took about 500 men and a section of 
Hopkins’ Battery from Fort Gibson and marched to Rabbit Ford on the Arkansas 
River on 24 May in an attempt to hold Confederate troops while his supplies came in.  
His men located the enemy at the ford and immediately opened fire on the 
Confederates.  In an attempt to engage the enemy troops, Phillips’ column feigned a 
crossing, hoping to remove some of the danger of a concentrated Confederate attack 
on the wagon train en route with desperately needed supplies and munitions.  
Cooper’s men responded, however, after the brief engagement Phillips’ troops retired 
from the field without fording the river.  Following the Union withdrawal, Cooper 
hurriedly moved back into position to intercept the supply train.171    
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 Once Phillips returned from Rabbit Ford, he ordered all of his available 
cavalry to meet and reinforce the approaching supply train while the remaining troops 
moved within the protection of the post’s fortifications.  The reinforcements reached 
the approaching column about nine miles from Fort Gibson on the Texas Road, 
bringing the escort to nearly 1,000 men.  To prevent attack, the column moved under 
the cover of darkness until about an hour before daybreak. Upon reaching the timber 
along the Grand River, about five miles north of the fort, skirmishers discovered the 
Confederate troops advancing.  Within minutes, firing erupted as the Confederates 
moved to take the wagons full of supplies.  The Union troops determined to move 
forward under fire and the train during the entire action.  With musket fire erupting 
from both sides the teamsters continued to push their teams, resulting in a running 
fight.  The supply train arrived at Fort Gibson shortly after sunrise on 25 May without 
the loss of a single wagon.  After a four day rest, Phillips took advantage of high 
water in the Arkansas River caused by recent storms and ordered Major Foreman to 
escort the unloaded wagons north to Baxter Springs.  Again Phillips sent an urgent 
request for reinforcements to General Blunt.172  Though federal troops repulsed the 
attack, Phillips his men required each train arrive successfully to maintain his 
position.   
The failure of Cooper to capture the wagon train may have been a 
disappointment, but it did not diminish his efforts to harass the Union forces at Fort 
Gibson for long.  Cooper understood the capture or destruction of a supply train 
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would force Phillips to withdraw from Fort Gibson immediately.  To maintain 
pressure on the Union forces, Cooper ordered Watie to make a raid through the 
Cherokee Nation to gather supplies and engage the federals as best he could.  Watie’s 
raid served another purpose, intimidating Unionists around Fort Gibson would force 
them to seek protection at the post, straining the quartermaster stores and increasing 
the federal dependence on each train’s arrival.  Watie and his men would operate on 
the Union flank until the next supply train was en route.  Cooper intended for Watie 
to reinforce the troops he would send up the Grand River to intercept the next Union 
train.173   
Watie’s movement did not go unnoticed by the federals for long.  Phillips 
ordered Major Foreman to return down the east side of the Grand River and strike at 
Watie’s marauding troops.  Upon making contact, Foreman pursued Watie from near 
Spavina Creek through Tahlequah and Park Hill to the Arkansas River, forcing him to 
withdraw. (See Map 5.)  When early reports of Watie’s retreat reached Phillips, he 
sent Colonel Stephen Wattles with about 400 men and a detachment of Hopkins’ 
Battery from Fort Gibson to join Forman.  However, by the time the troops reacted, 
Major Foreman had given up the pursuit.  Recalled after marching only fifteen miles, 
Wattles returned the Fort Gibson.  After a four-day rest, Foreman received orders to 
move north and escort the next supply train from Baxter Springs.174 
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Colonel Phillips was aware of the danger of his situation.  He clamored for 
reinforcements and additional supplies knowing Cooper had at least three regiments 
of Texans and five Indian regiments under his command ready to attack the Union 
forces.175  In response to Phillips’ plea for reinforcements, General Blunt ordered 
additional troops south with a large wagon train in late June 1863.  The 
reinforcements consisted of six companies of the 2nd Colorado Infantry, one company 
of the 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry, the 9th and 14th Kansas Cavalry, and one section of the 
2nd Kansas Artillery.  Upon reaching Baxter Springs, the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry 
under Colonel James M. Williams joined the supply train.176  Through scouts, Phillips 
learned that General Cabell’s army would soon join Cooper’s men in an attack on the 
supply train north of Fort Gibson.  If the Confederate forces managed to unite, their 
overwhelming numbers could easily capture the wagons train en route.  On 20 June, 
Phillips sent Foreman and 600 men from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Indian Regiments to help 
escort the train in safely.  The two columns met north of Cabin Creek on 28 June.  
Colonel Williams took overall command of the force and placed Foreman in front of 
the column to scout the area ahead.177  High water from heavy rains slowed the train 
as it crossed the Neosho River delaying its advance for three days.  To avoid a 
surprise attack, Major Foreman  
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Map 6: Battle of Cabin Creek 
 
From Wiley Britton’s, The Civil War on the Border Volume 2, 1863-1865. 
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detached Lieutenant Luke F. Parsons and twenty Cherokees to scout ahead of the  
column.  After traveling just four miles, Parson’s troops came upon thirty of Watie’s 
men.  In a brisk skirmish, the Union soldiers killed four and took three prisoners.178  
Through interrogation of the captives, Williams learned that Watie fielded 1,600 men 
at Cabin Creek and Cooper deployed another large contingent up the east side of the 
Grand River to be joined by Cabell and his 1,500 white troops with three pieces of 
artillery.179  Following the skirmish, Watie’s pickets returned and informed him of the 
wagon’s approach.  Watie knew William’s supply train had to cross Cabin Creek at a 
particular ford.  His troops began preparing for the upcoming fight by digging a line 
of rifle pits along south side of Cabin Creek and covering them with willow branches 
to hide them from the approaching enemy. Cabell arrived on the east side of the 
Grand River, but could not cross because of high water.180 (See Map 6.) 
 On 1 July, the federal supply train reached the heights overlooking Cabin 
Creek.  Heavy rains plagued their march and slowed their progress as the Texas Road 
turned into a muddy bog.  The delay allowed Colonel Williams the chance to plan his 
strategy for the impending with Watie’s troops.  Williams ordered the supply train 
corralled in the open prairie a mile north of the crossing at Cabin Creek while Major 
Foreman, supported by the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry and several pieces of artillery, 
went out in a skirmish line to determine the position of the enemy.  Upon initial 
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contact, Foreman found the enemy occupying a strong position along the south bank 
of the creek; however, the stream was swollen by recent heavy rain.  Unable to cross,  
the Union troops encamped for the night and anxiously waited for the water to fall.181  
During the evening, Williams consulted with Lieutenant Colonel Theodore H. Dodd 
and Foreman.  Fearing Cabell would soon reinforce Watie, they decided to cross the 
creek the next morning under the cover of artillery.  The federal commanders counted 
on the water level dropping just enough to allow troops to cross. Delaying the move 
any longer could endanger the entire operation in Indian Territory by denying the 
federal garrison at Fort Gibson desperately needed provisions.  Dodd posted pickets 
to guard the train and watch the enemy to prevent a surprise attack during the night.182 
It was already beginning to heat up on the morning of 2 July as the Union 
command prepared to take the offensive.  Colonel Williams ordered the artillery into 
position for the engagement.  Lieutenant A. Wilson took a section of the 2nd Kansas 
Battery and placed it on the extreme left of the Union line in an elevated position 
overlooking the field while Lieutenant Jule C. Cayot took one mountain howitzer and 
moved into position on the right of the line.  Captain A.J. Armstrong moved his guns 
into the Union center, just 200 yards from the enemy.183  Once in position, the 
artillery opened fire with shell and canister hoping to soften up the enemy before the 
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advance.184  It would later become apparent that the Union guns were firing over the 
heads of the Confederates in the rifle pits.  After a barrage of more than half an hour, 
Major Foreman, assigned to command the attack, moved forward.  Foreman’s initial 
assault included a mounted company of the 3rd Indian Home Guard, the 1st Kansas 
Colored Infantry, the 2nd Colorado Infantry, and three companies of the 9th Kansas 
Cavalry.185   
Once the Union advance reached the opposite bank of the creek, the 
Confederates rose up from the rifle pits and fired a heavy volley into the blue clad 
soldiers, wounding Foreman and others.  The federals failed to see the hidden 
entrenchments, so the sudden fire from the concealed enemy caused some confusion 
in the advance.  Almost immediately, the Union soldiers fell back.  The 1st Kansas 
Colored Infantry began to fire their muskets from a ridge on the north bank directly 
into the Confederates, driving them from their trenches.  Colonel Williams seized the 
opportunity and pushed forward, moving three companies to the bank of the creek as 
his artillery again fired upon the Confederates.186   
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Williams ordered a company of the 9th Kansas Cavalry, under Lieutenant R.C. 
Philbrick, to take the place of the Indian company in the advance.  Philbrick pushed 
forward under the cover of the artillery and secured a footing on the south side of the 
creek.  Once across, his men continued to draw heavy small arms fire.  Responding to 
Philbrick’s initial success, Williams advanced through the creek to aid the Kansans 
and formed a line of battle in front of the enemy.  A strong Union line developed and 
drove the Confederates from the brush, but they reformed and rallied on the edge of 
the prairie about a quarter mile away.187  As the Confederate established a new line of 
battle, Williams ordered Captain Stewart and two companies of cavalry to the right to 
keep the enemy from flanking his position.  Philbrick again pressed forward, breaking 
the Confederate center.  Once the Confederate line collapsed, Williams ordered 
Stewart and all of the available cavalry to while pursuing the retreating Confederates.  
The mounted soldiers dispersed their foe throughout the brush and creeks preventing 
Watie from rallying his troops.  Williams believed it ill advised to leave the train 
poorly defended and pursue the enemy for too great a distance so he called back 
cavalry as the train moved out towards Fort Gibson.188   
The federals reported three men killed and thirty wounded.  Williams reported 
Confederate losses as about fifty killed and nine taken prisoner. The Union supply 
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train reached Fort Gibson without further Confederate harassment.  Watie and his 
troops retired towards Honey Springs Depot.  Having failed to reinforce Watie 
because of high water on the Grand River, General Cabell moved back towards Fort 
Smith.189    
The attempt of the rebels to take the train at Cabin Creek and the large build 
up of Confederate forces at Honey Springs Depot prompted General Blunt to take to 
the field from Fort Scott with additional cavalry and artillery.190  Additional troops 
would allow for active campaigning against the Confederate forces operating around 
Fort Gibson.  By taking the fight to the enemy, Blunt could secure the supply line 
from Fort Scott to Fort Gibson and deliver a decisive blow to Cooper.   
The 600 Union reinforcements brought the total force at Fort Gibson to just 
over 3,000 men.191  When Cooper received news of the defeat at Cabin Creek and 
Blunt’s arrival at Fort Gibson, he dispatched a runner to General Cabell asking him to 
return to Honey Springs as soon as possible in order to make a combined attack on 
the Union forces.  The Confederate general still believed a successful strike at the 
Union forces would drive them from the territory.  Cooper posted strong pickets at all 
of the fords on the Arkansas River with instructions to slow any enemy advance and 
alert him to any Union troop movement.  The 6,000 Confederates at Honey Springs 
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prepared to march on Fort Gibson, waiting on the arrival of Cabell and his 3,000 
additional troops and artillery from Arkansas before they moved out.192 
 After a forced march from Fort Scott, Blunt and his men reached Fort Gibson 
on 11 July.193  Upon his arrival, Blunt received information of the proposed assault on 
Fort Gibson by the Confederates.  He determined to strike Cooper at Honey Springs 
Depot before Cabell could arrive to reinforce him.194  Due to unseasonably heavy 
rainfall, the Arkansas River was not fordable below the mouth of the Verdigris River.  
As a result, Blunt ordered his men begin construction of boats to transport them 
across the swollen river.  At midnight on 15 July, Blunt rode out of Fort Gibson with 
250 men from the 6th Kansas Calvary and four pieces of light artillery, marched up 
the Arkansas River about thirteen miles, forded it, and then returned down the south 
bank.  Confederate pickets downstream, near the mouth of the Grand River, noticed 
the federal troop’s movement and returned to Cooper’s headquarters at Honey 
Springs warning him of the Union advance.195   
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Map 7: The Battle of Honey Springs 
 
 
From Willey Britton’s, The Civil War on the Border Volume 2, 1863-1865. 
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 The remainder of Blunt’s men crossed the rain swollen Arkansas River at the 
mouth of the Grand by flat boat on the evening of the 16 July, and by 10:00 p.m., the 
federal army moved south down the Texas Road with just under 3,000 men and 12 
artillery pieces.196  General Blunt organized his troops into two brigades.  The first 
brigade, commanded by Colonel William R. Judson, consisted of the 1st Kansas 
Colored Infantry, the 2nd Indian Home Guard, a battalion of the 3rd Wisconsin with 
two howitzers, and four guns from the 2nd Kansas Battery.  The second brigade, under 
the command of Colonel Phillips, comprised of six companies of the 2nd Colorado 
Infantry, the 1st Indian Home Guard, and Hopkins’ Kansas Battery with four artillery 
pieces.197 
 Around daylight, the federal vanguard under Captain William Gordon came 
upon a force of Confederates, near Chimney Mountain, and formed to attack them.  
Gordon’s party quickly engaged their foe, but superior numbers forced the Union 
troops back until reinforcements could be brought up and the action continued. (See 
Map 5.)  As Blunt’s column approached, the federal forces reengaged the 
Confederates driving them from their position with cavalry.  The routed men fell back 
to the safety their main line, allowing Cooper to deploy for battle and to stop the 
Union advance.198  This skirmish near Chimney Mountain took place during a rain 
shower and at some point in the scuffle the Confederates realized that some of their 
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gunpowder imported and brought in through Matamoros, Mexico, absorbed moisture, 
causing their weapons to misfire.  199   
Moving ahead, the federal force discovered the Confederates positioned in the 
timber north of Elk Creek.  To get a better idea of Cooper’s position, Blunt and some 
of his staff rode forward with one company of the 6th Kansas Cavalry deployed as 
skirmishers and examined the Confederate line.  The enemy front extended for one 
and a half miles with their center on the Texas Road.200  After the inspection, Blunt 
rode back to the column.  The Union troops had marched all night, and during the 
next two hours the soldiers took a much needed break and ate from their haversacks.  
Many of the soldiers to filled their canteens in depressions, full of muddy water from 
the recent rain showers.201   
 Around 10:00 a.m., General Blunt formed his men into two columns and 
moved forward in a column of companies to conceal his troop strength.  A quarter 
mile of the Confederate position the federal soldiers deployed to the left and right of 
the road and within minutes, the Union force was in a line of battle covering the 
entire Confederate front. 202   Wishing to have white troops on the extreme flanks, 
Blunt placed the 1st Kansas Colored in the center of the Union line next to the 2nd 
Colorado.  The 1st Indian Home Guard and the 6th Kansas Cavalry comprised the left 
flank and the right flank was made up with the 2nd Indian Home Guard and the 3rd 
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Wisconsin Cavalry.  The artillery under Captains Smith and Hopkins formed their 
batteries in the center of the federal front.203 (See Map 6.) 
 The Confederates under General Cooper formed on both sides of the Texas 
Road in heavy timber along Elk Creek.  The 20th and 29th Texas Cavalry, dismounted, 
and the 5th Texas Partisan Rangers formed the center.  Cooper’s right wing was 
composed of the 1st and 2nd Cherokee Regiments and his left the 1st and 2nd Creek 
Regiments.  The Choctaw and Chickasaw Regiment and two squadrons of Texas 
cavalry provided Cooper a reserve.  These troops remained near Cooper’s 
headquarters, two miles to the rear of the main battle line.  The artillery formed in the 
front of the 20th Texas.204 (See Map. 6) 
 General Blunt’s soldiers advanced across the prairie until the Confederate 
artillery opened fire.  Within seconds, the Union guns replied as the enemy cannon 
revealed their positions.  For more than an hour, the artillery crews fired at each other 
without inflicting significant damage.  The troops on both sides hunkered down and 
awaited the inevitable order to advance.  While outnumbered two-to-one in men, 
Blunt’s batteries severely out gunned the Confederate units.  Cooper fielded three 
twelve-pound mountain howitzers and one experimental twelve pound bronze piece.  
The Federal artillery consisted of twelve field pieces; six of these were large twelve 
pound Napoleons, two iron six-pound guns, and four mountain howitzers.  During the 
opening minutes of the engagement the Confederate guns concentrated their fire on 
                                                 
203 James G. Blunt, Report, 26 July 1863. and John Bowles, Report, OR, Series I, Volume 22, 
Part 1, 449450. and Frederick W. Schaurte, Report, 20 July 1863. and William T. Campbell, Report, 
19 July 1863. and J. Nelson Smith, Report, 19 July 1863. and Cottrell, The Civil War in the Indian 
Territory, 79. and Britton, The Civil War on the Border Volume II 1863-1865, 118-119. and Britton, 
The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, 276-278.  
204 Thorton B. Heisten, General Order No.25, OR, ser. 1, vol. 22, part 1, 461-462. and 
Douglas H. Cooper, Report, 12 August 1863, 457-461. and Britton, The Civil War on the Border 
Volume II 1863-1865, 119 and  Britton, The Union Indian brigade in the Civil War, 278. 
85 
 
the Union battery supported by the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry removing one 
Napoleon from action.  The federal cannon fired upon the enemy with shot, canister, 
and shell, in turn dismounting an enemy gun.  One shot from the experimental piece 
burst among the Union officers killing one of Blunt’s aides.205    
 As soon as the artillery fell silent, the soldiers moved into action.  General 
Blunt’s cavalry on the right and left of the line dismounted to fight as infantry and 
moved forward to open fire on the Confederates in the timber.  Cooper attempted to 
flank the Union line on the left so the 6th Kansas Cavalry met, and repulsed them.206   
The Federal infantry moved forward within forty or fifty yards of the Confederate 
line hiding in the scrub brush along the creek.  Blunt ordered Colonel Williams and 
the colored infantry to capture the four-gun artillery battery supporting the 20th and 
29th Texas Cavalry Regiments, if feasible.207   
 Williams moved his men, with bayonets fixed and muskets loaded with buck 
and ball, to within forty paces of the Confederates and fired a devastating volley into 
their line.  At the same time Colonel Charles DeMorse of the 29th Texas gave the 
order to fire.  Williams fell wounded in the chest and face.208  Both sides kept firing 
for some time while the 1st Kansas loaded and shot from a prone position for 
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concealment. Lieutenant Colonel John Bowles assumed command of the colored 
regiment.209   
 Bowles was on the regiment’s right when he noticed some of the 2nd Indian 
Home Guard moving between the Union and Confederate lines.  He immediately 
ordered the Indians to fall back.210  The commander of the 29th Texas heard the 
instructions and mistook it for an order for the 1st Kansas to retreat.  Colonel 
DeMorse brought the Texas regiments up to within twenty-five yards of the colored 
regiment hoping to take advantage of their withdrawal.  Just as the Texans came into 
line, the 1st Kansas fired a volley into them killing and wounding a number of men 
including their color-bearer.  The remainder fell back in quick haste.211   
While the Colored infantry fired at the enemy, three companies of the 2nd 
Colorado Infantry on the Union left came close to being cut off and captured.  As the 
soldiers advanced through the brush and timber these three companies ventured as 
much as twenty paces in front of the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry and came upon an 
impassible gully. The troops filed to the left to come into line.  A group of 
Confederates hidden down in the ditch rose up between them and the Union line 
cutting them off.  In an effort to prevent disaster, Bowles ordered the 1st Kansas 
Colored Infantry to the oblique, marched to within fifty yards of the enemy and fired 
into them.  Only a few yards from the Confederates, the men from the Colorado 
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companies soon realized their situation and fired upon the enemy killing and 
wounding many of the soldiers.212   
At the same time, on the left of the Union line, the 1st Indian Home Guard and 
the 6th Kansas Cavalry entered the timber.  They quickly forced the Indians and 
Texans under Watie across Elk Creek at a lower ford.213   With the Confederate line 
crumbling, the 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry dismounted on the right of the Federal line to 
flank the enemy.  They engaged the two Creek regiments and with the assistance of 
howitzers, forced the Confederate left to break upon their center.214  At this point, 
General Cooper realized that he could no longer hold his position on the north side of 
Elk Creek and ordered his men and artillery to move south.  An effort was made to 
defend the bridge crossing the creek, but the troops failed to make a stand as the 
federal infantry flooded into the area. With the help of Hopkins’ Battery, the Union 
soldiers drove them from the vicinity.215  Blunt’s men continued to push the 
Confederate forces for three miles into the prairie towards Honey Springs Depot.216    
As the Union troops advanced, the Confederate troops set fire to all buildings 
and supplies at the Honey Springs Depot.217  One of the commissary buildings was 
captured before it could burn.  The 1st Kansas Colored Infantry inspected about 400 
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pair of handcuffs in one of the buildings.  David Griffith, a black slave who waited on 
Confederate Major J.A. Carrol, later stated he “frequently heard the southern officers 
say that the handcuffs were brought up there to be put on colored soldiers they 
expected to capture.”  He also said he “frequently heard the southern officers talking 
with each other say that they did not believe colored soldiers would fight and that all 
the southern troops would have to do was march up to the colored men and take 
them.”218 
By 2:00 p.m. the battle was over.  General Blunt’s men went into camp on the  
battlefield, collecting and burying the dead through the next evening. General Cooper 
and his defeated army moved east and linked up with General Cabell and his 3,000 
soldiers on the march to reinforce him at about 4:00 p.m.219  Blunt reported Union 
losses as seventeen men killed, sixty wounded, and that one hundred and fifty 
Confederates were buried on the field.  The federals also took seventy-seven 
prisoners, one artillery piece, one stand of colors, and two hundred stands of arms.220  
Cooper reported his losses at one hundred thirty four killed and wounded and forty-
seven Federals captured.  Even with Cabell’s additional troops, Cooper’s demoralized 
soldiers could not return to active fighting.  The combined force retired below the 
Canadian River and camped.221   
 General Blunt returned to Fort Gibson with more than a decisive victory; he 
successfully destroyed one of the Confederate’s advance supply depots just twenty 
miles from the Union base of operations.  The boost to the federal morale was 
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astounding.  With Confederate troops moving south, the federals could easily bring 
supplies south, boosting the garrison’s quartermaster stores.  The loss of Honey 
Springs Depot forced Confederate soldiers to rely on the depots at Perryville and 
Skullyville for operations.  The battle also placed the Confederates on the defensive 
and helped to secure the supply line from Fort Gibson to Fort Scott, allowing wagons 
full of supplies to move south. 
 Hearing of the General Cooper’s defeat, General Steele immediately took to 
the field to take command of the Confederate forces within Indian Territory.  On 22 
July, Steele ordered Cooper and Cabell to advance above the Canadian to Prairie 
Springs, just fifteen miles southeast of Fort Gibson.  General S. P. Bankhead was on 
his way north with an additional brigade of Texans.  Steele intended the combined 
force stop additional federal supplies and reinforcements from reaching Fort Gibson.  
However, General Bankhead failed to arrive and Cooper and Cabell’s armies 
disintegrated before their eyes as men deserted.  During a single night, Cabell lost as 
many as 200 troops.  General Steele again retreated to the south side of the Canadian 
and the safety of North Fork Town.222 (See Map 5.) 
 General Blunt noticed the troop movement and decided to act.  With the 
recent victory on his side, he wanted to move from Fort Gibson in search of his foe.  
On 21 August, Colonel William F. Cloud arrived at Fort Gibson with an additional 
1,500 troops from the 2nd Kansas Cavalry, bringing Blunt’s force to more than 4,500.  
Blunt took his entire force, the largest the federal army would field in the Indian 
Territory for the duration of the war, south to defeat the Steele and the concentrating 
forces of Cooper, Cabell, and Watie.   The army traveled sixty miles over the next 
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two days and came within sight of the camp, only to find it abandoned. To Blunt’s 
disappointment, Steele had divided his forces.  Steele and Cooper proceeded south 
towards the supply depot at Perryville, Choctaw Nation, while General Cabell 
marched towards Fort Smith, and Colonel Chilly McIntosh and his Creeks moved 
west towards the headwaters of the Canadian.223 (See Map 5.) 
 While still in the field, scouts advised General Blunt that Watie, Cooper, and 
Steele encamped about twenty-five miles south on the Texas Road with 5,000 men.  
Without delay, Blunt moved his army out at 3:00 a.m., placing cavalry and light 
artillery in the advance.  After seven hours of continuous marching, the advance 
guard came across parts of Steele’s rear and fired on a company of Choctaws.  In the 
brief skirmish, the federal troops killed four and took their captain prisoner.  From 
him, Blunt learned this company of Choctaws had just arrived in the field, part of an 
additional 800 man contingent.  Throughout the remainder of the day, Blunt sought 
the main body of the Confederate force.  When contact was made with any of Steele’s 
troops, the Union cavalry would ride forward to attack the enemy, and eliminate it.  
Around 8:00 p.m., the federal troops approached the outskirts of Perryville.  Advance 
skirmishers slowly made their way towards the town’s structures, hidden by timber.  
Suddenly from the darkness two Confederate howitzers fired canister shot, wounding 
four of Blunt’s troopers.224   
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 At Perryville, the Confederate commanders deployed their forces for the fight.  
They constructed barricades to slow the Union advance and had placed a pair of 
howitzers to guard the road while soldiers removed munitions, food, and other 
supplies from the town.  When the federal advance approached the Confederate guns 
opened fire.  As darkness began to fall, General Blunt deployed the 6th Kansas 
Cavalry on the right and left of the road as skirmishers and brought artillery up for 
support.  As the cavalry pressed forward, Blunt’s artillery unlimbered.  Once the 
federal troopers were within 300 yards, the Union guns fired a dozen rounds, forcing 
the enemy from the fortifications.225   
 General Steele managed to slow the advance long enough to remove large 
quantities of supplies from Perryville.  He moved his supply train several miles 
outside of town and slipped away in the darkness as Blunt occupied the town.  After 
covering forty miles and with his troops completely exhausted, Blunt did not give 
chase.226  General Blunt deemed the town a regular military post, with nearly every 
building containing military stores left behind by the fleeing Confederates.  All of the 
supplies that could be transported were loaded into federal wagons and then Blunt 
issued the command to burn the whole place.227 
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Map 8: The Fort Smith Campaign 
 
From Willey Britton’s, The Civil War on the Border Volume 2, 1863-1865. 
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 With Generals Steele and Cooper retreating towards Texas, General Blunt 
decided to move on Fort Smith.  Before he marched towards the post, Blunt sent 
Colonel Judson with the 1st Indian Regiment, 2nd Colorado, and 6th Kansas Cavalry 
west to protect his flank from Colonel McIntosh’s Confederate troops.  As the federal 
troops tracked the Creeks, many of McIntosh’s men deserted.  By the time the Union 
cavalry broke off the pursuit, the enemy force had shrunk to just 150 men.  Judson 
and his command retired to Fort Gibson without the loss of a single soldier.228   
 Blunt continued to march east towards Cabell at Fort Smith with Colonel 
Cloud’s brigade of 2nd Kansas Cavalry, 6th Missouri Cavalry, and two sections of 
Rabb’s Artillery.  Cabell moved into a defensive position on the Poteau River about 
nine miles outside of Fort Smith with 3,000 troops.  He deployed pickets at the San 
Bois Mountains to provide early warning of Blunt’s approach.  In order to slow the 
federal advance, trees were cut to block roads and fords.  To prevent the 
quartermaster supplies possible capture, Cabell ordered all of the provisions at Fort  
Smith loaded into wagons and moved to Waldron, Arkansas. (See Map 5.) All that 
remained was to wait for the Union forces to approach.  Hoping to pinpoint Blunt’s 
approach, Cabell ordered daily scouts sent out twenty-five miles, beyond the San 
Bois.229   
On 30 August, General Blunt’s advance guard met the Confederate scouts just 
west of the San Bois Mountains and gave chase.  Colonel Cloud, leading the 6th 
Kansas Cavalry, 6th Missouri Cavalry, and two sections of Rabb’s Artillery 
aggressively pursued Cabell’s men.  The running fight brought the lead elements of 
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the Union army to within four miles of Cabell’s front before darkness forced the 
Union soldiers to halt for the night.  With the return of daylight, the mounted troops 
again took up the chase hoping to locate the enemy force.   
On August 31, Blunt camped three miles west of the ford on the Poteau River, 
just miles from the enemy.  Cloud approached to within a quarter of a mile of the 
Confederate guns, but fell under artillery and musket fire.  After a brief skirmish, the 
federal forces retired as night fell.  Blunt’s scouts brought word that Cabell was 
entrenched along the right bank of the Poteau.  At daylight, the federal force again 
moved towards Cabell.  As the Union troops approached, they discovered Cabell’s 
men had slipped away under the cover of darkness.  Blunt crossed the Poteau River in 
search of Cabell and prepared to move on Fort Smith.230   
 The following morning, Cloud moved his brigade to attack.  However, once 
again Cabell retired during the night in the direction of Fort Smith.  Colonel Cloud 
requested a number of cavalrymen and two mountain howitzers pursue Cabell in an 
effort to capture his baggage train.  At noon, he located the Confederate rear guard on 
the road to Jenny Lind and the enthusiastic federals gave chase. Captain Edward 
Line’s Kansas troops finally overtook the Confederate rear guard and charged 
forward confidently, yelling and shouting as they rode.  The Blue clad cavalry ran 
head long into an ambush at the base of the Devil’s Backbone Mountain. (See Map 
5.) Deadly fire dismounted fourteen men in the two in the front companies.  The 
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remainder of the party fell back and awaited the main body of troops to arrive before 
reengaging Cabell.231 
  Forced to make a stand, Cabell placed Monroe’s Regiment at the foot of the 
mountain with the remaining troop’s en echelon along the sides of the slope near the 
road.  His artillery moved into a position overlooking the entire field.  Colonel Cloud 
rode up in person and found Cabell’s men spread throughout the timber supported by 
artillery.  In an effort to force Cabell back, Cloud ordered the entire federal force into 
action.  For over three hours the battle raged at Backbone Mountain.  During a lull in 
the fighting, eight of the Confederate companies broke and ran, forcing Cabell to 
suddenly withdraw, leaving his dead and wounded.232   
 Colonel Cloud immediately occupied the field and posted pickets.  He 
reported Union losses at fourteen with fifteen to twenty Confederate dead.  General 
Cabell reported his losses as five killed and twelve wounded.233   Cabell wrote of the 
Battle of Backbone Mountain, “there was nothing to make these regiments run, 
except the sound of cannon.  Had they fought as troops fighting for liberty should, I 
would have captured the whole of the enemy’s command, and gone back to Fort 
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Smith…”234  The exhausted condition of the federal cavalry prevented pursuit.  
Having secured the field, Cloud moved towards Fort Smith the following morning.235 
 After detaching Cloud to pursue Cabell, General Blunt proceeded to march to 
Fort Smith.  With his staff, body guard, and the 1st Arkansas Infantry (Union), he took 
possession of the fort and city without opposition.  Shortly after arrival, Blunt fell ill.  
When Cloud returned from Backbone Mountain, Blunt turned over command and 
returned to Fort Scott and the comforts of his headquarters.  The capture of Fort 
Smith on 1 September brought an end to the second federal invasion of Indian 
Territory allowing them to focus on maintaining their supply lines and pacifying the 
local population.  Confederate forces retired below the Arkansas River.  Union troops 
occupied Forts Gibson and Smith, and effectively reduced the ability of Confederate 
forces to concentrate in opposition.  Despite the victories across Indian Territory, 
Union control of the area was still limited.  Colonel William C. Quantrill’s raid on 
Lawrence, Kansas, on 21 August, spread fear throughout the Cherokee Nation.  
Desperate to restore confidence in civilian population, Union patrols deployed to hunt 
down the marauding guerrillas.   
On 4 October, General Blunt received a dispatch from Fort Smith informing 
him that a large number of Confederates were gathering in the vicinity.   Blunt 
prepared to move his headquarters from Fort Scott to Fort Smith to personally 
oversee operations.  He gathered all of his staff records, papers, and property and 
created an escort from the few men at the post.  With most troops in the field already, 
Blunt pulled men from Company I, 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry and Company A, 14th 
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Kansas Cavalry.  The escort, along with Blunt’s personal staff and the regimental 
band totaled about 100 men.  Blunt’s little column left late in the afternoon on 4 
October, marching only six miles the first day.  After two full days march, the 
expedition approached Baxter Springs around noon on 6 October.236   
Blunt halted his column and wagons near the camp, allowing the band to catch 
up.  The federal forces had transformed Baxter Spring into makeshift fort, halfway 
between Fort Scott and Fort Gibson, to serve as a resting point for the supply trains 
destined for Indian Territory.  Lieutenant James B. Pond arrived in early October at 
Baxter Springs with additional troops from the 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry.  The camp was 
not large enough to accommodate his command, forcing him to begin enlarging the 
fortifications.  The old post consisted of four walls, made of logs and earth, about four 
feet high.  The east wall housed barracks and ran about 100 feet in length.  The north 
and south walls remained in place; however, the west end of the cantonment was 
open due to active construction.  The mess area was located about 200 feet from the 
south side of the fort.  Pond had a variety of troops under his command at Baxter 
Springs, including one company of the 2nd Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry, 
Company D from the 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry, and a portion of Company C, 3rd 
Wisconsin Cavalry.237   
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Map 9: Engagement at Baxter Springs 
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General Blunt was not the only military column heading south on the Texas 
Road.  Fleeing frequent patrols in Kansas following his raid on Lawrence, Colonel 
Quantrill left southwestern Missouri on 1 October for winter quarters in Texas.  With 
him, over 400 mounted guerillas traveled south, unaware that a federal garrison lay in 
their path at Baxter Springs.  Early on 6 October, Lieutenant Pond ordered a detail to 
forage for supplies north of Baxter Springs.  All of the available wagons headed north 
with an escort of sixty cavalry troops.  Along with searching for forage, the 
detachment was to patrol the area, offering some protection to the weakened garrison.  
Quantrill’s scouts located the wagons moving north quite a distance from the safety 
of the cavalry.  After overwhelming the wagons, Quantrill learned from the prisoners 
that Union troops were encamped at Baxter Springs; however, the men politely forgot 
to mention the fortifications.  The guerilla leader quickly developed a plan to isolate 
the cavalry from the garrison and eliminate the two groups.238   
Quantrill ordered his column to close ranks and move in fours towards the 
camp.  In an instant, the thundering sound of hoof beats interrupted the federal 
soldiers as they relaxed for dinner.  Completely surprised, Pond ordered his men to 
take cover and return fire.   Quantrill’s men attacked with such ferocity that they 
drove in everything before them, and soon took possession of the stockade.  Having 
no infantry for support, the Confederates fell back and reformed for another assault 
unaware the majority of Pond’s men were unarmed.239  The federal soldiers forced 
their way through the mounted guerillas to reach their muskets, stacked neatly in the 
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fortifications.  Four federals were gunned down as they ran to their guns.  Lieutenant 
Pond, dining in his tent about 200 yards west of the camp, rushed to rally his men.  
Along with a handful of the 2nd Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry, he positioned his 
one howitzer and opened fire on Quantrill’s raiders.  After the initial shock wore off, 
Pond organized his men.  By the time the Confederates charged again, the federals 
presented strong defense, forcing the enemy to retreat outside of the range of the 
Union muskets.240  
Just as Quantrill’s men fell back to regroup, General Blunt’s column arrived at 
Baxter Springs.  Blunt halted his column about 400 yards from Baxter Springs, just 
out of sight of the post because of a high ridge.  While his escort closed ranks, Blunt 
noticed a group of men advancing from the timber near the spring, some 500 yards to 
his left.  When the mounted men came within 300 yards they halted.  Dressed in 
federal uniforms, Blunt assumed the group was Pond’s cavalry on drill.  Weary of 
such large numbers, Blunt choose to ere on the side of caution, and ordered his escort 
in line to face them.241 
  While the Union line moved into position, William S. Tough, a civilian 
scout, rode forward to examine the large force in the prairie.  Within minutes, he 
returned to the main line and informed Blunt that the cavalry to his front were 
Confederate irregulars.  General Blunt then rode toward the cavalry, to determine 
exactly who they were.  He moved forward about seventy-five yards when the 
soldiers commenced firing on his column.  To Blunt’s south, musket fire erupted at 
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the post.  Blunt immediately turned towards his escort and gave the order to fire; 
however, his troops broke and ran at a full gallop across the prairie.  As Blunt’s men 
fled, Quantrill’s guerillas charged with revolvers, followed by an additional 200 men 
from the timber cutting the Union general off from the safety of the fortifications.  
Along with Major H. Z. Curtis, Blunt managed to rally fifteen soldiers.  After sending 
a lieutenant and six troopers to Fort Scott for reinforcements, Blunt and the nine 
remaining soldiers hid on the fringe of the action, harassing Quantrill as best they 
could.242   
Major Benjamin Henning rode to the crest of the hill, hoping to ascertain the 
condition of the garrison at Baxter Springs.  He found Pond’s men nearly encircled, in 
heavy fighting.  He soon came under fire as a small group of Confederates tried to 
pass by with three prisoners.  Hoping to rescue the men, he called to Captain William 
S. Tough and Stephen Wheeler from the 3rd Wisconsin.  Wheeler and Henning rode 
forward firing on the guerillas, killing one and wounding another.  In the fight, one of 
the prisoners was shot through the shoulder.  The freed federals made their way to 
Pond and the safety of the post.  Henning turned his horse and raced towards Blunt.243    
Soon, the Confederate guerillas closed in on the federal troops fleeing across 
the prairie.  The guerillas hunted the federal soldiers down individually, slaughtering 
most where they were found.  Major Henning watched as the regimental band was 
murdered near their wagon.  Along with the dead were James O’Neal, a special artist 
for Frank Leslie’s pictorial paper and a twelve year old boy.   Both were shot and 
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thrown under the wagon before it was torched.  In addition, the drummer boy was 
shot and thrown under the wagon.  When the fire reached his clothes he must have 
regained consciousness and crawled about thirty yards before finally succumbing to 
his injuries.  He was found dead with all of his clothes burned off, except pieces 
between his back and the ground.244 
By 4:00 p.m. the fighting ended.  The federal garrison watched as Blunt’s 
deserted wagons were searched while Quantrill’s men looked for items of value.  
Quantrill reassembled his command on the prairie, but before moving south he sent 
two soldiers under a flag of truce to the federal fortifications demanding an exchange 
of prisoners.  When Lieutenant Pond told the men he had no prisoners the two rode 
back to the main body of troops.  After a few minutes Quantrill’s raiders headed south 
along the military road.  With them went nine wagons, each fully loaded, General 
Blunt’s buggy, one ambulance, several stands of colors, and various camp equipment.  
Blunt personally lost his sword, official commission of rank, all of his personal 
papers and letters.245   
Lieutenant Pond lost six men killed and ten wounded.  Blunt’s column bore 
the brunt of the casualties.  When he examined the prairie around Baxter Springs, 
Blunt and the Union troopers found eighty men killed, all shot through the head and 
mutilated.  Eight men survived, each shot at least six times each. Quantrill lists his 
losses as three killed and three wounded; however the federal reports list twenty to 
                                                 
244 Benjamin S. Henning, Report, 7 October 1863. and Britton, The Civil War on the Border 
Volume II 1863-1865, 218. and Rampp and Rampp, The Civil War in the Indian Territory, 47. 
 245 James G. Blunt, Report, 17 October 1863. and James B. Pond, Report, 7 October 1863. 
and Charles W. Blair, Report, 17 October 1863. and Benjamin S. Henning, Report, 7 October 1863. 
and William C. Quantrill, Report, 13 October 1863.  
103 
 
thirty Confederates dead buried.246  Union reinforcements arrived on 8 October.  
Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Blair received word early on 7 October of the attack 
and moved south with about 100 men from the 12th Kansas Infantry and the 2nd 
Kansas Colored Infantry.  After burying all of the dead, General Blunt returned to 
Fort Scott with Blair.247  The engagement at Baxter Springs developed by chance as 
the Quantrill’s men wandered into the federals.  The engagement reminded federal 
troops and Blunt that Confederate forces still operated at will above Fort Gibson and 
Fort Smith.   
The summer of 1863 brought a decisive blow to Confederate operations in 
Indian Territory.  Federals controlled two of the enemy’s most valued outposts, Fort 
Gibson and Fort Smith, and destroyed two additional depots at Honey Springs and 
Perryville.  Completely demoralized, the Confederate forces remained south of the 
Canadian River, while Steele and Cabell attempted to devise a plan to retake the two 
posts.  Late in the year, Colonel Richard M. Gano arrived with an additional 1,000 
Texas troops; however, the Confederate command still could not muster the strength 
to mount an offensive.  General Cooper could not mobilize his Indian troops and 
remained at Doaksville.  A severe ice storm ended all hopes for the immediate 
recapture of Fort Smith.  Without adequate clothing, Steele ordered the Confederate 
command to Boggy Depot, while Cooper remained with his forces along the Red 
River.  Hoping to occupy the federals, Watie began a raid through the Cherokee 
Nation to relieve the pressure on the Confederate command and shift the war north.   
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In November, Watie moved north with 500 to 800 men to harass the federal 
troops and frighten Unionists in the area.  He rode around Fort Gibson and attacked 
pro-Union Cherokees in Tahlequah, setting fire to everything in his wake.248  At Park 
Hill he burned the home of Chief John Ross.  While in Tahlequah, Watie broke up a 
council meeting as his cavalry moved up and down the streets shooting randomly into 
buildings.  News of the attack reached Fort Gibson on 17 December and Colonel 
Phillips dispatched patrols in search of Watie’s men.  Captain Alexander C. Spilman 
left Fort Gibson late 17 December with 290 troops from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Indian 
Home Guard and one howitzer.  Heading north along the Park Hill Road, Spilman 
reached the Illinois River at midnight and went into camp.249 
Through local inhabitants, Spilman learned that Watie had raided the Murrell 
house, burned a number of slave quarters at the Ross plantation, and then moved 
towards the Illinois River bottom during the evening to camp.  Just after 7:00 a.m. 
Spilman moved his command toward Barren Fork.  En route he encountered two 
small groups of Confederates.  As they approached they must have taken the Union 
soldiers for Watie’s column.  Soon, the discharge of muskets killed one and sent the 
remainder riding off in quick haste.  Composed of infantry, Spilman’s column lacked 
cavalry and offered no pursuit.  The discovery of the Confederate patrols intensified 
the federals hopes of finding Watie’s main force.250   
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Not quite a mile past Sheldon’s place along Barren Fork, the advance guard 
sighted the enemy force.251  Captain Spilman moved forward to examine the 
Confederate position.  Through the heavy underbrush he located them and formed in 
a ravine running from the road up a hill.  Spilman brought the howitzer and ninety-
five men from the 1st Indian Regiment up and placed them just to the right of the road 
under Captain Willets.  He sent Lieutenant Luke F. Parsons with the remaining 
Cherokees further to the right, between the gun and the base of the hill.  Before 
Parsons moved into position, the Confederates opened fire wounding Willets among 
others.  The federal howitzer quickly went into action, causing the enemy line to 
break.  With Captain Willets wounded, Parson’s troops pushed forward a quarter of a 
mile with all of the available men.  The Confederates formed again, only to be routed 
a second time.  With the road now clear, Spilman called his men back and moved into 
position on higher ground where a few scattered log buildings offered the infantry 
some protection.252 
Just as Spilman moved into his new position, the enemy attacked from the 
east.  The rough terrain slowed their advance just long enough for the Union howitzer 
to load.  With canister and shell, the Union gun forced them to seek refuge in the 
timber on an adjoining hill.  Sheltering themselves behind trees and rocks, the 
Confederates opened fire on the federal troops.  For more than two hours the two 
forces fired at each other, unable to push the other from the field.  Finally, Spilman 
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developed a plan to draw the Confederates from the trees.  He ordered the command 
to the road, pretending to abandon his position.  The ploy worked.  The Confederates 
advanced and dismounted.253   
Spilman ordered his men back into position at the double quick and quickly 
brought the howitzer up.  As the federals fired, the enemy again broke and fled.  The 
Union troops pursued, driving the enemy for more than a mile before halting from 
exhaustion.  Captain Spilman reported his losses as two severely wounded and 
Captain Willets killed.  In addition, two horses and two mules were lost.  Twelve 
Confederates were killed along with a number of enemy horses killed and wounded.  
Captain Spilman resumed his march, headed towards Major Foreman at Rhea’s Mill.  
Stand Watie and his men moved south, towards Fort Smith.254  As the year drew to a 
close, Confederate troops remained active in the Fort Gibson vicinity, forcing locals 
to seek refuge at the post. 
Frustrated by his experiences within Indian Territory General Steele, 
requested he be relieved of his command.  On 11 December the general was 
dismissed and General Samuel B. Maxey, of Texas, assumed command of Indian 
Territory.255  Infuriated that he was overlooked for the position, Cooper wrote directly 
to President Jefferson Davis, urging his own appointment to command.  To pacify 
Cooper and ease the command transition, General Maxey proposed the division of the 
department into two brigades under Cooper and Watie.  At the same time he decried 
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the conditions of Indian Territory to his superiors, particularly the lack of supplies.  
General Maxey began reorganization of his command in preparation for spring 
offensives.256 
Slowly winter returned to Indian Territory.  Confederate troops were 
demoralized and lacked enough supplies to be considered effective soldiers and 
continued to mass south of the Canadian River.  Raids became the prominent form of 
attack, most led by Colonel Watie and the Cherokee Mounted Rifles.  Frequent raids 
led to open hostility between federal forces and the civilian population.  As both 
armies requisitioned livestock and crops many families found themselves without 
food.  As the year closed some 18,000 pro-southern Indians fled south into the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in search of help.257  The flight of the Confederate 
refugees south showed the changing roles of the Union and Confederate armies in 
Indian Territory.  Federal success on the battlefield throughout the war bogged down 
the enemy troops while the Confederate commanders used up vast stores of 
munitions, clothing, and food.  In July, federal troops took Vicksburg and Port 
Hudson, along with control of the Mississippi River, separating the Trans-Mississippi 
Department from the rest of the South.   
By late September, James Bell, an officer in Watie’s command, wrote to his 
wife that out of 5,000 men about 1,000 were unarmed and without shoes and clothing.  
The destruction of the supply depots cost the Confederate troops valuable supplies.   
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He went on to say the troops were neither discouraged nor whipped.258   While the 
enemy troops remained south of the Arkansas River, federal troops hauled wagon 
loads of supplies south down the Texas Road.   
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Chapter 5: One Last Hurrah! 
 
Confederate troops found themselves hard pressed for victories after the 
successful federal invasion into Indian Territory in 1863.  Fort Gibson and Fort Smith 
were in Union hands and Blunt’s troops had destroyed the depots at Honey Springs 
and Perryville.  Confederate troops kept Phillips busy protecting his supply lines and 
constant escort duty prevented active federal campaigning during the fall of 1863.  
Following the Battle of Honey Springs, General Steele divided his army allowing 
General Blunt to engage and defeat his troops piecemeal.  Federal troops began 1864 
fully supplied and ready to engage the enemy.  On the other hand, Confederate troops 
had suffered serious setbacks and fell under the command of a new leader.  
Throughout the year Confederate troops defended the territory and shifted to mobile 
cavalry raids to strike federal supply lines.  These raids targeted communication, 
wagon trains, detached troops in hay camps or advanced bases, and lightly defended 
civilian populations and offered Generals Cooper and Maxey alternatives to direct 
confrontation. 
General Steele’s replacement, General Maxey, spent much of early 1864 
reorganizing the units and command structure in the territory.  Gano attached troops 
from the Creek and Seminole Nations to Stand Watie and his Cherokee troops to 
create the 1st Indian Cavalry Brigade.  Colonel Tandy Walker commanded the 2nd 
Indian Cavalry Brigade, composed of all remaining Native American forces.259  
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Maxey grumbled to his superior General E. Kirby Smith that his troops lacked 
competent leaders, leading to a lack of discipline.  He found many of his command’s 
muskets in deplorable condition while some soldiers lacked weapons at all.  The 
ability of the federal troops to advance south, in the face of Confederate opposition, 
forced some tribal members to waiver in allegiance to the government in Richmond, 
especially after the annuity payments failed to arrive early in the year.260  In addition, 
both the federal and Confederate commanders found themselves burdened by 
thousands of refugees, forced from their farms by the prospect of enemy raids and 
starvation.261  Unlike the two previous years of conflict, 1864 would become the year 
of great raids. 
Determined to clear out the small bands of Confederates still operating within 
the area, federal patrols from Fort Gibson and Fort Smith intensified.   Detachments 
from Fort Gibson focused on the Cherokee and Creek Nations.  Phillips established 
outposts at Hildebrand’s Mill, Mackey’s salt works, Cabin Creek, and Flat Rock to 
protect the supply lines and hay operations necessary for a continued Union presence 
in the territory.262   As 1864 began, battles fought in Indian Territory would be over 
food, hay, and equipment rather than gaining territory.  Increasing refugee problems 
caused both sides tremendous burdens.  Growing desperate for supplies and 
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ammunition, Confederate forces raided often.  Poor crop production in the Cherokee 
and Creek Nations, along with inclement weather, forced the federals to use wagon 
trains to supply their troops within Indian Territory.  The use of the supply trains was 
not new for the Union troops; however, the repeated use of the Texas Road removed 
much of the forage along the route.  Decreased rainfall and the drop in water levels 
throughout the area greatly increased the number of fordable crossings and allowed 
the Confederate forces to move about the territory without alerting the federals.263  
 Following a successful year of active campaigning, Colonel Phillips 
determined to take the war deep into enemy territory and deliver a devastating blow 
to Confederate forces.  Ordered south in late 1863, most of the Confederate troops 
remained deep inside the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations.  In January 1864, 
President Abraham Lincoln issued a proclamation to the Five Civilized Tribes 
offering pardons to any tribe willing to cease hostilities and support the federal 
government.  Phillips sought to take the war to those still in rebellion in order to 
distribute the proclamation and to collect all the forage possible along the way.  He 
included his own letters with that of the president, citing the futility of continuing the 
war.  To the Chickasaws, Phillips wrote “you cannot fail to see the end coming…The 
great government of the United States will soon crush all enemies.  Let me know if 
you want to be among them.”264  In the face of recent defeats, Phillips pleaded in his 
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letter to Seminole Chief John Jumper, “accept it soon [defeat], you may be preserved; 
if you do not, you and your people will be blotted out in blood.”265 
Map 10: Area of Operations, 1864 
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Adapted from Rampp and Rampp, The Civil War in the Indian Territory 
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 With his supply lines secure, Phillips planned an expedition through the heart 
of enemy territory to shorten the war in the west.  By mid January, Phillips began 
finalizing his plans.  He gathered troops for the campaign and worked on securing 
additional supplies for the upcoming campaign.  Union victories across the country 
boosted the soldier’s morale as rumors spread through the fort about the upcoming 
move.  On 27 January, a large forage detail left the post under Major Moses B.C. 
Wright, heading towards Rhea’s Mill to gather flour and fodder for the upcoming 
mission.  With provisions secured, the 150 men would rejoin the main federal column 
en route.266   
 The garrison received a circular, issued by Phillips, on 31 January with 
directions for the upcoming campaign.  Phillips was quite blunt in his instructions.  At 
least three times daily, each regiment and company was to call roll and any man 
deserting would be arrested and shot.  Phillips warned his soldiers to aim and shoot 
carefully; implying prisoners would slow the progress of the column.  Phillips called 
on the troopers to unleash their vengeance and make their footsteps severe in an effort 
to crush the will of the civilian population to continue the war.  Throughout the 
remainder of the year, numerous federal officers began similar offensives.  Phillips’ 
march proceeded General William Tecumseh Sherman’s infamous March to the Sea 
by three months.267    
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Map 11: Phillips’ Expedition, 1864 
 
Adapted from Rampp and Rampp, The Civil War in the Indian Territory 
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 Phillips gathered roughly 2,000 men for the invasion.  The expedition was 
made up of the 1st and 3rd Indian Regiments, elements of the 14th Kansas Cavalry, and 
one section of howitzers.  Phillips ordered Colonel Thomas Moonlight to join the 
column near Boggy Depot with the remainder of the 14th Kansas Cavalry to provide a 
fresh reserve for his troops after their long march south.268  Phillips thought his 
column strong enough to push into northern Texas and the arrival of Moonlight’s 
fresh troops would allow him to operate freely along the border, convincing the 
rebellious tribes to renounce allegiance to the Confederacy.269   
 Early on 1 February, the companies formed and wagons moved into line.  A 
large detachment of cavalry took the advance with the main body of the column 
composed of infantry, artillery, and wagons.  The expedition moved south quickly, 
hoping to penetrate deep into Confederate held territory before a defense could be 
mounted.  The column marched day and night, covering 105 miles in four days.  
From his camp on the North Fork of the Canadian, Phillips dispatched several patrols 
to scout the area.  One force went up the Canadian River into the Seminole Nation.  
Another detachment traveled up the Little River.  Each patrol’s orders included 
provisions that all materials and buildings of military value be destroyed.  Phillips left 
a small escort for Colonel Moonlight’s approaching cavalry and headed further down 
the South Canadian.  En route the expedition began to encounter occasional contact 
with small groups of Confederates, inflicting heavy losses on them before driving 
them from the column’s path.  In various skirmishes, the federal troops killed nearly 
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one hundred Confederates and took twenty five prisoners, all without the loss of a 
single man.270   
 The Confederate forces fell back in front of the advancing Union invasion 
while Cooper relocated his headquarters from Fort Towson to Fort Washita.  Fort 
Washita lay in the path of the federal onslaught, along the Texas Road.  Slowly, 
Cooper began organizing his troops to halt the federal advance while urgent pleas 
went out for reinforcements.  General Henry McCulloch ordered Quantrill’s men 
north; however, he refused to move citing a lack of adequate weapons or supplies.  
Determined to curb the federal advance, Cooper sent orders for all troops within the 
Indian Territory to converge on Fort Washita.  Writing to E.P. Turner, General 
McCulloch showed his disillusionment with the situation in Indian Territory, “I 
would not be surprised if they [the federals] take Boggy Depot and Fort Washita, with 
all the stores of both places.  I will do the best I can…but with very few men and very 
few caps and fewer guns than men, I cannot do much.”271 
 Phillips’ column continued to advance slowly, without encountering 
substantial resistance.  However, Colonel Moonlight failed to arrive with his 
reinforcements.  Finally deciding not delay the campaign any longer, Phillips ordered 
the 1st Indian Regiment to advance towards Boggy Depot on 10 February while the 
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main column waited one additional day for Moonlight’s arrival.  The next day the 
columns reunited and continued the march the next morning.  On 13 February, a scout 
reported a Confederate camp on the edge of a clearing near Middle Boggy Creek.  
With Phillips’ cavalry in the advance, Major Charles Willets organized the 14th 
Kansas Cavalry for an attack.272  He formed his men opposite the enemy camp and 
within minutes, his cavalry charged from the timber.  At a gallop, Willet’s soldiers 
took the Confederates completely by surprise.  Outnumbered four to one, they offered 
little resistance and scattered across the open prairie.  The fighting ended almost as 
soon as it had started.  Remembering Colonel Phillips’ orders, no prisoners were 
taken.  All of the dead were left on the field, with their throats cut from ear to ear.  
Willets reported forty nine Confederates killed without the loss of a single man.273 
 The following day, Phillips continued southwest towards Fort Washita, 
hoping to draw the enemy into a set battle.  After marching twenty one miles he 
established camp near the Blue River, along the Texas Road.  Without Moonlight’s 
troops, Phillips knew he could not push south into Texas.  However, he decided to 
make one final thrust towards Fort Washita and deliver a final blow before returning 
to Fort Gibson.  Phillips sent Colonel Wattles north to the Little River with the wagon 
train, captured oxen, supplies, and infantry while he assembled all of the available 
mounted men.  On 14 February, Phillips moved his fast moving column, composed of 
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450 troopers from the 14th Kansas Cavalry, 1st and 3rd Indian Regiments, and one 
howitzer, towards Fort Washita.  For the next three days his column met increased 
resistance as Cooper’s men mobilized.  Reevaluating his situation, Phillips decided to 
retire towards Fort Gibson without further incident.  The column reached the post on 
29 February.274 
 Phillips’ march lasted nearly a month, covered roughly 400 miles, and 
reportedly killed 250 enemy combatants without the loss of a single man.  Though 
Phillips failed to strike across the border into Texas, his troops had penetrated 165 
miles into enemy territory.  During the expedition “he burned every house and crop, 
confiscated or destroyed every viable food source, and captured women, children, 
slaves, and livestock,” and shipped the spoils north.275  However, Phillips failed to 
shatter defiance to federal authority in the territory and nearly eliminated his cavalry’s 
serviceable mounts.  The death and destruction that was left in his wake only served 
to reinforce the resolve of the southern sympathizers.  The Confederate commanders 
claimed Phillip’s column retreated in the face of Confederate forces.  General Maxey 
reported the Union expedition only added to the determination of the tribes to 
continue the fight. 276  
 In late February, a council composed of Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Seminole 
representatives met at Armstrong Academy.  General Maxey joined the tribal leaders 
and promised victory in the coming year.  Following the lead of the Choctaws, the 
tribes continued their loyalty to the Confederate government.  To help relieve fears 
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amongst the Indians, President Jefferson Davis personally wrote to the tribes in late 
February.  “The welfare of the citizens and soldiers you represent are identical with 
those of the Confederate States…”277  Davis promised the government would honor 
all treaty stipulations and designate the Indian Territory a separate military 
department under the command of General Cooper.278  Davis addressed the issue of 
supplying the territory firearms bluntly, “arrangements have been made with Major 
Le Flore to have a certain number of arms delivered…for the Indians.”279   
 Despite the council meeting and Davis’s letter, some tribal members remained 
unconvinced of the Confederate government’s ability to protect them.  In late 
February, representatives from the Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Seminoles met at 
Armstrong Academy.  General Maxey addressed the council, meeting many of the 
representatives for the first time.  Maxey and Cooper promised victory in the coming 
year and ensured the tribal representatives that the government in Richmond would 
honor all of the treaty obligations.  Following the lead of the Choctaws, the council 
reaffirmed their loyalty to the Confederacy.280   
 During March, the two opposing forces collected supplies and forage, trained 
their troops, and stepped up patrols.  On 12 March, the Union army began its 
campaign up the Red River from Shreveport, Louisiana.  While expedition quickly 
bogged down and became ineffective, the move occupied General Maxey’s attention 
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and kept Confederate troops in reserve in the southeastern corner of Indian Territory 
until mid April.  Supplying the garrisons at Fort Gibson and Fort Smith became the 
immediate concern for the Union army in the west while enemy troops remained 
south of the Arkansas River.  Colonel Phillips reported transportation for supplies as 
completely inadequate.  To gather wheat in early March, Phillips used every means 
available.  In a letter to General Curtis on 7 March, Phillips declared, “The supplies I 
have been getting from the border of Arkansas are being drained, and will not last me 
much more than a month longer.”281   
 In an effort to receive provisions, Phillips ordered several mule teams, along 
with nearly 200 head of oxen, to Fort Scott.  He requested quartermaster stores 
including pantaloons, socks, and shoes as well as condensed food, sugar, coffee, 
molasses, and desiccated potatoes.  Mules became so scarce in the vicinity of Fort 
Gibson that Phillips urged the employment of ox trains.  He located about 600 steers 
for confiscation at Roley McIntosh’s, a “rebel man,” and 500 to 1,000 among the 
loyal Creeks that could be bought for $20 to $40 per pair.   At Fort Smith, Blunt faced 
a similar situation.  He reported to Curtis that he needed 500 mules to hitch up all of 
the wagons.  Desperate for the animals, he sent Captain Durbin to purchase about 200 
animals at up to $175 per head.282 
 In a separate letter, Phillips outlined plans for reorganizing the Indian troops. 
To increase discipline, Phillips believed one regiment of white soldiers should be 
stationed with them.  Also, each company should have at least two white officers.  
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“Although nearly all the Indian officers are useless…they have in some cases 
influence that no white men have.  As a recruiting expense, even the Indian officers 
are worth the money.”283  Phillips urged his commanded to ship adequate food and 
clothing for his troops.  In addition, he also reported 200 to 300 deserters scattered in 
the hills.  During the lull in fighting, these fugitives began attacking loyal Indians.  To 
curb the problem, Phillips sought permission to arrest them and set them to work 
improving the fortifications at Fort Gibson under ball and chain. 284  At Fort Smith 
General Blunt reported similar problems.  Arriving on 8 March, Blunt found the 
garrison stripped of all supplies.285  General Curtis sought to provide the needed 
goods and ordered a train with ammunition from Fort Scott and supplies shipped up 
the Arkansas River by boat.  He reminded Phillips that “the fate of our nation depends 
on the events of this year’s campaign, and every officer should feel the importance of 
great efforts and endurance.”286   
 While the federals took advantage of the pause in combat Confederate leaders 
waited anxiously to head north.  From Fort Smith, Watie reported two regiments of 
cavalry headed to Fort Scott to escort a train south.287  By March, Confederate 
quartermaster stores slowly began to empty.  At Boggy Depot, just over 1,000 pounds 
of flour, between 9,000 and 10,000 pounds of meal, and 100 bushels of corn 
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remained.  The lack of forage in the area worried Cooper.  Wagons sent to Texas 
depots frequently had to search the countryside to find corn and other goods.288      
 In a move that would have infuriated his predecessor, Albert Pike, a number 
of the Indian troops under Maxey’s command moved across the border into Arkansas 
in early April to reinforce General Sterling Price.  Maxey commanded two brigades.  
Gano’s Texas brigade, under Colonel Charles DeMorse, was composed of the 29th, 
30th, and 31st Texas, Welch’s Texas Company, and one battery under Captain Butler 
Krumbhaar.  The second brigade, under Colonel Tandy Walker, included the 1st and 
2nd Indian Regiments. 289  After arriving in Arkansas, Maxey learned that a large 
supply train set lightly guarded as federal troops gathered hay and fodder at Prairie 
D’Ane, while the bulk of the Union force remained at Camden with General 
Frederick Steele.  The large federal force under Steele was part of the larger Union 
plan to capture the depot at Shreveport, Louisiana.290 
 Early on 18 April, Gano moved his brigades forward, and as senior officer 
took command of the Confederate troops gathering to assault the train.  About 9:00 
a.m., General John S. Marmaduke and General Cabell also moved into position to 
attack the unsuspecting federal troops.  Maxey deployed Marmaduke’s division on 
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the right, and his own troops and artillery on the left.  General Cabell’s men filled the 
center, supporting the artillery.  The Union soldiers held higher ground with the train 
closed up on the road behind troops.  With the Confederate line formed, Maxey’s 
division moved forward to the left of the field, just out of sight of the enemy as the 
artillery opened fire.  As the Confederates advanced, volleys erupted across the line.  
The Choctaw troops charged several times, finally driving the federal troops from the 
train into a heavily wooded ravine.  Colonel Tandy Walker moved his troops forward 
to attack.  As muskets blazed along the Confederate line, the Union troops again fell 
back.  Once again, the Choctaws charged forward, forcing the federal troops to flee 
towards Camden and the safety of General Steele’s main force.  After pushing them 
for more than two miles, the victorious soldiers returned to the wagon train.  
Confederates found about thirty of the wagons damaged and burned them on the field.  
About 170 wagons, still hitched to teams and filled with corn, bacon, clothing, hogs, 
geese, and “unscrupulous plunder” were theirs for the taking.  In addition, Maxey’s 
men captured a four gun federal battery.  At the Battle of Poison Springs, the federals 
lost nearly 500 killed and 100 captured.  General Maxey’s two brigades suffered 
seventeen dead and eighty five wounded.  In all, Confederate losses at Poison Springs 
were sixteen killed and eighty eight wounded.  On 28 April General Price released 
Maxey’s troops and they returned to the Indian Territory well supplied with a 
substantial victory on their side.291   
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  After returning to Indian Territory, Maxey knew the federal troops would not 
remain passive for long.  Rather than wait for the Union troops to move south, he 
choose to take the war to them while the victory in Arkansas remained fresh in the 
minds of his troops.  Maxey sought to avoid contact with the main federal army.  
Instead, he sought to strike at vulnerable logistical objectives and withdraw, shifting 
the balance of power in Indian Territory.  In early April, Colonel Adair received 
orders to move north with 500 men in two regiments.  General McCulloch requested 
that Quantrill also head toward Kansas.  Adair’s soldiers headed out on 17 April 
while Quantrill took about 150 irregulars in a separate column.  Heavy rains and 
federal outposts limited the movement of both groups.  Quantrill’s men tried to cross 
the Arkansas River above Fort Gibson but a federal guard at the ford forced them 
back.  Alerted to the increased activity, Colonel Phillips could do little.  He possessed 
no cavalry to offer pursuit.  As Quantrill’s force attempted to cross the Arkansas, 
Adair’s troops ran into federals while fording the Illinois River near Tahlequah.  
Without cavalry to hunt the enemy, Phillips reluctantly dispatched two regiments of 
infantry to chase down the Confederates, knowing they could not keep pace with the 
well mounted enemy.  Colonel Adair turned east towards Arkansas.  Fearing his 
troops would become trapped as the rains continued to fall; Quantrill crossed the 
Verdigris River and moved below Fort Gibson.  Phillips reported enemy movements 
to General Curtis and placed federal troops at all of the fords in the vicinity of Fort 
Gibson.  By early May, Quantrill and Adair returned south without causing 
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significant damage; however, they showed Phillips and the local inhabitants that raids 
could still be mounted and succeeded in placing federal troops on the defensive.292 
 The Confederate advance in April showed one of the developing weaknesses 
in the federal garrisons.  The lack of cavalry could prove disastrous if Maxey 
mounted a full campaign.  He wrote to General Steele, desiring instructions to 
procure horses for his Indian regiments.  These regiments entered service mounted on 
their own horses, but several years of action rendered the animals worthless.  Phillips 
estimated he needed 1,000 ponies to mount his men.  The situation grew so desperate 
that he had to borrow or hire horses for scouting.  General John M. Thayer, 
commander at Fort Smith, objected to the request stating “it is exceedingly difficult to 
obtain horses, even for the regularly organized cavalry; forage is scarce and grain 
could not be furnished; [and] the term of service of these regiments is drawing to its 
close.”293  Not alone in his opinion, Thayer estimated the cost of providing horses for 
Phillips at $160,000.  All of the federal commanders endured a shortage of cavalry 
units.  In July, the 1st Arkansas Cavalry (Union) reported about 100 mounts available 
for some 840 troopers and early the next month the 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry could 
mount only a dozen men.  Finally, Phillips concern reached all the way to General 
Ulysses S. Grant.  Grant wrote to Major Halleck from Culpeper Court House, 
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Virginia, with approval of Phillips’ plan.  Phillips brought in all of the ponies 
available from locals and purchased a small herd from the Osage tribe; however, he 
failed to mount most of his command.  Serviceable mounts were just not available in 
the area.294 
During the summer of 1864, the Union commanders in the west attempted to 
remove some of the burden of supplying Fort Gibson overland by dispatching a stern-
wheel steamer up the Arkansas River.  The garrison at Fort Smith routinely received 
shipments of goods via the river and General Curtis planned to use the Arkansas as a 
means to liberate Fort Gibson from the Texas Road.  In late February, Curtis wrote to 
Captain M.H. Insley, Quartermaster at Fort Scott, with plans for the use of shallow 
draft boats to run from Little Rock to Fort Gibson.  He understood that weather would 
limit navigation the Arkansas to a few weeks a year, but the prospect of quickly 
carrying large amounts of stores in a relatively short time period prompted an 
attempt.295   In June, heavy rainfall filled the Arkansas River to the point that a 
steamer could reach the post.  The J.R. Williams, a troop ferry at Fort Smith, was 
selected for the trip.  Cloth, cotton, blankets, harnesses, boots, 1,000 barrels of flour, 
and fifteen tons of bacon filled the steamer.  Twenty four men under Lieutenant A.B. 
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Cook assembled to escort the vessel along its route.  Lieutenant George W. Huston, 
from the 14th Kansas Cavalry, received orders to accompany the vessel and insure it 
stores were properly unloaded and the ship returned with salt and lime.296 
The departure of the J.R. Williams was no secret in Fort Smith.  Operating in 
the area, Stand Watie quickly learned of the voyage.  He moved with 300 men and 
three pieces of artillery to Pleasant Bluff along the Arkansas River, five miles below 
the mouth of the Canadian, and set up an ambush.  Watie’s troops used the timber 
along the river to conceal their positions and waited patiently for the ship to steam 
into sight.  Around 4:00 p.m., the J.R. Williams steamed within range and Captain 
George W. Grayson fired a warning shot across its bow, hoping to convince the 
steamer to stop.  When the ship refused to stop the Confederate troops opened fire on 
the vessel with the three howitzers and small arms.  The artillery quickly disabled the 
J.R. Williams, forcing the pilot to run the boat aground on a sandbar near the north 
shore of the river.  The federal troops took shelter behind the freight and returned fire 
but within minutes the Confederate artillery drove the defenders from the ship.  The 
Union soldiers jumped overboard into water waist deep and made their way to the 
shore and took shelter several hundred yards away in the timber.  With the ship on 
their side of the river, Lieutenant Cook decided to hold his position until 
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reinforcements arrived.  To his horror, the captain of the boat and Lieutenant Hudson 
emerged from the J.R. Williams as the enemy fire ceased and started across the river 
in a yawl.  Knowing Watie’s troops could now cross the Arkansas, Lieutenant Cook 
ordered his men to retreat towards Fort Smith abandoning the provisions.297 
Watie used the yawl to ferry soldiers over and secure the J.R. Williams.  His 
men found four federals dead.  Using ropes, the Confederates pulled the ship across 
the river and began to unpack its plunder.  As Watie’s men unloaded their bounty, a 
large portion of his Creeks and Seminoles laden with supplies left the camp and 
headed home.  Left with a few men, Watie continued to unload the cargo throughout 
the night while waiting for wagons to transport the goods.  About noon on 16 June, 
federal forces returned to the vessel.  As soon word of the attack reached him, 
Colonel John Ritchie marched from Mackey’s Salt Works, about ten miles from the 
J.R. Williams, with 200 men.  Upon his arrival, he found Watie’s troops still at the 
steamer and opened fire.  Neither Ritchie nor Watie could muster the strength to drive 
the other from the field.  Finally, Watie ordered the ship and supplies burned, fearing 
they would fall back into Union hands.  Even though a majority of the supplies 
aboard the J.R. Williams were destroyed, Watie’s shocking attack on the steamer 
exhilarated southern sympathizers in the region and forced the federal garrison to 
receive supplies from Fort Scott via the Texas Road.298     
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As Watie’s small party waited, he received word of a large federal detachment 
approaching up the south bank of the Arkansas.  He fell back twelve miles and met 
Lieutenant Thomas. C. Reynolds’ Chickasaw Regiment.  To slow the Union advance, 
Watie ordered 150 men under Major J.K.P. Campbell to Iron Bridge on the San Bois 
River while he took the remainder of the command to Limestone Prairie. (See Map 
10.)  Campbell reached the bridge just after dawn and began building fortifications.  
The federal force under Colonel S. J. Crawford advanced cautiously, not knowing 
what lay ahead.  With 700 troops from the 2nd Kansas Colored Infantry and the 11th 
United States Colored Infantry, and a section of artillery, Crawford severely 
outnumbered his foe. Upon reaching the river his men found the bridge flooring 
ripped up and crude breastworks assembled on the opposite bank.  The Confederates 
opened fire on the advancing federals.  The Union soldiers quickly formed a line and 
returned fire.  In an effort to force the enemy from its entrenchments, Crawford 
moved his howitzers forward and began shelling the enemy.  After firing a few shots, 
the gun crews got their bearings and began dismantling the fortifications causing the 
Confederates to break and run.  Exhausted by the march, Crawford chose not to 
pursue the routed enemy.299  
With a string of victories on their side, Confederate activity intensified in July.  
While encamped on James Creek in the Choctaw Nation, Cooper learned that General 
Thayer had established a permanent cavalry base near Caldwell’s with additional 
troops at Massard Prairie, just five miles from Fort Smith.  On 26 July, General Gano 
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gathered 500 men from his brigade, detachments from the 2nd Indian Brigade under 
Colonel Folsom, and Wells’ battalion for to strike the federal troops.  Together the 
force exceeded 1,500 mounted men.  Cooper, Watie, and Gano developed a plan to 
trap the federal cavalry and ordered Colonel McCurtain to Backbone Mountain 
southwest of Fort Smith.  Folsom and the Choctaws were to attack the federal camp at 
Caldwell’s and destroy it.  Gano ordered Folsom to fall back along the Fort Towson 
Road under the watchful eye of McCurtain and his troops on Backbone Mountain if 
pursued by the Union cavalry at Massard Prairie or Fort Smith.  Gano’s brigade 
would follow the federals and then attack their rear while Folsom and McCurtain held 
them at mountain.300 
General Cooper arranged for the various units to meet on the Poteau River, 
but before the entire troop arrived Folsom began his march north to arrive at 
Caldwell’s before dawn.  As evening approached the remaining commands met.  
Finding the force smaller than anticipated, General Gano personally took charge to 
lead the attack.  Hoping to strike at daylight, the cavalry moved in two columns along 
roads leading to Massard Prairie.301  General Gano struck just as the sun began to 
break the horizon.  Advancing on two fronts, mounted troopers quickly overwhelmed 
the federal pickets.  The attack caught most of the enemy troops still sleeping, with 
their mounts grazing about half a mile from the camp.  Major David Mefford heard 
the gunfire erupt from his pickets and ordered the federal horses secured.   The Union 
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troops formed between the advancing Confederates and their mounts.  Before the 
ponies could be brought up, the Confederates charged the disorganized federal line 
and stampeded the Union herd.  Lieutenant Jacob Morehead formed his men on the 
right of the camp, while the remainder of the 6th Kansas Cavalry fell in on his left.  As 
the troops moved into position, heavy musket fire erupted throughout their ranks 
temporarily halting the Confederate advance.302   
 Forced to fight dismounted, the Union line began to fall back on the open 
prairie towards Fort Smith.  The federal cavalry again established a line and repulsed 
three enemy charges before being outflanked by overwhelming numbers.  With their 
line crumbling, the remaining federals fled to a house on the prairie while the 
Confederates captured stragglers. As they reached the house, Mefford’s men again 
tried to reform.  The mounted Confederates encircled the structure, forcing Mefford 
to surrender his command before it was destroyed.  Some of the federal troops 
managed to escape the enemy onslaught by hiding in the thick brush.303 
 Confederate troops pillaged Mefford’s camp, taking what they wanted and 
destroying the rest as they fell back.  As the enemy approached, Lieutenant William 
M. Burgoyne placed the regimental records and flag into a wagon and started it to 
Fort Smith.  Quickly overtaken, the Confederates took the pens, ink, and paper before 
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destroying what they could not carry.  “It was payday…I saw a man throw an armful 
of money in the fire.  I asked what did he do that for.  He said it was no good, but 
other boys held what they got”304  After quickly gathering prisoners and supplies, 
Gano retreated south and crossed the Arkansas River before a relief column could 
arrive.  Gano reported enemy losses at fifty killed and wounded and 127 taken 
prisoner including Major Mefford.  In addition the Confederate soldiers captured 
some 200 Sharps carbines, 400 revolvers, camp equipment, and a number of horses.  
Gano lost only seven killed and twenty six wounded.305 
 The Confederate attack at Massard Prairie was a tremendous success.  The 
battle boosted morale and forced the federals on the defensive.  Following the 
engagement, General Gano and his columns fell back to Backbone Mountain and on 
28 July, Watie received orders to hand pick 200 men and officers for a raid across the 
Arkansas River to break up a hay operation on Blackburn’s Prairie.  By mid-summer, 
large numbers of federal troops were assigned to the massive haying operations 
needed to maintain the Union presence at Fort Gibson and Fort Smith.  Watie’s 
troopers rode in surprising the federal soldiers.  They quickly went to work burning 
the hay while they disabled the mowing machine.  Rather than engage the Union 
troops in a set battle the raiders quickly retired from the field.306 
                                                 
 304 William M. Burgoyne, Report, 29 July 1864. and Edward Folsom, Reminiscences of 
Edward Folsom, no date. and U.S. War Department, Records of Events, July and August 1864, 
Supplement OR, Volume 21, Part 2, 298. and Burke, Official Military History of Kansas Regiments in 
the Suppression of the Great Rebellion, 88-89.      
 305 William M. Burgoyne, Report, 29 July 1864. and Samuel B. Maxey, Report, 30 July 1864. 
and Burke, Official Military History of Kansas Regiments in the Suppression of the Great Rebellion, 
88-89. and Robert C. Horn, The Annals of Elder Horn, Early Life in the Southwest, 48. and Rampp and 
Rampp, The Civil War in the Indian Territory, 92-93.   
 306 Douglas H. Cooper, Report, 10 August 1864. and Rampp and Rampp, The Civil War in the 
Indian Territory, 93.  
134 
 
 With morale high from recent victories, General Cooper planned to assault on 
Fort Smith.  On 29 July, Cooper directed Colonel McCurtain to move to Double 
Spring and rendezvous with Gano.  After the two commands united, they marched on 
to James’ Fork near Wall’s Mill.  Watie and his Indians moved to Skullyville Prairie 
and combined with Colonel Folsom’s Choctaws, Well’s battalion, and a section of 
Howell’s battery.  At sunrise on 30 July, both columns marched east.  Gano and 
McCurtain moved towards Massard Prairie while Cooper personally took Watie’s and 
Folsom’s regiments, Wells’ battalion, and Howell’s section and advanced up the main 
road to Fort Smith.307    
 Using his Indian troops to lead the attack, Cooper ordered Watie forward to 
drive in the federal pickets.  While Watie’s troops advanced to engage them, the 
Choctaw Brigade, First Creek Regiment, and Wells’ battalion formed on a hill to the 
north of Fort Smith with the artillery.  Watie separated his column en route, ordering 
Colonel Bell and the 1st Cherokee Regiment to attack up the main road while Colonel 
Adair and the 2nd Cherokee Regiment moved left and charged up the Line Road.  
Suddenly, the federal guards found hundreds of enemy troops charging their camp as 
they prepared dinner.  At the first rifle crack, Lieutenant Levi F. Stewart mounted his 
thirty five cavalry soldiers and started towards the rifle fire.  Within minutes, he ran 
into one of his pickets with a number of Cherokees in chase.  Stewart quickly formed 
a line, but after several shots the Confederates overwhelmed his small detachment, 
forcing him to retire towards Fort Smith.  Following the brief engagement, Watie’s 
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men returned to the federal camp and dined on the abandoned dinner while the ragged 
troops took all of the supplies they could use.308 
 Soon, the shock wore off from the surprise attack and General Thayer’s 
garrison began mounting a defense.  Federal troops filled the roads leading from the 
post, resulting in heavy skirmishing.  Watie reported the enemy advancing in force so 
Cooper ordered Wells’ battalion to the Line Road to cover Watie as his troops moved 
into a new position near the fork in the road at Mill Creek.  General Gano, still at 
Massard Prairie, received orders to cross the prairie and form on Watie.  Quickly, 
Cooper brought up his artillery under Captain John T. Humphrey.  The Confederate 
guns moved into position and opened fire on the enemy at 600 yards.  As Gano’s men 
arrived, a section was thrown forward as flankers.  Supported by the Cherokees, they 
drove the federal troops back under the protection of Fort Smith’s artillery.  As the 
Union troops retreated, Captain Humphreys followed with his light battery and fired 
on the enemy cavalry with devastating accuracy.  Confederate shells rained down on 
the federal troops, killing a number of men and horses.  Finally, Union artillery 
arrived under Captain J.W. Rabb and returned fire.  The federal shells passed 
harmlessly overhead as Humphrey’s men limbered the guns.  Before he could retire, 
one shell exploded among the battery horses, killing three and ripping the leg off one 
of the men.  Another round decapitated one of Gano’s troops.  Quickly cutting the 
dead horses loose, the Confederate battery fell back without additional losses.309 
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 As the sun began to set, Cooper faced a dilemma.  Thick timber screened the 
nearby Union infantry and prevented him from using his cavalry.  Numerous roads 
crisscrossed the area, allowing the federal troops to flank the Confederate line.  
Convinced his position was to precarious to maintain and his soldiers could not drive 
the federals from the post he ordered his forces to fall back on his reserve with 
General Gano’s troops taking up the rear.  Gano’s men were directed to burn the 
federal picket camp as they fell back, while the main force under Cooper moved to 
Cedar Prairie, nine miles southwest of Fort Smith, and encamped.  The federal troops 
retired to the safety of Fort Smith, unaware that the enemy had slipped away in the 
darkness.  Despite heavy fighting, casualties remained light.  General Thayer reported 
Union losses as one killed while Cooper listed one dead and five wounded. Early on 1 
August, Cooper’s army mounted up and continued their march into Indian Territory.  
Watie moved towards Skullyville while the remainder of Cooper’s men retired to 
Buck Creek.  Soon after beginning their march, heavy artillery fire erupted in their 
rear.  Captain Gunter and a few Cherokee amused themselves by firing at the federals 
across the Poteau River.  As soon as the Union guns returned fire, the little party 
moved into a new position, hidden by the brush.  Once the enemy tired and the guns 
went quiet, Gunter would begin again.  For most of the day, Cooper’s troops could 
hear the barrages at Buck Creek, twenty five miles away.310 
 On his return, Captain Gunter reported the federals crossing to the north side 
of the Arkansas River.  Cooper dismissed the report until Watie sent word that he 
heard drums at tattoo, but not reveille.  To investigate, Cooper ordered Watie back to 
Poteau Bottom and sent Gano to Massard Prairie.  Contrary to his own opinion, 
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several witnesses told Cooper that the federals were evacuating Fort Smith.  Just in 
case the rumors turned out to be true, he ordered his supply train up.  By evening, 
scouts advised him that Union refugee families moving into Fort Smith had caused 
the commotion.  Satisfied that the federals remained determined to hold the post, 
Cooper ordered his troops west.  The attack on Fort Smith forced many of the pro-
Union citizens in the area to flee to federal troops for safety.  Even though his men 
fought remarkably well, Cooper remained convinced that he could not force the 
federals out of the post in a set fight without enduring tremendous losses.  His 
exhausted and hungry men fell back across the Arkansas River to rest and 
reorganize.311 
 In mid-August Cooper’s Confederates returned to raiding federal outposts and 
haying operations.  By striking at such logistical operations, a limited number of 
Confederate troopers could tie up large numbers of federal troops and remove the 
forage necessary for maintaining the garrison at Fort Gibson.  On 24 August, 500 of 
Watie’s men struck a large hay operation at Gunter’s Prairie, southwest of Fort Smith 
at daybreak.  About 350 men from the 11th U.S. Colored Infantry were detailed to put 
up hay on the prairie under the watchful eye of some seventy cavalry soldiers.  The 
Confederate troops quickly overwhelmed the pickets and moved on the colored 
infantry.  In the confusion that ensued, some of Watie’s men managed to set the hay 
on fire.  With the fires burning, Watie’s troops retired from the field.  In all, twenty 
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federals lay dead on the prairie.  Losing one soldier in the fight, the Confederate 
troops made off with about 150 horses and mules and fourteen white prisoners.312 
 As Watie’s men attacked the federals at Gunter’s Prairie, Captain W.H. 
Shannon gathered 100 men and moved to intercept a refugee train on Lee’s Creek, 
west of the Wire Road.  Shannon began his journey on 16 August under orders to 
move into Missouri and locate horses.  He scoured the southwest corner of the state 
looking for mounts.  On his return home, he located a refugee train and decided to 
strike.  Shannon divided his men, using all of the soldiers with rifles as infantry and 
all of the troops with revolvers as cavalry.  As the train approached, the infantry fired 
on the advanced skirmishers, rapidly driving the surprised federals into his cavalry 
troops.  Shannon pressed forward with his infantry to set fire to the wagons.  As his 
mounted troops passed, one of his men got excited and ordered the infantry to their 
horses, leaving Shannon with just twelve men.  As the federal soldiers moved into a 
defensive position, the Confederates withdrew leaving ten Union soldiers dead.313   
 Moving south down the Wire Road, Shannon discovered a mail party with 
several wagons had just passed with about sixty federal cavalry.  The next morning 
Shannon overtook the company six miles south of Lee’s Creek.  Dividing his troops 
in two, Shannon took half the men and circled around in front of the federals while 
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Captain Adair moved in behind the wagons.  With his men dismounted, Shannon 
waited for the Union troops to approach.  Seeing the small Confederate force to their 
front, the federal cavalry formed to fight, cursing and yelling. They warned Shannon 
they had him right where they wanted and began the attack.  The federal cavalry 
charged three times, but failed to route Shannon’s men.  Then, to their surprise, 
Captain Adair charged their rear.  In the chaos that ensued, only seven men escaped.  
The Confederate Indians captured two wagons, loaded with mail, tobacco, and 
various weapons.314 
 Union troops continued their massive hay operations in late summer in order 
to provide forage for the cavalry horses and other livestock during the coming winter.  
In Kansas, troops prepared massive stores of supplies for the journey south to feed the 
Union army and supply the growing refugee population surrounding Fort Gibson 
during the coming winter.  Because of difficulties providing adequate supplies, 
Federal troops had subsisted on half rations over the previous winter and spring.  The 
repeated progression of wagon trains down the Texas Road consumed most of the 
available forage, making each journey more difficult.  Lack of rainfall dropped water 
levels across the territory, allowing Confederate raiders to move through the area 
without detection.  These combined factors convinced the enemy commanders to 
believe they were on an equal footing with the federal troops.315   
 Watie and Adair approached Maxey with a plan to raid north of Fort Gibson 
in September and again place pressure on the federal supply line.  For several months 
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Cooper urged Maxey to let his troop’s move north of the Arkansas and strike at the 
federal hay operations and supply trains.  In light of their recent success, Maxey 
wrote to General Kirby Smith for permission to turn the mounted men loose, robbing 
the federal troops of the supplies necessary to remain at Fort Gibson.  The plan was 
approved in late August, just as Confederate scouts alerted General Douglas H. 
Cooper that one of the largest U.S. supply trains ever to be sent to Fort Gibson 
prepared to move south from Fort Scott, Kansas.  Such an opportunity could not be 
overlooked.  In mid August, Maxey wrote to General Smith that his troops were 
ragged, barefoot, and lacked clothing necessary for decency.  The Confederate 
commanders saw their chance for a campaign to raid the hay fields and capture the 
large Union train meant to supply Fort Gibson and the refugees in the surrounding 
area.  Despite formation of a field transportation department in the Trans-Mississippi 
in 1863, Indian Territory found itself short of wagons to transport supplies.  
Confederate held regions lacked the workshops to manufacture and repair wagons, 
forcing Maxey to depend on facilities in Arkansas and Texas.  By August, the 
territory relied on about seventy ox drawn wagons to transport provisions for the 
troops and thousands of refugee Indians from north Texas.  Each trip took between 
twenty and thirty days to transport nine days worth of goods.316 
 Hoping to put pressure on the federal garrison, Gano ordered a large 
Confederate cavalry force up the Grand River above Fort Gibson in September.  
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Watie took 800 men from the 1st Indian Cavalry Brigade and 1,200 men from Gano’s 
Texas Brigade for the task.  Outflanking the Union troops on their move north, the 
Confederate army thundered into the Grand River Valley about fifteen miles north of 
Fort Gibson with 2,000 soldiers supported by six artillery pieces placing Fort Gibson 
at risk.317 
 At Flat Rock, two miles from the Grand River, lay the Federals largest hay 
operation.  Flat Rock Creek was a small tributary of the Grand River that branched 
out onto the open prairie.  There were numerous pools connected by thin threads of 
water along the creek.  The lagoons, lined with undersized willows and brush, 
provided cool refuge for the men working in the hay fields.  One hundred twenty-five 
men, mostly black troops from the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry, and a detachment of 
the 2nd Kansas Cavalry were stationed at the camp under Captain Edgar Barker.  
Barker kept small cavalry patrols out around the clock near his camp to alert his men 
to any danger.318 
 Late in the afternoon of 16 September, one of Barker’s cavalry patrols came 
racing into camp with the horrifying news that hundreds of enemy cavalry were 
riding straight for Flat Rock.  Barker immediately ordered his men in from the hay 
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fields.  The soldiers gathered their muskets and deployed along a ravine in a 
defensive position.  Captain Barker and a small escort rode out to a high ridge to 
observe the approaching enemy and spotted the 2,000 enemy troops advancing 
towards him.  The party quickly rode back to Flat Rock, closely pursued by 
Confederate cavalry.  By the time Barker and his troop dismounted and ran to the 
cover of the ravine, the enemy had approached to within 200 yards.319 
 Watie’s men attacked the Union troops in the ravine from five different 
directions.  Over the course of the next half hour, the severely outnumbered federals 
repulsed charge after charge.  However, it became evident to Captain Barker and his 
command that they would soon be overrun.  As a result, he made a desperate 
decision.  All of the cavalry that could locate their horses were soon gathered.  Barker 
planned to lead them in a desperate charge against the Confederate line, hoping to 
break through and ride to Fort Gibson for reinforcements.  The colored troops and the 
dismounted cavalrymen would be left behind and hopefully they would be able to 
fight their way to the Grand River and the safety of its timber.  In a desperate gamble 
Barker and forty mounted men charged headlong into Watie’s line.  Barker along 
with fifteen men escaped through the chaos and immediately set out for Fort 
Gibson.320 
                                                 
319 Edgar A. Barker, Report 20 September 1864. and Thomas W. Daugherty, Letter, 29 
September 1864, Twenty-Ninth Texas Collection, Harold B. Simpson Research Center, Hillsboro, 
Texas. and R.M. Gano, Report, 23 September 1864 OR, Series 1, Volume 41, Part I, 788. and John K. 
Graton, Letter, 29 September 1864. and James M. Williams, Letter, 16 September 1864. and Yeary, 
Reminiscences of the Boys in Gray, 1861-1865, 46, 733. and Grayson, A Creek Warrior for the 
Confederacy, 95. and Britton, The Civil War on the Border Volume II 1863-1865, 244-245. and 
Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, 438.  and Cottrell, The Civil War in the Indian 
Territory, 98. and Cunningham, General Stand Watie’s Confederate Indians, 153.  
320 Edgar A. Barker, Report, 20 September 1864. and Thomas W. Daugherty, Letter, 29 
September 1864. and R.M. Gano, Report, 23 September 1864. and Britton, The Civil War in the 
Ozarks, 245-246. and Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, 439. and Cottrell, The Civil 
143 
 
 Back in the ravine the soldiers of the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry rallied under 
Lieutenant Thomas B. Sutherland, knowing that no quarter would be given for the 
colored troops.  They prepared to make their stand, each knowing the chances of 
escaping were slim.  The troops determined to make the enemy to take their position 
at a heavy cost.  Putting up tremendous resistance, the Confederates continued to 
repeatedly charge the federals in an attempt to dislodge the defenders.  With each 
attack, the Union casualty list climbed and their supplies dwindled.  With their 
munitions exhausted after two hours of intense fighting, Sutherland gave one last 
order for men to save themselves.  The remaining troops dashed from the ravine and 
ran in every direction as the Confederate artillery opened fire with grapeshot.  Almost 
immediately the slaughter commenced.  “Some of our men discovered a negro [sic] 
hiding in the weeds near the creek and shot and killed him.  At another point one was 
found hid in the weeds, the men proceeded to hunt them out much as sportsmen do 
quail.”321  All across the prairie, Confederate troops searched for the routed troops. 
 Many of the federals that escaped hid in the shallow lagoons amidst the brush 
and lilies with their noses barely emerging from the water.  “Some of the negroes 
[sic] finding they were about to be discovered, would spring up from the brush and 
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cry out, Oh master spare me… and were shot down without mercy.”322  The 
Confederates hunted down every man possible and set fire to an estimated three 
thousand tons of hay as well as a government hay-mowing machine.323  In the wake 
of their destruction, the Confederate cavalry moved north from Flat Rock along the 
Texas Road to intercept the approaching Union supply train, the ultimate goal of their 
expedition.  The convoy consisted of 300 wagons full of supplies valued at over one 
and a half million dollars.  To protect the provisions, Major Henry Hopkins 
commanded a guard of 260 troopers from the 2nd, 6th, and 14th Kansas Cavalry and 
100 troops from the 3rd Indian Home Guard.324  
 While encamped on Horse Creek, Hopkins received a dispatch from Fort 
Gibson informing him that 1500 Confederates were advancing to the north to attack 
the train.  On 17 September, Hopkins moved the supplies and wagons to Cabin Creek 
where a federal stockade had been constructed.  At the post, 310 men from the 2nd and 
3rd Indian Home Guard waited.325  Hopkins arrived at Cabin Creek at noon on 18 
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September.  His effective fighting force now totaled 600 soldiers.  The troops set 
about moving cotton bales into defensive positions around the stockade.  After his 
arrival Hopkins and twenty-five men from the 2nd Kansas set out to scout the train’s 
route south.  Almost immediately, the party discovered a portion of General Gano’s 
force occupying the ravines two miles below the post.  Hopkins fell back to the post 
and quickly ordered the wagons assembled in close order to the rear of the stockade.  
He then strengthened his picket line and formed his men for the ensuing action.  At 
the time Hopkins believed the enemy lacked artillery and numbered less than 800 
men.326 
 By midnight, Watie arrived with the remainder of the troops and artillery.  
Watie and Gano decided to use the light of the night’s full moon to advance on the 
federal position.  Once their troops moved to within a half mile of the Union post, 
they deployed for battle with Gano’s soldiers on the right and Watie’s men on the left. 
The Confederate artillery formed in the center.  At 1:00 a.m., the rebels advanced.  
The federals allowed the enemy to approach within 300 yards before unleashing their 
first volley in the night’s air.  The Confederates returned fire and their increased 
numbers became apparent by the numerous muzzle flashes in the darkness.  Then, to 
Hopkin’s horror the six Confederate cannons thundered to life from the center of the 
enemy line.  “Hundreds of iron balls from the artillery canister rounds tore through 
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the camp tents, timber, and wagons like giant shotgun blasts.”327  Artillery shells were 
sent screaming into the stockade, their explosions causing hundreds of animals to 
stampede and plunge over the 150-foot bluff at the creek, often taking wagons with 
them.  Many of the teamsters and wagon master cut their mules loose and escaped 
north towards Fort Scott, Kansas.  Unrelenting artillery and gunfire continued 
throughout the night, causing many of the federal troops to retreat from the 
engagement, disappearing into the pre-dawn darkness.328 
 As the sun rose, the Confederates moved closer, encircling the remaining 
Union forces and creating a damaging crossfire.  Finally, severely outnumbered and 
subjected to tremendous fire from the Confederate lines, the surviving federal force 
withdrew from the battlefield towards Fort Gibson.  The Confederates burned the 
damaged wagons and slaughtered the injured mules.  Over 130 wagons loaded with 
$1,500,000 worth of clothing, food, ammunition, and accouterments were theirs for 
the taking.  The victorious soldiers also claimed 740 mules.  This one battle took a 
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ragged and half-starved army and transformed it into a well fed, well equipped, and 
virtually uniformed command.329 
 The newly energized Confederates moved south in two columns with their 
spoils.  Gano knew federal reinforcements from Fort Gibson would soon approach.   
That evening at Pryor Creek, they ran headlong into a strong force of federal infantry, 
under Colonel James M. Williams, making a forced march to reinforce Hopkins at 
Cabin Creek.  William’s column consisted of the 1st and 2nd Kansas Colored Infantry, 
the 11th U.S. Colored Infantry Regiment, and one battery of Parrot Rifles. Gano left a 
guard at the train and deployed in a line of battle to meet the federals.  Outnumbered 
two to one, Williams fell back to a strong defensive position.  As soon as the 
approaching enemy came within range, he unleashed his highly accurate artillery 
pieces.  Soon, the Confederate advance fell back.  Gano and Watie responded with 
their own artillery, starting a duel that lasted until dusk fell.  In the darkness, Gano 
deployed his force in a battle line on a high ridge in the open prairie in full view of 
Williams and the federal force.  Under the cover of the night Gano’s men emptied 
100 of the wagons and drove them over the prairie convincing Williams the train was 
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being parked to the rear of the Confederate line while the remainder of the captured 
wagons rushed southwest towards the Verdigris River.330   
 The Confederates built fires along the ridge in the open prairie to give the 
impression they had encamped in force while they slowly disappeared into the 
obscurity of the night.  As dawn broke the next morning, Colonel Williams 
discovered the enemy had slipped away.  In less than two days, his infantry had 
advanced eighty miles and were in no condition to pursue an enemy force that 
outnumbered him two to one.  Gano and Watie crossed the Verdigris River near 
Claremore Mound and headed south.  On 28 September, they arrived at Camp Bragg 
on the south side of the Canadian River.  They had ridden over 400 miles in 14 days 
and crushed the federal army in one of the worst defeats in Indian Territory.   
  This engagement, known as the Second Battle of Cabin Creek changed 
perceptions of the war on both sides.  The Confederate army in Indian Territory was 
not a weak, defeated mix of broken troops; instead the force was still a threat to the 
unionist in the area and the federal army.  Despite the staggering artillery fire and 
intense musketry during the battle, casualties were generally light.  The federal force 
made use of the bluffs near the creek while the Confederates moved along ravines and 
used fallen logs as cover.  Gano’s Texans suffered eight dead and thirty-seven 
wounded.  Watie did not give a complete list of his losses, instead reporting one 
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officer killed, four officers wounded.  Union casualties were reported as seven killed, 
six wounded, with twenty-four missing.  Losses among the civilian teamsters are 
unknown.331 Following their victory at Cabin Creek, Watie sent several messages to 
Cooper advising him of the success.  Cooper ordered Colonel McIntosh north with 
some 400 Creeks to help escort the wagons to Fishertown.  Cooper personally met the 
column as they arrived.332   
 The defeat at Cabin Creek left the federal commanders in awe.  At Fort Smith, 
General Thayer spent the rest of September ordering various troops back and forth 
between the two federal posts, confident the enemy planned to attack him.  On 22 
September, he wrote to General Halleck, “the enemy in my front numbers 8,000 or 
10,000, from 5,000 to 6,000 well mounted, while I have not 200 effective mounted 
men.”333  The repeated request for reinforcements convinced his superiors the 
garrison was about to be overrun.  Thayer became so paranoid that he ordered a halt 
to all supply trains from Fort Scott, fearing a repeat of Cabin Creek, robbing the 
federal troops in Indian Territory of desperately needed supplies.  In late September, 
Thayer ordered Colonel Wattles to send every available wagon loaded with corn from 
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Fort Gibson to Fort Smith.  Thayer proved more than willing to reduce the garrison at 
Fort Gibson, or abandon it, to save the federal post at Fort Smith.334   
 General Sterling Price’s raid into southwestern Missouri only added to 
Thayer’s concerns.  He set to work improving the fortifications at both posts while 
Price rode Missouri with thousands of Confederate cavalry on a large raid.  During 
late September and October, Confederate forces in Indian Territory moved south and 
began preparing for winter.  Even though the Confederate’s attack at Cabin Creek 
secured numerous wagons full of supplies, the troops did not have the guns, 
ammunition, or horses needed to mount a successful campaign that fall.  Unaware of 
the enemy’s condition, Thayer believed Indian Territory was nearing a state of 
emergency.  He wrote to Wattles at Fort Gibson, “It is my intention to hold Fort 
Smith…even if necessary to abandon every other point in the district.”  Thayer went 
on to warn Wattles to keep enough transportation available to move his ammunition 
and commissary stores and authorized conscription of all private teams to move the 
wagons.  Once again federal troops at Fort Gibson prepared to move.335 
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 In mid October, federal forces in Missouri began pushing Price south.  
Halleck attempted to ease Thayer’s concerns, notifying him that Price would be 
closely pursued.  Halleck also sent word that Little Rock would provide supplies to 
the garrison.  Until their arrival, he directed Thayer “collect all supplies you can from 
the surrounding country, taking them from the rebel inhabitants.”  To increase Fort 
Gibson’s stores, Thayer ordered Wattles to obtain all of the local supplies he could.  
He advised Wattles, “I don’t mind what price you pay for it, or what inducements you 
offer to Indians to bring in cattle or corn.  Secure all you can.”  By the end of 
October, Thayer’s constant worries began to ease.  He wrote to Wattles instructing 
him “I have concluded not to have you leave Gibson…You will therefore remain and 
occupy it.”336 
 Slowly, relative quiet spread across Indian Territory as Union and 
Confederate troops settled into defensive positions for winter.  In early November, 
Maxey met with the Grand Council of the Allied Tribes.  For three hours he reviewed 
the highlights and successes of his administration during the previous months of the 
war.  By resolution the council continued to fully endorse Maxey’s administration.  
From there, Maxey traveled to Fort Washita and inspected the post and found the 
garrison in good sprits and well supplied.   In a letter, Maxey went on to advise that 
lack of forage would hamper troop movements within the territory.  Indian Territory 
remained calm until early November.337   
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 Federal forces under Curtis, Blunt, and Rosecrans defeated Price in Missouri 
at the Battle of Big Blue on 21 October and then again at Westport on 23 October.  
Price turned south to avoid complete destruction.  General Price crossed into Indian 
Territory on 7 November As federal troops pushed him south.  His soldiers entered 
Indian Territory near starvation with their supplies and provisions depleted.  Price 
headed to Boggy Depot to re-supply before continuing his march to Texas.  Cooper 
tried to supply the men as best he could before they continued their march.  Despite 
their great victories throughout the year, the ragged, starving, and defeated soldiers 
reminded the Cooper and Maxey that the federals remained in control in the north.  
Price crossed the Red River, reaching Bonham, Texas, on 2 December.338     
 Despite the successful Confederate resurgence in Indian Territory, defeat was 
inevitable.   Sterling Price’s army moved south of the Red River following their 
devastating defeat in Missouri, Robert E. Lee’s troops were under siege at Petersburg, 
William Tecumseh Sherman had marched to the sea and taken Savannah, and John 
Bell Hood’s army had been destroyed at Nashville.339  In early 1865, both the Union 
and Confederates reorganized their commands.  Thayer was transferred from Fort 
Smith, replaced by Cyrus Bussey, and General Steele relinquished command of the 
department to General J.J. Reynolds.  Colonel Phillips returned to command troops at 
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Fort Gibson.  To the south, General Maxey was transferred to Texas, finally placing 
Cooper in command of the district of Indian Territory.340     
 Watie replaced Cooper as division commander and moved the Indian troops to 
Boggy Depot, where they remained until mustered out of service after the end of the 
war.  Throughout the spring Confederate forces deserted in droves all over the Trans-
Mississippi.  All across the region commanders reported their troops would not fight.  
In May, Cooper asked his officers for assistance to help prevent mayhem stating, 
“there is more danger of anarchy from lawless bands of armed men in case the war is 
stopped than there is now from the public enemy.”  He requested the civil authorities 
give assistance by advising the warriors “to stand to their colors, obey orders, refrain 
from plunder and protect their country until the storm is over…”  For Cooper, the war 
was over.  He began concentrating troops at Boggy Depot.  Once again he called 
upon his superiors to send white troops to Indian Territory; however, now he sought 
the troops to protect public property and enable him to preserve order.341 
 In late May, Cooper recommended the leaders of the Confederate Indians call 
a meeting of the Grand Council.  He recognized each tribe should seek terms of 
surrender as independent entities.  When E. Kirby Smith surrendered the Trans-
Mississippi Department on 26 May, Cooper relinquished his white troops.  On 10 
June, the tribal leaders met and agreed to surrender to the United States government.  
Colonel Asa C. Matthews and Adjutant William H. Vance arrived at Doaksville, 
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Choctaw Nation, to receive the surrender of the Indian Tribes.  The Choctaw tribe 
capitulated on 19 June, followed by Watie and his Cherokees on 23 June, ending the 
Civil War in the Indian Territory.  The end came quietly as officers waited their turn 
to surrender and moved to nearby federal garrisons to be paroled.  From there, the 
troops returned home to begin their life after four years of war.342 
 Unlike the two previous years of conflict, 1864 became the year of 
great raids.  In February, Union troops marched into the heart of the Choctaw Nation; 
however, Phillips was unable to deliver a decisive blow and fell back in the face of 
mounting resistance.  The death and destruction that was left in his wake reinforced 
the resolve of the southern sympathizers and cost him the majority of serviceable 
cavalry mounts.  In addition, both the sides found themselves burdened by thousands 
of refugees, forced from their farms by the prospect of enemy raids and starvation.  
Later in the year Confederate raids targeted communication, wagon trains, detached 
troops in hay camps, and lightly defended civilian populations and offered Generals 
Cooper and Maxey alternatives to direct confrontation.  In September, Confederate 
forces seized a federal supply train valued at more than $1,500,000 and transformed 
their army into a well fed and well equipped army.   
 The Confederate offensive during the summer and fall 1864 may have failed 
to recapture Fort Gibson and Fort Smith but it did succeed in holding the garrisons in 
check.  The campaign inflicted numerous casualties on the enemy, denied military 
resources to the federal commanders, and diverted Union attention sufficiently to 
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prevent large scale operation into the Choctaw or Chickasaw nations after Phillips’ 
incursion in February.  Confederate activities destroyed Phillips’ and Thayer’s ability 
to maintain effective cavalry troops.  Slowly, relative quiet spread across the Indian 
Territory as Union and Confederate troops settled into defensive positions for the 
upcoming winter.  In spite of the successful Confederate resurgence in Indian 
Territory, defeat was inevitable.  Throughout spring 1865, Confederate forces 
deserted in droves across the Trans-Mississippi and commanders reported their troops 
would not fight.  Finally, the Trans-Mississippi Department surrendered on 26 May 
followed by the Choctaws and Cherokees in June.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 For four years, the Civil War devastated Indian Territory while tribes suffered 
significant losses for their part in America’s war.  At the outset of hostilities, federal 
troops abandoned Indian Territory leaving the various tribes without their promised 
government protection.  Bloodshed began in 1861 as Confederate troops drove pro-
Union Indians north to Kansas.  For the next four years, armies crossed the territory, 
particularly the Cherokee Nation, in an effort to dominate the region.  The war 
stripped the land of livestock while farms went untended.  By the end of hostilities, 
thirty three percent of the population was widowed, sixteen percent of the children 
were fatherless, and fourteen percent of children were orphans.  Many depended on 
the generosity of others for mere survival.343  By the end of the war, the Confederacy 
used over 10,000 Native Americans in their army whiled federal forces recruited 
some 5,000.344  
 When warfare broke out across the nation in 1861, the United States withdrew 
federal forces from Indian Territory, citing the inability to supply such garrisons.  
Hoping to use the area as a buffer between pro-Union Kansas and supply stores in 
Texas and Arkansas the Confederacy sought to establish alliances with these tribes 
citing cultural, economic, and geographic ties to the Indian Nations.  The growth and 
development throughout Indian Territory mimicked that of the South, with farming, 
livestock production, and slave-driven agriculture.  Many of the progressive Indians 
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within the territory imitated southern aristocracy.  Abandoned by the Union forces 
and refused annuity payments, the Choctaw Nation led the way in establishing 
treaties with the new government in Richmond and the Confederate victory at 
Wilson’s Creek, Missouri, in August 1861, inspired tribal governments to repudiate 
alliances with the United States.  However, the Confederate cause was not 
unanimous, leaving many loyal natives with little choice but to flee to Kansas.  
Devastated en route by veteran Texas cavalry, Opothleyaholo and his band of 
Unionists eventually crossed the border into Kansas destitute and near starvation, 
prompting attention from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
 Despite battlefield success during the first year of the war the Confederate 
Trans-Mississippi region suffered several drawbacks.  The region was almost entirely 
agrarian with limited industrial infrastructure.  Compared to the rest of the south the 
area lacked any semblance of a substantial transportation network forcing the Trans-
Mississippi Department to rely on river systems and wagons to move the bulk of its 
goods.345  When Confederate states occupied federal arsenals at the outbreak of the 
war they confiscated all equipment and weapons; however, a majority of these 
firearms proved obsolete and the state governments located few serviceable, outdated, 
cannon.  By the end of the year the Ordnance Bureau began shipping field pieces west 
and in February several guns arrived in Indian Territory for the upcoming spring 
offensive; however, federal troops would maintain superiority in artillery throughout 
the conflict.346  
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During spring 1862, both sides increased military activity.  Once in Kansas, 
the destitute natives overwhelmed the Southern Superintendency and military 
quartermasters at Fort Scott with demands for provisions prompting a expedition to 
return the refugees.  The plan called for a military invasion and occupation of Fort 
Gibson, to be supplied from the quartermaster department at Fort Scott.  Once in 
Indian Territory, federal troops would receive supplies from Fort Scott and gather 
additional commissary goods from the recently returned civilians as they put in crops.  
From the beginning, the Indian Expedition, under the command of Colonel William 
Weer, moved rapidly and Union battlefield victories destabilized Confederate 
alliances with the tribes in Indian Territory, particularly the Cherokee.  However, the 
failure to supply the troops, and weaknesses in the federal command, culminated in a 
mutiny and Weer’s arrest, reassuring pro-Confederate tribal governments that Union 
troops could not support themselves within the borders of Indian Territory. 
The year 1863 proved to be a turning point for the Civil War in the Indian 
Territory.  Colonel William A. Phillips successfully invaded Indian Territory and 
opened the door for General James G. Blunt’s occupation of Fort Smith.  Despite 
numerous Confederate attempts, the supply line from Fort Scott remained open, 
providing the garrison’s with provisions.  However, failure to stabilize the area 
surrounding the post increased the refugee population, adding to the burden of 
providing adequate supply.  Confederate losses throughout the year used up valuable 
and irreplaceable supplies.  In July, federal troops took Vicksburg and Port Hudson, 
along with control of the Mississippi River, isolating the Trans-Mississippi 
Department from the rest of the Confederacy.  Late in the year, an overwhelming 
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defeat at Baxter Springs reminded federal soldiers that enemy troops could 
successfully attack above the Arkansas River.  Frustrated by his experience with other 
officers and the poor condition of troops in Indian Territory, Confederate General 
Frederick Steele requested he be relieved of his command.  On 11 December he was 
dismissed and General Samuel B. Maxey assumed command of Indian Territory.  
Maxey decried the conditions of Indian Territory to his superiors, particularly the lack 
of supplies, and began reorganizing his army in preparation for spring offensives.  
Military provisions brought into the Trans-Mississippi were not evenly distributed 
throughout the department and the majority of goods that made it through the 
blockade, or arrived via Mexico, were distributed to the army in Texas.347 
Slowly, winter returned to Indian Territory.  Demoralized Confederate troops 
lacked enough equipment to be considered effective soldiers and remained south of 
the Arkansas River.  Raids became the prominent form of attack, most led by Colonel 
Stand Watie and the Cherokee Mounted Rifles.  Frequent incursions resulted in open 
hostility between federal forces and the civilian population as both army’s 
requisitioned livestock and crops from local inhabitants.  Many families found 
themselves without food as the year closed.  By the end 1863, some 18,000 pro-
southern Indians fled south into the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in search of 
assistance.  General Maxey spent much of early 1864 reorganizing the units and 
command structure in the territory and constantly grumbled to his superior General E. 
Kirby Smith that his troops lacked competent leaders, suffered from a lack of 
discipline, and were without even basic military supplies.   
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Unlike the two previous years of conflict, 1864 became the year of great raids.  
In February, Union troops marched into the heart of the Choctaw Nation.  The ability 
of enemy troops to advance in the face of Confederate opposition forced some tribal 
members to waiver in allegiance to the government in Richmond especially after the 
annuity payments failed to arrive early in the year.  However, Phillips was unable to 
deliver a decisive blow, and fell back in the face of mounting resistance.  The death 
and destruction that was left in his wake only served to reinforce the resolve of the 
southern sympathizers and cost him the majority of serviceable cavalry mounts.   
In addition, both the sides found themselves burdened by thousands of 
refugees, forced from their farms by the prospect of enemy raids and starvation.  Soon 
supply shortages began to affect Union troops as well.  Mules became so scarce in the 
vicinity of Fort Gibson that Phillips urged the employment of ox trains.  Blunt 
became so desperate for the animals that he authorized payment of $175 for each 
mule.  Desperate for the materials necessary to continue the war, Union forces turned 
to oxen to carry supplies south from Fort Scott.   
Later in the year Confederate raids targeted communication, wagon trains, 
detached troops in hay camps or advanced bases, and lightly defended civilian 
populations and offered Generals Cooper and Maxey alternatives to direct 
confrontation. The Confederate advance showed one of the developing weaknesses in 
the federal garrisons; Phillips’ command lacked horses to mount his men.  He 
estimated he needed 1,000 ponies for his troops.  The situation grew so desperate that 
Phillips had to borrow or hire horses for scouting while he dispatched infantry to hunt 
down the mounted Confederate raiders.   
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In September, Confederate forces seized a federal supply train valued at more 
than $1,500,000 in one of their greatest victories.  The triumphant soldiers also 
claimed 740 mules, impeding the federal’s ability to transport materials to Fort 
Gibson.  This one battle took the ragged and half-starved Confederates and 
transformed it into a well fed, well equipped, and virtually uniformed army.  The 
defeat also left the federal commanders in awe.  At Fort Smith, General John M. 
Thayer spent the rest of September ordering various troops back and forth between 
the two federal posts, confident he the enemy planned to attack him.  He eventually 
became so paranoid he ordered a halt to all wagon trains, robbing the federal troops in 
Indian Territory of desperately needed supplies.   
 The Confederate offensive during the summer and fall 1864 may have failed 
to recapture Fort Gibson and Fort Smith but it did succeed in holding the garrisons in 
check.  The campaign inflicted numerous casualties on the enemy, denied military 
resources to the federal commanders, and diverted Union attention sufficiently to 
prevent large scale operation into the Choctaw or Chickasaw nations after Phillips’ 
incursion in February.  Confederate activities destroyed Phillips’ and Thayer’s ability 
to maintain effective cavalry troops.   
Slowly, relative quiet spread across the Indian Territory as Union and 
Confederate troops settled into defensive positions for the upcoming winter.  In spite 
of the successful Confederate resurgence in Indian Territory, defeat was inevitable.  
In early 1865, both the Union and Confederate commands were again reorganized.  
Throughout the spring, Confederate forces deserted in droves across the Trans-
Mississippi and commanders reported their troops would not fight. 
162 
 
Finally, General Edmund Kirby Smith ordered the Trans-Mississippi Department to 
lay down arms on 26 May.  On 10 June, the tribal governments agreed to surrender to 
the United States.  The Choctaws capitulated on 19 June followed by Watie and his 
Cherokees on 23 June, ending the Civil War in Indian Territory.  The end came 
quietly as officers moved to nearby federal garrisons and waited their turn to 
surrender.  From there, the troops returned home to begin their life again. 
 Despite Confederate efforts throughout the war, federal troops continued to 
receive supplies from Fort Scott down the Texas Road, ensuring their occupation at 
Fort Gibson and Fort Smith would hold firm.  Confederate forces continued to fight 
until all hope was lost.  Other than Phillips’ expedition into the Choctaw Nation in 
1864, federal troops remained north of the Arkansas River, occupied with supplying 
themselves.  All along the Red River Valley and North Texas, farmers continued to 
provide some subsistence to the Confederate troops; however, a lack of military 
supplies kept commanders from driving the federals from Indian Territory.   
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